07a8ff6989e91e4bb72ac7c406f946deb655fe9b
17
Commits
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bbe535d158 |
fix: omit AWS's empty-object placeholders from the cloned PDF policy
Build and deploy / build-and-deploy (push) Failing after 4s
`configure.mjs --apply` failed on its first write, 2026-09-04, and nothing
reached the distribution. `get-response-headers-policy` returns
`"ContentSecurityPolicy": {}` for a member the source does not define, and
sending that back fails `create-response-headers-policy` on ParamValidation
before the call leaves the machine — a config AWS hands back is not
necessarily a config AWS will accept.
Of the 16 structures reachable from `ResponseHeadersPolicyConfig` in the CLI's
service model, 15 declare a required field, so `{}` is illegal there and can
only be the placeholder; the one exception is `SecurityHeadersConfig` itself,
which section 4 already skips on when empty. The strip is therefore recursive.
The dry run now asserts the generated config carries no empty object, and does
so as a section-4 SKIP rather than a throw — section 4 must never block
sections 1-3 from re-applying `router.js`.
The two functions move to `policy-shapes.mjs` with a 23-case test (7 of 7
mutations killed), because `configure.mjs` reads argv and calls AWS at import
time and the runbook was otherwise claiming a proof nobody could re-run.
Also: the handler was redeployed 2026-09-04 via docs/09 §5.5. Re-read against
production — the two bundled SDK clients moved 3.1125.0 -> 3.1126.0 with no
file in this repository changing, which is what §7's own row predicted. §12
gains R22, because that row named itself as the reminder covering them while
no such reminder existed. docs/05, docs/06 and docs/09 §5.5 each held their
own stale copy of the deployed commit; all three now cite §7.
Reviewed twice by adversarial-reviewer: 7 findings, then 8, of which five were
defects in the first round's repairs. All 15 fixed.
Nothing was applied to the distribution and nothing was deployed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
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3c3ba5dc6e |
feat: price med-arb by phase, attest the conflicts undertaking, and answer the first real spam
Build and deploy / build-and-deploy (push) Failing after 4s
Pouya's rulings of 2026-09-03 (the last two D20 findings) and 2026-09-04 (the spam observation and four mitigations), in one change set. D20 finding 10 — med-arb is billed BY PHASE, each phase at the rates already published, so /fees/'s "Every figure is on this page" is true as written rather than narrowed. FEES.medArb is the single source; docs/07 §Med-arb carries the rule INTERIM against R5, and R5 now carries it back, because a derived price moves silently when a rate moves. D20 finding 13 — conduct undertaking (g), attested 2026-09-03, published as his wording verbatim on /legal/privacy/ and /contact/. The clause that raised the finding promised to DISCLOSE a conflicts check's outcome, which the attestation does not cover; it is struck. D20 now partitions 17 fixed / 2 refuted / 1 owed. Spam, 2026-09-04 — recorded in docs/05 §Observed abuse with the date and signature. A second honeypot (a decoy checkbox, own class, `hidden`, a label that tells a human not to tick it) and scoring that LABELS and never rejects: nothing is dropped, nothing new is stored, and only the operator notification changes. Q65 opens the WAF cost call. The timing floor could not be built: there is no timing check and never has been. docs/05 carries it struck, and every mechanism that would give a real per-visitor clock breaks zero-JS, handler-and-form-only, or D1. Q66. configure.mjs gains section 5 — a custom origin request policy forwarding CloudFront-Viewer-Address on /api/*. Written, dry-run against the live distribution, NOT applied. It reads the handler's own header reads and refuses to run if the whitelist omits one. And reading the live account to do it found four AGENTS.md §7 rows saying the intake backend was undeployed, two days after it went live — corrected against get-function-configuration, get-routes, get-stage, get-policy and the deployed zip, which was downloaded and read. Review: adversarial-reviewer only (claims-auditor is D20's cutover pass and has run). Round 1 five lenses, 56 findings, 7 blocking, 4 refuted by an independent refuter; round 2 four lenses, 36 findings, 33 of them defects in round 1's own repairs. Stopped at two per D19. Gates, exit status read for each: check 0 · build 0 (23 pages) · check:claims 0 · check:intake 0 · og:proof 0 · lint 0 · spam-score.test 39/39 with 6/6 mutations killed · router.test 30/30 · minifier grep 1 (clean) · lighthouse 0, no category below 95 · configure.mjs dry run 0, nothing written. Nothing deployed and nothing applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5 |
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4735989f0b |
feat: cut /legal/privacy/ §Who can see it to four plain statements; name SML Company Ltd on the consent; close Q64 moot
Two rulings from Pouya, 2026-09-02.
(1) The section stays generic — "it over-explains technical mechanics that
belong in the evidence file, not in front of an inquirer." Deleted: the
measurement paragraph, the root-credential sentence, the SSO/federated-login
enumeration, the resource-policy clause, the "company that runs a database"
aside, the deploy-credential sentence and the three-copies summary. All of it
stays true and stays measured in AGENTS.md §7 and the evidence file, which now
maps each shipped sentence to what it rests on.
(2) The consent string names the corporation: "I consent to SML Company Ltd
storing and using the information in this form…". docs/05 §Consent text moves
with it, proven byte-identical. Two new §4 rows carry the attestations the copy
rests on.
(3) The §Who can see it approval closes via the page read-through, which is now
blocker 2 in docs/06's callout rather than a checklist line.
Q64 closes MOOT — the paragraph it was about was deleted, so it gates nothing.
The underlying gap is unchanged: §7 records root as held by Pouya, not held only
by Pouya, and nothing about root custody may be published without asking again.
Two sentences were added back under review: the shared-account disclosure, to
§Where it is stored (a storage disclosure, never named in the ruling — without
it no page said the intake sits in a shared account), and one naming SML Company
Ltd in the policy, because a consent naming a company the linked policy never
mentions is an accountability gap.
adversarial-reviewer, two rounds, 14 findings, all resolved, none declined;
nine of round 2's ten were defects in round 1's own repairs. claims-auditor
correctly deferred to cutover per D20.
Gates, exit status read: check 0 · build 0 (23 pages) · check:claims 0
(12 patterns, 33 approved strings) · check:intake 0 · og:proof 0 · lint 0 ·
lighthouse 0, worst of 23 99/100/100/100. Tripwire proven both ways — exit 0 on
the revised page, exit 1 with 5 matches on the
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99889a3491 |
feat: rule Q63 in three limbs; take the human headcount off /legal/privacy/; close R10; ratify /med-arb/
Pouya's rulings, 2026-09-02.
Q63(a) — wording approved with two trims: the editorial closing sentence is
struck, and the mailbox clause is rewritten per (b).
Q63(b) — info@smlcompany.ca is a delegated mailbox read by Pouya and by
administrative staff. The page said "anyone who can reach that mailbox"; it now
says who. The answer reached four sentences, not the one the ruling named, in
three sections: "my mailbox" had been written as a personal one throughout.
Q63(c) — the account root credential is held by Pouya, has no programmatic key
and carries MFA. The page now states the first two.
And the answer to (c) took the human headcount off the page. His attestation:
"two people is an exaggeration... a handful is accurate — the simulation counts
identities, not humans, and the two are not the same claim." The enumeration was
exhaustive and the inference off it was not: two IAM identities is a LOWER BOUND
on people and was published as an exact count. The page now attributes read
access to "the account's administrators — me, and the small number of people who
administer it with me", and the false inference is corrected at its source in
docs/reference/intake-table-access-verification.md as well as on the page.
R10 — CLOSED on a fresh one-line confirmation, not on the 2026-08-28 stamp.
ADRIC, ADRIO, the three OBA sections and the CTF all current. Re-stamped on all
four stamp-bearing sites; the row stays live, because its trigger is an event.
/med-arb/ — ratified as shipped, no credential line restored. His note for the
record: med-arb is a service he provides, not a designation.
The tripwire is unchanged and proven both ways: exit 0 on the revised page,
exit 1 with 5 matches on the pre-correction bytes rebuilt from
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6aaf089b05 |
feat: rule Q62 by stating the truth; strike the /med-arb/ gloss; re-stamp R18
Pouya's four rulings of 2026-09-01, applied 2026-09-02.
Q62 — RULED "state the truth", not "remove the access". /legal/privacy/
now says two people can read the intake table, names their role, and adds
the two stronger facts the false sentence had crowded out: the handler
role holds PutItem only, and adr-sml-deploy is implicitDeny on all seven
read and write actions. Wording is subject to Pouya's read-through —
Q63(a), with a TODO(pouya) beside the copy.
The ruling named one sentence; a vocabulary sweep found the falsehood in
three places, and the audit then found two more. Five paragraphs now
answer "who can see it" and change together.
The tripwire stays permanently, per ruling, and grew from two
alternatives to five. Every alternative is one string that reached dist/.
Proven both ways against the pre-correction page rebuilt from
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bd282aa47d |
feat: production run — Q61 ramp, /404/, CloudFront router, cutover runbook
Build and deploy / build-and-deploy (push) Failing after 4s
Five items of Pouya's production run, 2026-09-01.
Q61 — scroll-padding-top becomes a max() ramp on `10lh - 83px`, with the
plain calc() first as the fallback for engines without `lh`. Hidden focus
stops under minimumFontSize=32: 290 of 1,455 -> 0, control build still
290. Default settings byte-identical (0 differences over 352 page-widths x
17 fields). The 12 residual cells at minimumFontSize=16/20 are pre-existing
and unchanged-or-better; reported, not widened, per instruction.
Intake backend + CloudFront — docs/09-cutover-runbook.md is the
copy-paste sequence for admin execution: every command followed by its
verification and expected output, rollback per part, and Part 10 is Q60's
TTL test. infra/cloudfront/router.js is the trailing-slash function
(30-case suite; 8 fail against the pre-review version, incl. a
protocol-relative open redirect). infra/cloudfront/configure.mjs is
dry-run-by-default and idempotent. scripts/intake-env.mjs emits the six
Lambda env vars from src/data/site.ts.
Four launch blockers found by reading the running system:
- handler.mjs wrote pk/sk; the live table's key is submissionId with no
sort key, so every submission would have failed validation silently
- the Lambda invoke permission is scoped to the old route path
- 22 of 23 pages 403 without the router function
- there was no 404 page; src/pages/404.astro adds it
Claims audit (D20 cutover pass) — five gloss over-reaches corrected on
/practice/energy/, /practice/insurance/ (x2), /practice/technology/ and
/med-arb/. Three findings left open for Pouya: Q62, the /med-arb/ gloss,
and Q60.
Q62 — one frozen-tripwire pattern added under the freeze's own breach
exception, with a probe and four negative fixtures. check:claims exits 1
until the false /legal/privacy/ sentence is corrected, so both deploy
paths are blocked by a mechanism rather than by memory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
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0f7595b602 |
feat: eyebrow 14px and one small-text floor; fix a site-wide reflow defect; stamp TTL; §4 bars the struck universal
Pouya's five rulings of 2026-08-31, after
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64bce105f8 |
feat: eyebrow 12px → 13px from one definition; confirm and gate the intake TTL
Two of Pouya's rulings of 2026-08-31, committed as one tree at his instruction
("as-is") because AGENTS.md Change Log entry (ai) covers both and splitting it
would mean rewriting the record rather than moving it. This is a deliberate
departure from one-logical-change-per-commit, recorded here rather than left to
be inferred.
THE EYEBROW. `--text-eyebrow: 0.8125rem` added to tokens.css; `.eyebrow` in
global.css retargeted to it. One edit site, which is what the design system
claimed. 13px is not a rung on the modular ladder — it sits between xs and sm
deliberately, because uppercase mono at 0.18em tracking reads smaller than it
measures. `--text-2xs`'s comment stopped calling itself the eyebrow floor.
The rendered sweep (22 pages × 2 widths, 838 mono elements measured over CDP,
not grepped) found exactly one escape and one deliberate override:
- h2.footer-heading, 176 instances — an ESCAPED EYEBROW. Five declarations
byte-identical to `.eyebrow`, differing only in colour. Consolidated to
`class="eyebrow footer-heading"`; the scoped rule is now colour + margin.
The colour is load-bearing, not decorative: `.eyebrow`'s own `--text-meta`
on ink is 3.07:1 and fails.
- span.eyebrow.brand-tagline, 21 instances — HELD at `--text-2xs`. Measured:
at 13px the header grows 81 → 83.4px while `--header-h` is pinned at 81 and
drives `scroll-padding-top`; and with a seventh nav item the CTA lands past
`.header-inner`'s content edge by 42px at 1216, 18px at 1240, 26px at 1280
and 1440. Document overflow is 0 in all of those, so no page-level check
can see it. Insights is that seventh item.
Everything else mono-uppercase is a genuinely different component and was left:
the 0.06em `--tracking-wide` family, the 14px mixed-case designation strip, the
/bio/ print sheet, /contact/'s form labels.
Measured after: contrast unchanged on all 817 instances (11.09 / 8.11 / 5.47 /
5.01:1, all pass at 13px, which is still normal text and needs 4.5:1). Zero
document overflow and identical header geometry at 15 widths. Two eyebrows gain
a line below 414px — /'s hero, already wrapping at 320px before this, and
/insights/'s empty state at 320px only. Accepted, not re-tuned.
docs/02's type spec moved 11–12px → 13px and now enumerates the three 11px
carve-outs instead of implying there are none. The /type-scale/ proof sheet
(d) asked for no longer exists — deleted at build step 2 — so the spec prose is
the proof sheet now.
THE TTL. backend/intake/handler.mjs CONFIRMED to match `AttributeName=ttl`: it
writes `ttl` as a Number, in epoch seconds, at RETENTION_MONTHS = 24. Nothing
needed changing for the enable command.
Removed `|| 0` from the TTL computation. DynamoDB does not expire an item whose
TTL is more than five years past, so `ttl: 0` meant RETAINED FOREVER while
/legal/privacy/ promises deletion — a fallback whose failure mode was the exact
inverse of the claim it was protecting. Unreachable in practice, which is why
it would never have been noticed. A bad value now fails the write.
§7 records TTL as DISABLED at first verification, so the privacy policy's
automatic-deletion promise was unbacked from the moment it was written. §7 is
the only place that status lives; docs/05 and docs/06 carry the constraint and
cite §7, because round 2 of review caught this change set reproducing the SES
DKIM defect — five copies of a status that is about to be re-stamped.
Added, and these are the gate: `TODO(pouya)` on /legal/privacy/'s retention
section, §9 Q60, §12 R19. The page does not publish a period, it asserts a
MECHANISM — deleted by the database rather than by someone remembering — and
nothing in the toolchain can see that. check:claims is frozen with no pattern
for it and deploy does not read docs/06. The copy was NOT softened: it is about
to be true, and weakening a privacy commitment to make it defensible is the
move the rules forbid. What was missing was the gate, not the caveat.
Reviewed by adversarial-reviewer, two rounds (D19 cap), 15 findings, all
accepted, none declined. claims-auditor did not run — D20. Round 1's findings
were almost entirely in prose written that session, and round 2's blocking
finding plus its sharpest should-fix were both defects in round 1's own fixes.
public/pouya-lajevardi-bio.pdf is deliberately NOT in this commit. It was
regenerated and reverted: /bio/'s eyebrow sits inside `.no-print`, so the sheet
has no eyebrow at all, and `cmp -l` showed exactly 10 differing bytes, all in
/CreationDate and /ModDate.
Gates, every one read as an exit status and none through a pipe: check 0,
build 0 (22 pages), check:claims 0, og:proof 0, check:intake 0, lint 0,
minifier tripwire clean, TODO in dist 0. Lighthouse run twice with identical
output: perf 99 on / and 100 on the other 21, a11y 100, best practices 100,
SEO 100 on every indexable page, CLS 0.000, LCP 1.50–2.03s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
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9f2d2eeb04 |
fix: resolve adversarial review round 2 — 9 findings, 8 of them in round 1's fixes
Build and deploy / build-and-deploy (push) Failing after 4s
D19 caps the loop at two rounds, and this is what the second round is for. BLOCKING. Round 1 made NO_RETAINER_NOTICE a requireEnv and added it to no document, while the fix's own comment claimed docs/06 named it. The deployment list said five variables for a handler that needs six, so an operator following the cutover checklist would have deployed a function that throws at cold start on every invocation — 5xx from API Gateway, every inquiry lost from the moment /api/* was wired, loud in CloudWatch and silent to Pouya. docs/05 and docs/06 now name all six, and the comment that asserted the documentation existed is corrected rather than deleted. The intake route check added in round 1 could not fail: curl -w already prints 000 on a failed transfer, so `|| echo 000` double-appended and the failure arm was unreachable, and the pass arm accepted anything that was not literally 404 — including the 403 CloudFront returns when the /api/* behaviour is missing, which is the one distinction the check exists to draw. It now sends the correct Origin and asserts a positive: 303 to /contact/could-not-send/, which the handler returns before any DynamoDB write or email. Probed on refused/501/403/303; the old version passed the first three. Fixed in both deploy paths. Removing priceRange left three statements saying it was present or pending, one of them the stated reason /fees/ emits no Offer node. Deleting overtimeStartsAfterSessionHours left AGENTS.md §9 naming it and left Q59 recorded as open. The Google-as-processor fix was applied to the privacy policy's "Where it is stored" and not to "Who can see it", which still read "Nobody else has access". And the variable removal was justified with a path-scoped git grep — which also cannot see untracked files. The unscoped sweep found docs/06's variable table, the OIDC example, and .env.example still carrying them; .env.example also restates the execute-api hostname, falsifying a live claim in intake.ts that has been corrected. That file is not edited here: this environment denies read access to it, and nothing may edit a file it cannot read. It is in the batched list. Also: og:image:alt was the page title rather than the card's headline on 20 pages; og-card.ts documented the wrong path and invocation for the contact sheet; deploy-local.sh still said Q22's deploy credential "does NOT yet exist"; and the round-1 fix comments were trimmed per D19, though the ratio held at 0.44. Round 2 also confirmed the round-1 fixes by measurement: all 56 .btn instances across 22 pages, the consent checkbox's computed accessible name, the radio labels hit-tested at 44px, and og:proof exercised against synthetic article pages in a sandbox. Verified: check/build/check:claims/og:proof/check:intake/lint/bio:pdf all exit 0 on a clean build; 22 pages; Lighthouse 99-100 / 100 / 100 / 100, CLS 0.000. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5 |
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210bc25a26 |
feat: build steps 7a-10 — the site is complete and reviewable at 22 pages
Steps 7a through 10 as one authorised run. Nothing deployed (D11).
7a Lighthouse returns as `lighthouse@13.4.1` + `chrome-launcher`, NOT
`@lhci/cli`. AGENTS.md §7's advisory attribution was wrong: the carriers
were @lhci/cli's own `tmp` and @puppeteer/browsers' `extract-zip`, not
Lighthouse, which audits clean. A deliberate deviation from R11's literal
trigger, recorded with what it costs. Local gate; CI has no Chrome.
7b OG card generator (satori + sharp) discharges R15 — 20 typed cards plus
per-article cards; the portrait stays on / and /about/ by Q40. Insights
plumbing: ArticleCard, Prose, the index, the article route, articleGraph,
and /'s section 7. Card copy is constrained structurally because text in a
JPEG cannot be grepped by check:claims: every headline IS its page's <h1>,
enforced by `npm run og:proof`.
7c Five drafted launch articles, draft: true / reviewedByPouya: false. An
independent compliance audit returned 76 findings and 57 unsourced
assertions; all blocking and should-fix applied.
8 /contact/, the intake form, and backend/intake/ (undeployed). Plain HTML
POST to a same-origin /api/intake with a 303 redirect, so the form works
with zero JavaScript. docs/05 records three deliberate deviations.
9 /fees/ on Q59's ruling — overtime runs from the session cap, and the
reservation point ships adjacent to the rate. One-page PDF bio discharges
R16; /bio/ is its source, so the circulated artefact stays inside the
review apparatus.
10 /legal/privacy/ and /legal/terms/, written to the backend as built. Three
of the policy's statements are derived and cannot drift.
Also: /about/'s inverse credentials band (approved at step 6); Q59 closed;
R15 and R16 discharged; and a fix to shipped copy — /practice/energy/ asserted
the absence of a regulation the source extract says must not be asserted.
Review: adversarial-reviewer, two rounds (D20/D19). Round 1 returned 16
findings including two blocking — an invisible ghost button on /fees/ at
1.00:1 that Lighthouse scored 100, and a privacy policy that named one data
processor when there are two. All 16 acted on.
Lighthouse, 22 pages, mobile: performance 99-100, accessibility 100,
best practices 100, SEO 100 on every indexable page, CLS 0.000.
AGENTS.md entry (ah) has the detail, including four of my own verification
commands that were wrong and what each of them nearly caused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
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165d259f5c |
feat: build step 2 — the home page; close Q35, Q37, Q39; Q39's answer corrected the register
Pouya's rulings and the page are one commit, not two, because they are not separable: Q37 changed the credential label the page renders, Q39 scoped the arbitration copy, and Q35 gave Med-Arb the row that lets the footer link stand. Splitting them would produce a commit where the register says one thing and the page says another. RULINGS Q39 — ANSWERED, and my assertion was FALSE as a universal. Pouya checked rather than defended. Family arbitration in Ontario is gated: prescribed training, 14h on screening for domestic violence and power imbalances, 30h of Ontario family law for arbitrators outside the bar, 10h ongoing per two years. claims-auditor produced that counter-example from inside the repo on 2026-08-26 and it was right. The source is now IN the repo per R14 — docs/reference/ontario-family-arbitration-training.md, retrieved with its provenance — and §4 states which half it establishes: the family gate directly, the commercial half only by absence. So "commercial arbitration in Ontario requires no licence and no designation" is recorded as Pouya's stated position, unstamped. What disposes of the question is the scope exclusion: he does not do family arbitration, so it is NOT OFFERED and the gate never bears on the practice. The false universal survived in three more live places, found by grep, not recall: §4's NOT-NEGOTIABLE boundary bullet (the boundary paragraph breaching its own boundary), §9's Q33 closure row, and a comment in SiteHeader.astro. Q35 — ANSWERED, all four items, and the answer supplied a gate that was missing. Med-Arb gets an Offerings row and stays in the footer sitemap. The six subject-matter labels pass test 1. §4 gains "Subject-matter areas — the publication gate": competence to accept an appointment, AND a page that frames it as positioning without claiming history. Nothing in the nav or footer is unrowed any more. Q37 — ANSWERED. "Law and engineering" becomes "Legal training and engineering practice". A degree is not a practice; the parallel was doing the implying. Q38/R13 — the committed SVG does not close it; the walk-back went too far. It renders faithfully BECAUSE it is the raster. R13 stays open. R1 — surfaced and acknowledged; the interim licensure framing is now carried by a shipped page rather than a spec, which raises the stakes. BUILD STEP 2 Seven of docs/01's eight home sections, six new components, zero JavaScript. Section 7 (Latest insights) ships at step 7 with the collection it lists — recorded in docs/01 and in the page, not just here. Four credential slots, not three: §4's paired-disclosure condition requires the Q.Arb stage on any page that offers arbitration. No booking link (R6). The masthead tagline is suppressed on / (it duplicated the hero eyebrow). The step-1 proof sheet is deleted, and five live references to it were found by grep. WHAT THE REVIEWS FOUND — 24 findings across the two passes claims-auditor FAILED it on ten, every one implication or scope rather than fabrication, which is where D13 says the risk lives. The four that mattered: "I mediate and arbitrate" asserted a track record §4 does not hold for arbitration; the JSON-LD asserted arbitration twice and stated the stage nowhere (a crawler-only claim is still a claim); "at one published rate with preparation time included" misdescribed money against docs/07's two day rates and capped prep allowance; and "Law and engineering are not blended here" was Q37's struck parallel relocated into prose one day after Pouya struck it. It also found the Canadian Tax Foundation missing from §9 Q8 — a stale second copy of a fact that would have bitten at step 3. adversarial-reviewer found fourteen, three blocking. The first was class="section-head" on <SectionHeading> never matching — the parent-cannot- style-a-child defect for the FOURTH time, written into a diff where I had just added fresh warnings about it to two other components. Measured: 0px margin, 0px gap, headings over the card edges, with astro check and eslint both clean. I had looked at a screenshot of that section and passed over it. Fixed with a page-owned wrapper (48px, measured) and the prop is deleted from six components so it is now a build error. Also: the credential row was never "two up on a phone" and its comment said it was; PROCESS was hardcoded in the page against the reason written in site.ts; 83px of residual overflow at a 200% default font size, now 3px. Seven more I found myself first, including <Picture widths> declaring the untouched 1600px master as the <img src> fallback (254,626 B for a 476px slot, and the build log said "before: 349kB" either way), and a prop named `as` silently turning off type-checking for a whole component. VERIFICATION — run, not asserted. Full figures in AGENTS.md entry (w). npx tsc 6.0.3 · check 0/0/0 · lint clean · build clean · audit 0 1 <script> and it is JSON-LD; non-JSON-LD scripts 0; no JS bundle; identical page with script execution disabled (444 nodes, 6,578 chars) Phase 5 minifier check: no `animation` shorthand beside animation-timeline overflow 0 at 14 widths, AND every mark measured at 1.5654-1.5657 vs 1.5657 one h1, no heading skips, focus order == DOM order across 44 focusables 31 painted contrast pairs at 3 widths, 0 failures 72/72 hit-test points across 8 cards resolve to the card's link print 0 hidden, reduced-motion 0 hidden Lighthouse NOT RUN — tool unavailable until step 7 (R11) HTML validator NOT RUN, and 4 of 12 srcsets carry a duplicate 1x descriptor Opened for Pouya: Q40 (one OG image for nineteen pages), Q41 (does Q37 reach prose; may the comparative be restored; what LAT pre-hearing mediation means), Q42 (the four "also offered" processes have no row), Q43 (the process timings are published commitments with no row). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0148NztQskLKKApP5SzAA78e |
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8134709548 |
feat: build step 1 — scaffold, layout, header, footer, SEO; zero JavaScript
Build order step 1 (docs/01): scaffold, tokens, base layout, header, footer, SEO component, plus a temporary /type-scale/ proof sheet that step 2 deletes. THE FONTS WERE NEVER ON DISK. global.css declared six @font-face rules pointing at /fonts/*.woff2 and public/fonts/ did not exist, so every face had been silently falling back to Georgia and the system sans. Six cuts committed, 123,804 bytes, SIL OFL 1.1, provenance in docs/reference/fonts-provenance.md. ?v=1 on every URL because the deploy script serves them immutable for a year. ZERO JAVASCRIPT. The reveal was an inline IntersectionObserver in <head>; docs/05 specifies script-src 'self' with no unsafe-inline, so the only script on the site was the one thing the site's own CSP would refuse to execute. Replaced with animation-timeline: view() behind @supports. 0 script tags and 0 .js files in dist. The infinity mark is lifted verbatim from the deployed site's own smlMark loading thumbnail, not redrawn (Q32 asks whether a canonical vector exists). The proof sheet computes its contrast table from tokens.css rather than restating docs/02 — all eleven ratios reproduce the measured table exactly. Register: Canadian Tax Foundation added (§4, R10 widened); Q30 closed — SML Company Ltd is federally incorporated under the CBCA, and the footer publishes neither that nor the place of business; Q31 closed — Plausible, on EU-only data residency (D15 amended). ROLE constants added for "Director of Firm Operations" and "active litigation exposure" so step 3 does not hand-type them. Lighthouse unavailability now stated in six places rather than left as a control that had silently stopped existing (§7, R11). Both review agents ran twice. The second pass found four defects in the first pass's fixes, including the minifier bug written back into its own fix and a colour-alone repair that used the banned gold-on- cream pairing at 2.10:1. Measured in headless Chrome at thirteen widths with a seventh nav item injected: 0 overflow, 0 tap targets under 44x44, 0 focus-order inversions, state indicators at 12.29:1, 755 words of body text with no JavaScript. Opened: Q32-Q37. Closed: Q30, Q31. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF |
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0d8b63380a |
chore: install toolchain, wire lint, add local deploy path
Answers four questions and starts build step 1. Q22 — the scoped deploy user does not exist: aws iam get-user returns NoSuchEntity. Recorded in §7 as NOT PROVISIONED and swept so that no file describes it as existing. §10 records that user/pouya, the broadly- permissioned personal user that has been authenticating to this account, must never be used in CI; scripts/deploy-local.sh refuses to run as it. Q23 — the Gitea instance reports 1.27.2, well above the vars-context floor, so the first-step guard is belt-and-braces rather than load-bearing. What remains is not a fact but a dependency: the instance is jointly administered, so enabling Actions and registering a runner both need a second admin. Hence npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh), which performs exactly what the workflow performs — same guard, same three passes, same headers, same invalidation. Documented as the current path, not as a workaround. §10 gains the risk that follows: the deploy secret will live on jointly administered infrastructure, where an instance admin can reach repo secrets. That does not change the plan, but it makes the scoped IAM policy the actual control between a shared Gitea instance and an AWS account holding another business's client-database backups. Never widen it. Q27 — response time is two business days, in site.ts with a derived short form so the confirmation email cannot drift from the page. Q28 — OBA sections confirmed, stamped "for now"; membership renews yearly, tracked as R10. Build step 1: dependencies installed and package-lock.json created, closing the npm ci blocker. ESLint flat config and Prettier config added; npm run lint, check and build all pass. Prettier deliberately excludes *.md and tokens.css — reasons recorded in .prettierignore. npm audit reports 7 high-severity advisories, all requiring an Astro major upgrade. Not applied; escalated in AGENTS.md entry (s) as a decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF |
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2b6176e4d7 |
feat: SES production access and monitoring; §7 as single source of operational truth
Q19 is closed — SES production access granted in ca-central-1, confirmed in writing. Nothing now blocks /contact/. The structural change is the important one. Specs in docs/ carried their own copies of resource IDs, regions, DNS records and service state. AGENTS.md §7 is now the single source of truth for operational facts and docs/ cite it rather than restating it, with the rule recorded in CLAUDE.md under Conventions. The reason is the previous commit's DKIM inversion, generalised: the same fact lived in §7 and docs/05, a correction reached one of them, and the stale copy told an operator to delete the records that authenticate outbound mail. A duplicated fact is one that will eventually be wrong in one place, and the copy that goes stale is the one nobody re-reads. Verified by grep over docs/*.md — no operational identifier remains. Also in this change: - §7 records the SES monitoring: SNS topic ses-alerts, alarms SES-BounceRate-High (>= 0.03) and SES-ComplaintRate-High (>= 0.001), and the deliberate choice of email feedback forwarding over an SNS feedback topic at this volume. The ses-alerts email subscription is stamped PENDING CONFIRMATION — the alarms currently notify nobody, now tracked as R9 and on the cutover checklist. - docs/05 records why those alarms are a real control: SES suspends above roughly a 5% bounce rate, and under 100 messages a month five bounces crosses it. - Q29: the deploy guard now covers AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY (emptiness only, never echoed) and INTAKE_ENDPOINT, promoted to job-level env. An empty intake endpoint ships a live form posting to nothing, which is worse than a failed build. Executed under sh -e across four input states; fails closed, leaks nothing. - docs/06: account ID removed from the backup-bucket callout, pointing at §10 instead, as README already does. - astro.config.mjs: prefetch removed entirely. Any setting ships Astro's prefetch script to every page against the zero-JS convention. Recorded as a decision; revisit against real Lighthouse numbers. AGENTS.md entry (r) records the full reasoning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF |
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6bf1167624 |
fix: sweep D3 amendment through the specs; correct inverted DKIM table
The re-audit of the deploy-guard change surfaced defects well outside the diff, including one that would have broken production mail. docs/05-backend-spec.md had the two SES DKIM sets exactly inverted, labelling the three records that resolve as "orphans" and the three NXDOMAIN records as "Live. Never delete". Entry (j) corrected this in AGENTS.md §7 and the correction never reached docs/05. Since SES has no custom MAIL FROM, DKIM is the only thing satisfying DMARC, so acting on that table would have silently broken intake mail authentication. Also in this change: - .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml gains a guard as steps[0] that fails the run, naming the variable, if AWS_REGION, S3_BUCKET or CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID is empty — how a Gitea too old for the vars context manifests. Verified fail-closed under bash -e, sh -e and bash -euo pipefail. - AGENTS.md Current Truth: SPF and DMARC recorded as present (Q20), the matching §10 High risk row retired, three duplicate Q rows removed. - docs/reference/AWS-Hosting-Guide.md tracked and given a do-not-execute banner; it was an executable procedure for the architecture D1/D3 replace. - Copy decks: "a working litigator" and "an active litigation practice" replaced with the register's own wording; LegalService JSON-LD replaced with ProfessionalService; tribunal-secretary offers removed per D14; nine stale question blockers swept. - astro.config.mjs: prefetchAll disabled — it injected JS into every page against the zero-JS convention with no decision recorded. - src/data/site.ts: unregistered response-time commitment nulled (Q27); OBA section names downgraded to [assumed] (Q28). - s3:AbortMultipartUpload reasoning corrected to measure ./dist, not the repo. Opens Q27, Q28, Q29. AGENTS.md entry (q) records the full resolution, including the findings declined and why. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF |
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e6abdf42e8 |
feat: execution protocol, review agents, DNS and SES findings
Build and deploy / build-and-deploy (push) Failing after 6s
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19f7226661 |
chore: project scaffold, specs, and working record
Build and deploy / build-and-deploy (push) Failing after 5s
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