Answers four questions and starts build step 1.
Q22 — the scoped deploy user does not exist: aws iam get-user returns
NoSuchEntity. Recorded in §7 as NOT PROVISIONED and swept so that no file
describes it as existing. §10 records that user/pouya, the broadly-
permissioned personal user that has been authenticating to this account,
must never be used in CI; scripts/deploy-local.sh refuses to run as it.
Q23 — the Gitea instance reports 1.27.2, well above the vars-context floor,
so the first-step guard is belt-and-braces rather than load-bearing. What
remains is not a fact but a dependency: the instance is jointly administered,
so enabling Actions and registering a runner both need a second admin. Hence
npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh), which performs exactly what the
workflow performs — same guard, same three passes, same headers, same
invalidation. Documented as the current path, not as a workaround.
§10 gains the risk that follows: the deploy secret will live on jointly
administered infrastructure, where an instance admin can reach repo secrets.
That does not change the plan, but it makes the scoped IAM policy the actual
control between a shared Gitea instance and an AWS account holding another
business's client-database backups. Never widen it.
Q27 — response time is two business days, in site.ts with a derived short
form so the confirmation email cannot drift from the page.
Q28 — OBA sections confirmed, stamped "for now"; membership renews yearly,
tracked as R10.
Build step 1: dependencies installed and package-lock.json created, closing
the npm ci blocker. ESLint flat config and Prettier config added; npm run
lint, check and build all pass. Prettier deliberately excludes *.md and
tokens.css — reasons recorded in .prettierignore.
npm audit reports 7 high-severity advisories, all requiring an Astro major
upgrade. Not applied; escalated in AGENTS.md entry (s) as a decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF
The re-audit of the deploy-guard change surfaced defects well outside the
diff, including one that would have broken production mail.
docs/05-backend-spec.md had the two SES DKIM sets exactly inverted, labelling
the three records that resolve as "orphans" and the three NXDOMAIN records as
"Live. Never delete". Entry (j) corrected this in AGENTS.md §7 and the
correction never reached docs/05. Since SES has no custom MAIL FROM, DKIM is
the only thing satisfying DMARC, so acting on that table would have silently
broken intake mail authentication.
Also in this change:
- .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml gains a guard as steps[0] that fails the run,
naming the variable, if AWS_REGION, S3_BUCKET or CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID
is empty — how a Gitea too old for the vars context manifests. Verified
fail-closed under bash -e, sh -e and bash -euo pipefail.
- AGENTS.md Current Truth: SPF and DMARC recorded as present (Q20), the
matching §10 High risk row retired, three duplicate Q rows removed.
- docs/reference/AWS-Hosting-Guide.md tracked and given a do-not-execute
banner; it was an executable procedure for the architecture D1/D3 replace.
- Copy decks: "a working litigator" and "an active litigation practice"
replaced with the register's own wording; LegalService JSON-LD replaced with
ProfessionalService; tribunal-secretary offers removed per D14; nine stale
question blockers swept.
- astro.config.mjs: prefetchAll disabled — it injected JS into every page
against the zero-JS convention with no decision recorded.
- src/data/site.ts: unregistered response-time commitment nulled (Q27);
OBA section names downgraded to [assumed] (Q28).
- s3:AbortMultipartUpload reasoning corrected to measure ./dist, not the repo.
Opens Q27, Q28, Q29. AGENTS.md entry (q) records the full resolution,
including the findings declined and why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF
