feat: cut /legal/privacy/ §Who can see it to four plain statements; name SML Company Ltd on the consent; close Q64 moot

Two rulings from Pouya, 2026-09-02.

(1) The section stays generic — "it over-explains technical mechanics that
belong in the evidence file, not in front of an inquirer." Deleted: the
measurement paragraph, the root-credential sentence, the SSO/federated-login
enumeration, the resource-policy clause, the "company that runs a database"
aside, the deploy-credential sentence and the three-copies summary. All of it
stays true and stays measured in AGENTS.md §7 and the evidence file, which now
maps each shipped sentence to what it rests on.

(2) The consent string names the corporation: "I consent to SML Company Ltd
storing and using the information in this form…". docs/05 §Consent text moves
with it, proven byte-identical. Two new §4 rows carry the attestations the copy
rests on.

(3) The §Who can see it approval closes via the page read-through, which is now
blocker 2 in docs/06's callout rather than a checklist line.

Q64 closes MOOT — the paragraph it was about was deleted, so it gates nothing.
The underlying gap is unchanged: §7 records root as held by Pouya, not held only
by Pouya, and nothing about root custody may be published without asking again.

Two sentences were added back under review: the shared-account disclosure, to
§Where it is stored (a storage disclosure, never named in the ruling — without
it no page said the intake sits in a shared account), and one naming SML Company
Ltd in the policy, because a consent naming a company the linked policy never
mentions is an accountability gap.

adversarial-reviewer, two rounds, 14 findings, all resolved, none declined;
nine of round 2's ten were defects in round 1's own repairs. claims-auditor
correctly deferred to cutover per D20.

Gates, exit status read: check 0 · build 0 (23 pages) · check:claims 0
(12 patterns, 33 approved strings) · check:intake 0 · og:proof 0 · lint 0 ·
lighthouse 0, worst of 23 99/100/100/100. Tripwire proven both ways — exit 0 on
the revised page, exit 1 with 5 matches on the bd282aa bytes. Regex untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
This commit is contained in:
Pouya Lajevardi
2026-09-02 12:03:47 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 99889a3491
commit 4735989f0b
7 changed files with 602 additions and 259 deletions
+16 -17
View File
@@ -415,23 +415,22 @@ const FIXTURES = {
the wording a correction is likely to reach for. Where a fixture is one of
those, the comment beside it says so. */
mustNotMatch: [
/* NEGATIVE FIXTURES FOR `sole-administrator-q62`. The first SEVEN are LIVE
PAGE COPY, verbatim from the corrected `/legal/privacy/` —
which is the fixture that matters, because Q62's ruling required this
pattern to be proven silent on the true sentence as well as loud on the
false one. THEY MUST BE RE-SYNCED WHENEVER THAT COPY CHANGES — this set
has now gone stale twice, once within the hour of being written and again
when Pouya's 2026-09-02 ruling took the human headcount off the page. The
rest are near misses on the same subject: the pattern is anchored on five
strings that reached `dist/`, not on the ideas in them, so a truthful
sentence about administrative access must pass. */
"The account's administrators can — me, and the small number of people who administer it with me. The table sits in an Amazon Web Services account that also runs systems unrelated to this practice, and administrative access to that account carries the ability to read the table. That is who can read the stored record; who reads the notification email is a separate question, answered in the last paragraph of this section.",
'The access itself is measured rather than assumed: every user and every role in the account was simulated against this table, and every identity that comes back able to read it is reachable only by those administrators.',
"The account's root credential — the one path no policy constrains — has no programmatic key, and I hold it.",
'Two things in the system are narrower than I am, and they are worth stating because they are the part you cannot check for yourself.',
/* The replacement summary, which must not trip the third-surface alternative. */
"There are therefore three copies of what you send. The record in the table, which the account's administrators can read.",
"The notification, which lands in the practice's mailbox — read by me and by administrative staff — on Google Workspace, so Google holds a copy of whatever you sent me.",
/* NEGATIVE FIXTURES FOR `sole-administrator-q62`. The first FIVE are LIVE
PAGE COPY, verbatim from the corrected `/legal/privacy/` — which is the
fixture that matters, because Q62's ruling required this pattern to be
proven silent on the true sentence as well as loud on the false one.
RE-SYNC THEM WHENEVER THAT COPY CHANGES. ⚠️ **A SENTENCE THAT LEAVES THE
PAGE LEAVES THIS LIST — it is not kept as a near miss.** Struck copy in a
list captioned "what this site legitimately publishes" is an invitation to
restore it. The rest below ARE near misses on the same subject: the
pattern is anchored on five strings that reached `dist/`, not on the ideas
in them, so a truthful sentence about administrative access must pass.
Rendered as text, without the `<strong>` wrappers — what is proven is that
the PATTERN is silent on the words. */
'The record in the table: me, and the small number of people who administer the account it sits in with me.',
'The system that receives what you send can only add a record — it cannot read back what is stored.',
"The notification goes to the practice's mailbox, which is read by me and by administrative staff and is hosted on Google Workspace — so Google holds a copy of whatever you send me.",
'The confirmation that went to you sits with whoever runs your email. That copy is in your hands rather than mine.',
'No one else is sent it. There is no CRM, no mailing list and no analytics on the submission.',
'The table is reachable by the function that writes to it.',
'Two accounts hold administrative access to the AWS account, and the function that writes to the table cannot read it.',