fix: resolve adversarial review round 2 — 9 findings, 8 of them in round 1's fixes

D19 caps the loop at two rounds, and this is what the second round is for.

BLOCKING. Round 1 made NO_RETAINER_NOTICE a requireEnv and added it to no
document, while the fix's own comment claimed docs/06 named it. The deployment
list said five variables for a handler that needs six, so an operator following
the cutover checklist would have deployed a function that throws at cold start
on every invocation — 5xx from API Gateway, every inquiry lost from the moment
/api/* was wired, loud in CloudWatch and silent to Pouya. docs/05 and docs/06
now name all six, and the comment that asserted the documentation existed is
corrected rather than deleted.

The intake route check added in round 1 could not fail: curl -w already prints
000 on a failed transfer, so `|| echo 000` double-appended and the failure arm
was unreachable, and the pass arm accepted anything that was not literally 404 —
including the 403 CloudFront returns when the /api/* behaviour is missing, which
is the one distinction the check exists to draw. It now sends the correct Origin
and asserts a positive: 303 to /contact/could-not-send/, which the handler
returns before any DynamoDB write or email. Probed on refused/501/403/303; the
old version passed the first three. Fixed in both deploy paths.

Removing priceRange left three statements saying it was present or pending, one
of them the stated reason /fees/ emits no Offer node. Deleting
overtimeStartsAfterSessionHours left AGENTS.md §9 naming it and left Q59
recorded as open. The Google-as-processor fix was applied to the privacy
policy's "Where it is stored" and not to "Who can see it", which still read
"Nobody else has access".

And the variable removal was justified with a path-scoped git grep — which also
cannot see untracked files. The unscoped sweep found docs/06's variable table,
the OIDC example, and .env.example still carrying them; .env.example also
restates the execute-api hostname, falsifying a live claim in intake.ts that has
been corrected. That file is not edited here: this environment denies read
access to it, and nothing may edit a file it cannot read. It is in the batched
list.

Also: og:image:alt was the page title rather than the card's headline on 20
pages; og-card.ts documented the wrong path and invocation for the contact
sheet; deploy-local.sh still said Q22's deploy credential "does NOT yet exist";
and the round-1 fix comments were trimmed per D19, though the ratio held at 0.44.

Round 2 also confirmed the round-1 fixes by measurement: all 56 .btn instances
across 22 pages, the consent checkbox's computed accessible name, the radio
labels hit-tested at 44px, and og:proof exercised against synthetic article
pages in a sandbox.

Verified: check/build/check:claims/og:proof/check:intake/lint/bio:pdf all exit 0
on a clean build; 22 pages; Lighthouse 99-100 / 100 / 100 / 100, CLS 0.000.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5

scripts/deploy-local.sh

@@ -36,8 +36,12 @@
 # PUBLIC_BOOKING_URL went with it: `CONTACT.bookingUrl` is `null` in source while
 # R6 keeps booking parked, and nothing read that variable either.
 #
-# Credentials: use the scoped deploy user. AGENTS.md Q22 records that it does
-# NOT yet exist. NEVER run this as user/pouya — see AGENTS.md §10.
+# Credentials: use the scoped deploy user, `adr-sml-deploy`. AGENTS.md §7 records
+# it as PROVISIONED, with one inline policy verified by nine
+# simulate-principal-policy checks; Q22 closed on execution 2026-08-28.
+# (This comment said it "does NOT yet exist" for three days after it did —
+# found by `adversarial-reviewer` round 2.)
+# NEVER run this as user/pouya — see AGENTS.md §10.
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -123,27 +127,52 @@ aws cloudfront create-invalidation \
 # deploy that succeeds while the form posts into a 404 is the failure the old
 # guard was reaching for and could not see.
 #
-# 404 means not routed. 403 means routed and REFUSED, which is the correct answer
-# to this request: the handler checks the Origin header and this curl sends none,
-# so it is rejected before any DynamoDB write or any email. That makes 403 a pass
-# and is why this probe is safe to run against production.
+# ⚠️ IT ASSERTS A POSITIVE, AND THE FIRST VERSION ASSERTED THE ABSENCE OF ONE
+# CODE. That version was `code=$(curl ... || echo 000)` and passed on anything
+# that was not literally 404. Two defects, both measured by
+# `adversarial-reviewer` round 2:
+#
+#   - `curl -w '%{http_code}'` ALREADY prints 000 on a failed transfer, so
+#     `|| echo 000` double-appended and $code became `000000` — the 000 arm was
+#     unreachable and a connection failure reported success.
+#   - If the /api/* behaviour is MISSING, the POST falls through to the S3
+#     default behaviour and CloudFront answers 403 for a disallowed method —
+#     indistinguishable from the handler's Origin refusal, which is the one
+#     distinction the check exists to draw. It also passed on a real 501.
+#
+# So it now sends the correct Origin and asserts the answer it should get:
+# the handler validates, finds an empty submission, and redirects 303 to
+# /contact/could-not-send/. That happens BEFORE any DynamoDB write and before
+# any email, which is what makes the probe safe against production.
 echo "==> Intake route check"
 code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
   --max-time 15 \
+  -H "Origin: https://adr.smlcompany.ca" \
   -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
   --data 'deploy-route-probe=1' \
-  "https://adr.smlcompany.ca/api/intake" || echo 000)
-case "$code" in
-  404|000)
-    echo >&2
-    echo "WARNING: POST /api/intake returned $code." >&2
-    echo "The contact form posts there. 404 means the CloudFront /api/* behaviour" >&2
-    echo "is missing; 000 means the request did not complete. The site is" >&2
-    echo "deployed and the form is not wired — see docs/06's cutover checklist." >&2
-    ;;
-  *)
-    echo "    POST /api/intake -> $code (routed; 403 is the Origin check refusing a probe)"
-    ;;
-esac
+  "https://adr.smlcompany.ca/api/intake")
+rc=$?
+location=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{redirect_url}' -X POST \
+  --max-time 15 \
+  -H "Origin: https://adr.smlcompany.ca" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
+  --data 'deploy-route-probe=1' \
+  "https://adr.smlcompany.ca/api/intake" 2>/dev/null || true)
+if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo >&2
+  echo "WARNING: the POST to /api/intake did not complete (curl exit $rc)." >&2
+  echo "The contact form posts there. The site is deployed and the form is" >&2
+  echo "unverified — see docs/06-deployment.md's cutover checklist." >&2
+elif [ "$code" = "303" ] && case "$location" in *"/contact/could-not-send/") true;; *) false;; esac; then
+  echo "    POST /api/intake -> 303 -> $location (routed, validating, rejecting an empty probe)"
+else
+  echo >&2
+  echo "WARNING: POST /api/intake returned $code (expected 303 to" >&2
+  echo "/contact/could-not-send/); redirect was '${location:-none}'." >&2
+  echo "404 means the CloudFront /api/* behaviour is missing. 403 can mean the" >&2
+  echo "same thing — CloudFront rejecting a method the default behaviour does" >&2
+  echo "not allow — or the handler refusing the Origin. Either way the form is" >&2
+  echo "not verified working. See docs/06-deployment.md's cutover checklist." >&2
+fi
 
 echo "==> Deployed to https://adr.smlcompany.ca ($(git rev-parse --short HEAD))"