feat: price med-arb by phase, attest the conflicts undertaking, and answer the first real spam

Pouya's rulings of 2026-09-03 (the last two D20 findings) and 2026-09-04 (the
spam observation and four mitigations), in one change set.

D20 finding 10 — med-arb is billed BY PHASE, each phase at the rates already
published, so /fees/'s "Every figure is on this page" is true as written rather
than narrowed. FEES.medArb is the single source; docs/07 §Med-arb carries the
rule INTERIM against R5, and R5 now carries it back, because a derived price
moves silently when a rate moves.

D20 finding 13 — conduct undertaking (g), attested 2026-09-03, published as his
wording verbatim on /legal/privacy/ and /contact/. The clause that raised the
finding promised to DISCLOSE a conflicts check's outcome, which the attestation
does not cover; it is struck. D20 now partitions 17 fixed / 2 refuted / 1 owed.

Spam, 2026-09-04 — recorded in docs/05 §Observed abuse with the date and
signature. A second honeypot (a decoy checkbox, own class, `hidden`, a label
that tells a human not to tick it) and scoring that LABELS and never rejects:
nothing is dropped, nothing new is stored, and only the operator notification
changes. Q65 opens the WAF cost call.

The timing floor could not be built: there is no timing check and never has
been. docs/05 carries it struck, and every mechanism that would give a real
per-visitor clock breaks zero-JS, handler-and-form-only, or D1. Q66.

configure.mjs gains section 5 — a custom origin request policy forwarding
CloudFront-Viewer-Address on /api/*. Written, dry-run against the live
distribution, NOT applied. It reads the handler's own header reads and refuses
to run if the whitelist omits one.

And reading the live account to do it found four AGENTS.md §7 rows saying the
intake backend was undeployed, two days after it went live — corrected against
get-function-configuration, get-routes, get-stage, get-policy and the deployed
zip, which was downloaded and read.

Review: adversarial-reviewer only (claims-auditor is D20's cutover pass and has
run). Round 1 five lenses, 56 findings, 7 blocking, 4 refuted by an independent
refuter; round 2 four lenses, 36 findings, 33 of them defects in round 1's own
repairs. Stopped at two per D19.

Gates, exit status read for each: check 0 · build 0 (23 pages) · check:claims 0
· check:intake 0 · og:proof 0 · lint 0 · spam-score.test 39/39 with 6/6 mutations
killed · router.test 30/30 · minifier grep 1 (clean) · lighthouse 0, no category
below 95 · configure.mjs dry run 0, nothing written.

Nothing deployed and nothing applied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5

backend/intake/fields.mjs

@@ -115,3 +115,25 @@ export const FIELDS = [
  * stops filling the field. `check:intake` asserts it is absent from `FIELDS`.
  */
 export const HONEYPOT = 'company_website';
+
+/**
+ * The SECOND honeypot — a decoy checkbox that must arrive ABSENT. Also not in
+ * `FIELDS`, for the same reason, and `check:intake` asserts that too.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **DIFFERENT TRAP, NOT A SECOND COPY.** `HONEYPOT` catches a bot that fills
+ * every text input; this catches one that sets every control it enumerates.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **IT IS PROBABLY INERT AGAINST THE 2026-09-04 PAIR, AND THE COMMENT HERE
+ * SAID THE OPPOSITE FOR ONE ROUND.** They left `HONEYPOT` empty, so they skip
+ * hidden fields — and a bot that skips a hidden text input skips a hidden
+ * checkbox. `src/data/intake.ts` carries the full argument; this is defence in
+ * depth against a different class, not a counter to the observed one.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **UNCHECKED SENDS NOTHING, so absence is the pass — and so is an empty
+ * value, because the handler tests for a non-empty one rather than for mere
+ * presence.** See
+ * `src/data/intake.ts` for the full reasoning; the two files state it separately
+ * because they are separately deployed and `check:intake` is what keeps the
+ * NAMES in step, not the comments.
+ */
+export const DECOY_CHECKBOX = 'updates_optin';