# adr.smlcompany.ca

The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.

A static site built with [Astro](https://astro.build), built for deployment to
Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is
not yet proven.

## Quick start

```bash
nvm use            # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
npm install
npm run dev        # http://localhost:4321
```

## Scripts

| Command | Does |
|---|---|
| `npm run dev` | Development server with hot reload |
| `npm run build` | Static build to `./dist` — 22 pages |
| `npm run preview` | Serve the built site locally |
| `npm run check` | `astro check` — type and template errors |
| `npm run check:claims` | `AGENTS.md` §4 Forbidden, enforced on `dist/`. **Runs on every deploy** |
| `npm run check:intake` | The intake form's field table against the Lambda's — two on purpose |
| `npm run og:proof` | Every `og:image` resolves; every card headline **is** its page's `<h1>` |
| `npm run lint` | ESLint + Prettier check |
| `npm run format` | Prettier — rewrite files in place |
| `npm run lighthouse` | The performance budget, all four categories. **Local only** |
| `npm run bio:pdf` | Re-renders the committed one-page PDF from `/bio/`. **Local only** |
| `npm run deploy` | Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |

**Two of those cannot run in CI, and that is stated rather than left to be
discovered.** `lighthouse` and `bio:pdf` drive an installed browser; the Gitea
runner has none. They are keyboard gates plus blocking items on `docs/06`'s
cutover checklist, and they are deliberately **not** wired into `npm run build`
or either deploy path — a check described as running where it cannot is the
defect `AGENTS.md` Q22 turned out to be.

**`og:proof` and `check:intake` exist because two facts here are deliberately
duplicated**, and a duplicated fact needs a mechanism rather than a comment.
Text baked into an OG card cannot be grepped by `check:claims`, so `og:proof`
comparing each card's headline to its page's `<h1>` is the only thing keeping
card copy inside the claim register. And the Lambda validates against its own
field table, because a server that validates against a list the client shipped
it is not validating.

*(`npm run check:claims` was missing from this table before 2026-08-31, along
with the four added that day. A table of the project's controls that omits a
control is the shape those controls exist to catch.)*

## Before you contribute

Read **`AGENTS.md`** first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
**`CLAUDE.md`** for the working rules, and the specs in `docs/`.

The single hardest rule: **no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
`AGENTS.md` §4.** This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
contained fabricated credentials.

## How work is done here

Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
work. Run **`/build <task>`** for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
`AGENTS.md`. `/review` runs the review pass alone; `/wrap` closes a session.

Full protocol and prompt guidance: `docs/08-execution-protocol.md`.

## Deployment

**Today, deploys run locally: `npm run deploy`** (`scripts/deploy-local.sh`).
It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
changes only *how* a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` are one artefact in two places: change one, change
both.

`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` is the CI pipeline — **Gitea Actions**, not GitHub
Actions. **It has never run**, for two reasons that are not oversights:

- Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is
  jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).

*(It previously listed a second reason — that the scoped IAM user did not exist.
**It exists**: `adr-sml-deploy`, created 2026-08-26, Q22 closed 2026-08-28. See
`AGENTS.md` §7 for the inventory and the least-privilege verification.)*

Its **first** step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any
required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no
value is echoed.

The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
`docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example` in case the project ever moves
to a forge that supports it. It sits outside `.github/workflows/` on purpose:
Gitea falls back to that directory when `.gitea/workflows` is absent, so a
workflow file left there with a `push` trigger would be only conditionally
inert. As an `.example` under `docs/` it cannot be picked up at all.

**The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and that
credential now exists.** Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role
to assume: deploys authenticate as a scoped IAM user, `adr-sml-deploy`, with its
access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. **The user was created
2026-08-26 and verified least-privilege by execution — `AGENTS.md` §7, Q22 closed
2026-08-28.** Its access key has **never been used** (`LastUsed` null), because
deploys still run locally. *(This paragraph asserted the user "has not been
created" until 2026-08-28.)* In the meantime the local script
**refuses to run as `user/pouya`**, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
see `AGENTS.md` §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
place yet:

- **The policy must stay narrow.** Four actions: `s3:ListBucket` on one bucket,
  `s3:PutObject` and `s3:DeleteObject` on that bucket's contents, and
  `cloudfront:CreateInvalidation` on one distribution. No `Action: "*"`, no
  `Resource: "*"`, nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution.
  The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose
  name indicates another business's production database backups — that
  narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is
  load-bearing rather than hygiene. See `AGENTS.md` §10. If a deploy step needs
  a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy.
- **The key must be rotated quarterly. It now has an owner and a date: first
  rotation due 2026-11-26** (key created 2026-08-26) — `AGENTS.md` §12 **R17**.
  Create a second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy
  succeeds, **then** delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active
  is not rotation, and deleting before verifying leaves no way to authenticate
  the fix. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is unavailable, so
  this is a standing calendar task. *(It read "nobody owns that yet" until
  2026-08-28; R17 is the owner, and the date is the whole point of the row.)*

Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
`docs/06-deployment.md`.