/**
 * Shape helpers for the CloudFront policy configs `configure.mjs` builds.
 *
 * ⚠️ **A POLICY AWS HANDS BACK IS NOT A POLICY AWS WILL ACCEPT.**
 * `get-response-headers-policy` returns `{}` for a member the source does not
 * define — `Managed-SecurityHeadersPolicy` does it for `ContentSecurityPolicy`
 * — and sending that back fails `create-response-headers-policy` on
 * ParamValidation before the call leaves the machine. `docs/09` Part 3 carries
 * the incident and the exact error.
 *
 * **Dropping an empty member is safe at every depth, and that is a measurement
 * rather than a hope.** Of the 16 structures reachable from
 * `ResponseHeadersPolicyConfig` in the CLI's own service model, **15 declare at
 * least one required field** — so `{}` is not a legal value there and can only
 * be the placeholder. The single exception is `SecurityHeadersConfig` itself,
 * and `configure.mjs` skips before it can build one of those empty, because a
 * PDF policy cloning no security headers is the thing that section exists to
 * avoid.
 *
 * They live in their own module so they can be tested: `configure.mjs` reads
 * argv and calls AWS at import time, so importing THAT to reach two pure
 * functions is not possible. Same reason `fields.mjs` sits beside
 * `handler.mjs`. See `policy-shapes.test.mjs`.
 */

/**
 * Every empty-object member removed, at every depth, bottom-up — so a member
 * left empty by stripping its own children is removed in turn.
 *
 * Arrays are recursed into but never have elements removed: an element index is
 * load-bearing against its `Quantity` sibling, and an empty object inside one
 * would be this script's own construction rather than an AWS placeholder. That
 * case is left for `emptyObjectPaths` to report.
 */
export const withoutEmptyMembers = (value) => {
  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(withoutEmptyMembers);
  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
  const out = {};
  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
    const cleaned = withoutEmptyMembers(v);
    const isEmptyObject =
      cleaned &&
      typeof cleaned === 'object' &&
      !Array.isArray(cleaned) &&
      Object.keys(cleaned).length === 0;
    if (!isEmptyObject) out[k] = cleaned;
  }
  return out;
};

/** True for `{}` — the value AWS accepts nowhere in these configs. */
export const isEmptyObject = (v) =>
  Boolean(v) &&
  typeof v === 'object' &&
  !Array.isArray(v) &&
  Object.keys(v).length === 0;

/**
 * The dotted path of every empty object left in a config. A post-condition on
 * the strip above, not a filter: if this returns anything, the strip did not do
 * what this module claims it does.
 *
 * Empty ARRAYS are not reported — `{Quantity: 0, Items: []}` is valid and
 * common, while an empty object is valid nowhere.
 */
export function emptyObjectPaths(value, path = '') {
  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
    return value.flatMap((v, i) => emptyObjectPaths(v, `${path}[${i}]`));
  }
  if (value && typeof value === 'object') {
    if (Object.keys(value).length === 0) return [path || '(root)'];
    return Object.entries(value).flatMap(([k, v]) =>
      emptyObjectPaths(v, path ? `${path}.${k}` : k),
    );
  }
  return [];
}

/**
 * ⚠️ **NOTHING LOCAL ENFORCES ANY OF THESE, WHICH IS WHY THIS TABLE EXISTS.**
 * Measured 2026-09-04: `botocore/validate.py` checks **neither `max` nor
 * `pattern`** — `range_check()` reads only `min`, and the word `pattern` does
 * not appear in the file — and the caps that matter are not modelled as
 * constraints anyway. On both policy configs `Comment` is a bare `string`, and
 * the 128 lives in the shape's **`documentation` prose**. So a 182-character
 * `Comment` left the machine unremarked and came back `InvalidArgument`, after
 * section 4 had already created its policy. **Every limit here is enforced by
 * the service and by nothing else**, which makes the dry run the only
 * pre-flight there is. `docs/09` Part 3 carries both attempts.
 *
 * ⚠️ **THE ENTRIES THAT MATTER MOST GUARD *CLONED* VALUES, NOT LITERALS THIS
 * FILE AUTHORS.** A literal we write is reviewed when it is written; a value
 * copied out of the default behaviour's policy changes without anyone here
 * touching it, and `docs/05` already specifies a Content-Security-Policy that
 * would land there. `CreateResponseHeadersPolicy` declares a dedicated error
 * for exactly that — `TooLongCSPInResponseHeadersPolicy`.
 *
 * ⚠️ **KNOWN GAP, RECORDED RATHER THAN GUESSED: `RemoveHeadersConfig` is cloned
 * too and its count cap is not published.** The operation declares
 * `TooManyRemoveHeadersInResponseHeadersPolicy`, so a cap exists; the quotas
 * page states no number and inventing one would be worse than the gap. A breach
 * there surfaces as that error at the write, not as a pre-flight skip.
 *
 * ⚠️ **ABSENCE FROM A SOURCE IS NOT ABSENCE OF A LIMIT.** Entries marked
 * `[assumed]` have no AWS source at all; they are kept because they cost nothing
 * and constrain nothing this script sends.
 */
export const PAYLOAD_LIMITS = {
  'response-headers-policy': [
    {
      path: 'Name',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 128,
      source:
        '[assumed] — no AWS source states a policy name length; the documented Name rule is uniqueness. Pouya, 2026-09-04',
    },
    {
      path: 'Comment',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 128,
      source:
        'service model, ResponseHeadersPolicyConfig.Comment documentation: "The comment cannot be longer than 128 characters"',
    },
    {
      /* CLONED, not authored here — see the header. */
      path: 'SecurityHeadersConfig.ContentSecurityPolicy.ContentSecurityPolicy',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 1783,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas, Quotas on headers: "Maximum length of the Content-Security-Policy header value | 1,783 characters"; error shape TooLongCSPInResponseHeadersPolicy',
    },
    {
      path: 'CustomHeadersConfig.Items[].Header',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 256,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas, Quotas on headers: "Custom headers: maximum length of a header name | 256 characters"',
    },
    {
      path: 'CustomHeadersConfig.Items[].Value',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 1783,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas, Quotas on headers: "Custom headers: maximum length of a header value | 1,783 characters"',
    },
    {
      path: 'CustomHeadersConfig.Items[]',
      rule: 'maxCount',
      limit: 10,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas: "maximum number of custom headers that you can add to a response headers policy | 10" (adjustable); error shape TooManyCustomHeadersInResponseHeadersPolicy',
    },
    {
      paths: [
        'CustomHeadersConfig.Items[].Header',
        'CustomHeadersConfig.Items[].Value',
      ],
      rule: 'maxCombinedLength',
      limit: 10240,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas: "Custom headers: maximum length of all header values and names combined | 10,240 characters"',
    },
  ],
  'origin-request-policy': [
    {
      path: 'Name',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 128,
      source: '[assumed] — see the response-headers-policy Name entry',
    },
    {
      path: 'Comment',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 128,
      source:
        'service model, OriginRequestPolicyConfig.Comment documentation: "The comment cannot be longer than 128 characters". This is the one that failed on 2026-09-04 at 182',
    },
    {
      path: 'HeadersConfig.Headers.Items[]',
      rule: 'maxCount',
      limit: 10,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas: "Headers per origin request policy | 10" (adjustable); error shape TooManyHeadersInOriginRequestPolicy. We send 5',
    },
    {
      paths: ['HeadersConfig.Headers.Items[]'],
      rule: 'maxCombinedLength',
      limit: 1024,
      source:
        'CloudFront quotas: "Total combined length of all query string, header, and cookie names in an origin request policy | 1024". We contribute header names only',
    },
  ],
  /* Checked as a flag before any AWS call, because by the time a distribution
     payload exists sections 4 and 5 may already have created policies.

     ⚠️ NOT DECORATION. `aws cloudfront list-functions --output text` returns the
     ARN twice, tab-joined, because the function exists in a DEVELOPMENT and a
     LIVE stage — 113 characters, and it fails the pattern too. Staging that
     replaces a working `router.js` association with a value CloudFront will not
     accept, and `router.js` keeps 22 of 23 pages off S3's AccessDenied.
     `docs/09` Part 2 derives it correctly with `describe-function --stage LIVE`. */
  'function-association': [
    {
      path: 'FunctionARN',
      rule: 'maxLength',
      limit: 108,
      source: "service model, shape FunctionARN: {'max': 108}",
    },
    {
      path: 'FunctionARN',
      rule: 'pattern',
      limit: 'arn:aws:cloudfront::[0-9]{12}:function\\/[a-zA-Z0-9-_]{1,64}',
      source: 'service model, shape FunctionARN: pattern',
    },
  ],
};

/**
 * Resolve a dotted path, where `[]` means "every element of this array". Always
 * returns `{path, value}` pairs with the index substituted, so a violation
 * names the element rather than the collection.
 */
function resolvePath(root, path) {
  let frontier = [{ path: '', value: root }];
  for (const segment of path.split('.')) {
    const next = [];
    const isArray = segment.endsWith('[]');
    const key = isArray ? segment.slice(0, -2) : segment;
    for (const { path: p, value } of frontier) {
      const child = value?.[key];
      const here = p ? `${p}.${key}` : key;
      if (child === undefined || child === null) continue;
      if (isArray) {
        if (!Array.isArray(child)) continue;
        child.forEach((v, i) => next.push({ path: `${here}[${i}]`, value: v }));
      } else {
        next.push({ path: here, value: child });
      }
    }
    frontier = next;
  }
  return frontier;
}

/**
 * Every limit the given payload breaches. Empty means it is safe to send as far
 * as this table knows — which is a claim about the table, not about AWS.
 */
export function limitViolations(kind, payload) {
  const rules = PAYLOAD_LIMITS[kind];
  if (!rules) throw new Error(`no limit table for payload kind '${kind}'`);
  const out = [];
  const add = (v) => out.push(v);

  for (const rule of rules) {
    /* `paths` (plural) is for the aggregate rules, where AWS caps a total
       across more than one field — header names AND values combined. */
    const paths = rule.paths ?? [rule.path];
    const label = paths.join(' + ');
    const resolved = paths.flatMap((one) => resolvePath(payload, one));

    if (rule.rule === 'maxCount') {
      if (resolved.length > rule.limit) {
        add({
          path: label,
          rule: 'maxCount',
          actual: resolved.length,
          limit: rule.limit,
          message: `${label} has ${resolved.length} entries; the limit is ${rule.limit} (${rule.source})`,
        });
      }
      continue;
    }

    if (rule.rule === 'maxCombinedLength') {
      const total = resolved.reduce(
        (n, { value }) => n + (typeof value === 'string' ? value.length : 0),
        0,
      );
      if (total > rule.limit) {
        add({
          path: label,
          rule: 'maxCombinedLength',
          actual: total,
          limit: rule.limit,
          message: `${label} totals ${total} characters; the limit is ${rule.limit} (${rule.source})`,
        });
      }
      continue;
    }

    for (const { path, value } of resolved) {
      if (typeof value !== 'string') continue;
      if (rule.rule === 'maxLength' && value.length > rule.limit) {
        add({
          path,
          rule: 'maxLength',
          actual: value.length,
          limit: rule.limit,
          message: `${path} is ${value.length} characters; the limit is ${rule.limit} (${rule.source})`,
        });
      }
      if (
        rule.rule === 'pattern' &&
        !new RegExp(`^(?:${rule.limit})$`).test(value)
      ) {
        add({
          path,
          rule: 'pattern',
          actual: JSON.stringify(value),
          limit: rule.limit,
          message: `${path} does not match ${rule.limit} (${rule.source})`,
        });
      }
    }
  }
  return out;
}