fix: resolve adversarial review round 2 — 9 findings, 8 of them in round 1's fixes

D19 caps the loop at two rounds, and this is what the second round is for.

BLOCKING. Round 1 made NO_RETAINER_NOTICE a requireEnv and added it to no
document, while the fix's own comment claimed docs/06 named it. The deployment
list said five variables for a handler that needs six, so an operator following
the cutover checklist would have deployed a function that throws at cold start
on every invocation — 5xx from API Gateway, every inquiry lost from the moment
/api/* was wired, loud in CloudWatch and silent to Pouya. docs/05 and docs/06
now name all six, and the comment that asserted the documentation existed is
corrected rather than deleted.

The intake route check added in round 1 could not fail: curl -w already prints
000 on a failed transfer, so `|| echo 000` double-appended and the failure arm
was unreachable, and the pass arm accepted anything that was not literally 404 —
including the 403 CloudFront returns when the /api/* behaviour is missing, which
is the one distinction the check exists to draw. It now sends the correct Origin
and asserts a positive: 303 to /contact/could-not-send/, which the handler
returns before any DynamoDB write or email. Probed on refused/501/403/303; the
old version passed the first three. Fixed in both deploy paths.

Removing priceRange left three statements saying it was present or pending, one
of them the stated reason /fees/ emits no Offer node. Deleting
overtimeStartsAfterSessionHours left AGENTS.md §9 naming it and left Q59
recorded as open. The Google-as-processor fix was applied to the privacy
policy's "Where it is stored" and not to "Who can see it", which still read
"Nobody else has access".

And the variable removal was justified with a path-scoped git grep — which also
cannot see untracked files. The unscoped sweep found docs/06's variable table,
the OIDC example, and .env.example still carrying them; .env.example also
restates the execute-api hostname, falsifying a live claim in intake.ts that has
been corrected. That file is not edited here: this environment denies read
access to it, and nothing may edit a file it cannot read. It is in the batched
list.

Also: og:image:alt was the page title rather than the card's headline on 20
pages; og-card.ts documented the wrong path and invocation for the contact
sheet; deploy-local.sh still said Q22's deploy credential "does NOT yet exist";
and the round-1 fix comments were trimmed per D19, though the ratio held at 0.44.

Round 2 also confirmed the round-1 fixes by measurement: all 56 .btn instances
across 22 pages, the consent checkbox's computed accessible name, the radio
labels hit-tested at 44px, and og:proof exercised against synthetic article
pages in a sandbox.

Verified: check/build/check:claims/og:proof/check:intake/lint/bio:pdf all exit 0
on a clean build; 22 pages; Lighthouse 99-100 / 100 / 100 / 100, CLS 0.000.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5

src/pages/legal/privacy.astro

@@ -219,10 +219,27 @@ const COLLECTED = INTAKE_FIELDS.map((field) => field.label);
         </p>
 
         <h2>Who can see it</h2>
+        {
+          /* ⚠️ THIS SAID "Nobody else has access" AND THE SECTION TWO ABOVE HAD
+            JUST NAMED GOOGLE. The Google correction was applied to §Where it is
+            stored and not swept into the section actually headed with the
+            question a reader asks — so the page answered "who can see the names
+            of the opposing parties I gave you?" with *nobody else* under that
+            heading and *Google* under a different one. Fixing one section and
+            not the section that answers the same question is the sweep failure
+            `CLAUDE.md` describes. Found by `adversarial-reviewer` round 2. */
+        }
         <p>
           I can. The table is reachable by the function that writes to it and by
-          one administrative account, which is mine. Nobody else has access, and
-          there is no team, no assistant and no external administrator.
+          one administrative account, which is mine — nobody else has access to
+          the table. There is no team, no assistant and no external
+          administrator.
+        </p>
+        <p>
+          The one other place a copy exists is the notification email, which
+          sits in the Google Workspace mailbox named above. So the honest answer
+          to "who can see this" is: me, and Google as the company that runs my
+          mail.
         </p>
 
         <h2>Cookies and analytics</h2>