adr-sml/docs/06-deployment.md

06 — Deployment and cutover

Authority: AGENTS.md §3 D3 as amended 2026-08-26 (git + Gitea Actions → existing S3/CloudFront) and D11 (build everything, one clean cutover). Existing infrastructure: AGENTS.md §7 is authoritative. docs/reference/AWS-Hosting-Guide.md records how that infrastructure was originally built — it is a historical record carrying a do-not-execute banner, not a procedure, and §7 wins wherever the two disagree (Q24).

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Topology

Gitea push to main
  └─ Gitea Actions (act_runner)
       ├─ npm ci && npm run build        → ./dist
       ├─ static scoped IAM user key      (from Gitea secrets — NOT OIDC)
       ├─ aws s3 sync ./dist s3://<bucket>   (three passes, see Cache policy)
       └─ cloudfront create-invalidation
Namecheap DNS → CloudFront → S3 (OAC)
API Gateway → Lambda → DynamoDB / SES     (intake, unchanged path)

DNS is at Namecheap, not Route 53 [verified 2026-08-25]. Nothing in the pipeline touches DNS. Certificate renewal is ACM-automatic as long as the validation CNAME stays in place at Namecheap — do not delete it.

Today, deploys run locally

npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh) is the current path. It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes in the same order with the same cache headers, and the same invalidation as the workflow — at this scale the pipeline changes only how a deploy is triggered, not what it does. Treat the script and the workflow as one artefact in two places: change one, change both.

One thing blocks the workflow, and it is not a fact to look up:

• Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered (Q23). The Gitea instance is jointly administered, so both need its second administrator.

✅ AND THAT IS NOW A DECISION RATHER THAN A BLOCKER — Pouya's ruling, 2026-09-01: THE FIRST PRODUCTION DEPLOY GOES OUT VIA scripts/deploy-local.sh, AND THE GITEA RUNNER IS DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER LAUNCH.

His reason, and it is the reason the deferral is safe: enabling Actions and registering act_runner depends on the instance's second administrator, so the date it happens is not his to set — and nothing about the deploy depends on it. The script and the workflow are one artefact in two places; they run the same guard, the same three passes with the same cache headers, the same invalidation and the same intake route check. The pipeline changes only how a deploy is triggered. So a launch that waits for a runner is a launch waiting on someone else's calendar for no gain.

What the deferral actually costs, stated rather than waved past: every deploy until then is a person at a keyboard with a long-lived access key in their environment, and nothing gates a merge to main (there is no pull_request trigger). Both were already true; the ruling does not add a risk, it declines to remove one yet. AGENTS.md R17's rotation date does not move — the key is live either way.

It is not a cutover-checklist item and must not become one: a checklist fires once, at cutover, and this is deliberately scheduled for after it. The docs/09-cutover-runbook.md Part 8 sequence is the deploy path that ships.

✅ adr-sml-deploy EXISTS — created 2026-08-26, Q22 closed 2026-08-28. DO NOT CREATE IT. This bullet said "adr-sml-deploy does not exist — aws iam get-user returns NoSuchEntity… Create it from Create the user below" until 2026-08-28, and an operator following it would have created a second IAM user, or hand-provisioned one with a different scope from the adr-sml-deploy-minimal policy §7 now records. §7 carries the inventory and the eight simulate-principal-policy results.

Found by adversarial-reviewer: the Q22 flip to PROVISIONED was swept in AGENTS.md and nowhere else, and the Change Log entry's sweep block covered the copy corrections only. Same shape as the SES-DKIM inversion — the stale copy instructed an action against a High-risk credential.

Create the user below is retained as the record of how it was provisioned, not as an instruction. Read it that way.

The script refuses to run as user/pouya — the broadly-permissioned personal user that has been authenticating to this account. See §10.

CI runs on Gitea, not GitHub

AGENTS.md D3 as amended, 2026-08-26: self-hosted Gitea. The instance, version, and repository are recorded in §7 — the version is comfortably above the floor for the vars context, so the first-step guard is belt-and-braces rather than load-bearing.

The live pipeline is .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml. Gitea Actions speaks GitHub Actions syntax, so it is a near-direct port — the build steps, the three-pass sync, and the cache headers are unchanged. The GitHub Actions original, with its OIDC role assumption, stays in the repo as docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example — deliberately outside .github/workflows/, because Gitea falls back to that directory when .gitea/workflows is absent.

The one real difference: no OIDC

Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider. There is no role to assume, so deploys authenticate with a scoped IAM user whose access key lives only in the repository's Gitea secrets.

This is a genuine step down in security from an OIDC setup — which was designed here but never built — and it should be treated as one. The mitigations are the policy scope and the rotation schedule.

Create the user:

1. IAM → Users → adr-sml-deploy. Programmatic access only — no console password, no MFA device, no group membership.
2. Attach this inline policy and nothing else. Substitute the real bucket name, account ID, and distribution ID from scripts/aws-discover.sh:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "ListSiteBucket",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "s3:ListBucket",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::BUCKET_NAME"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "WriteSiteObjects",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject"],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::BUCKET_NAME/*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "InvalidateOneDistribution",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "cloudfront:CreateInvalidation",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:cloudfront::ACCOUNT_ID:distribution/DISTRIBUTION_ID"
    }
  ]
}

Four actions on one bucket and one distribution. No Action: "*", no Resource: "*" — the only wildcard is BUCKET_NAME/*, which scopes to the objects of that one bucket. s3:PutObjectAcl was dropped on 2026-08-26: aws s3 sync does not use it without --acl, and it is inert under Origin Access Control with ACLs disabled. If a deploy step needs a permission this policy lacks, the correct response is to question the step, not to widen the policy.

3. Create an access key. Copy it once — AWS will not show the secret again.

s3:AbortMultipartUpload is deliberately absent, and here is the actual reason. aws s3 sync switches to multipart above its 8 MB multipart_threshold; an interrupted multipart upload then cannot clean up its own parts, and orphaned parts accrue storage charges that do not appear in the bucket listing. What makes that safe today is simply that nothing here comes close to 8 MB — the largest file the pipeline uploads is well under it. The biggest source asset is src/assets/pouya-lajevardi.jpg at 357,627 bytes [verified 2026-08-26 — stat], Astro emits it smaller still after AVIF/WebP conversion, and the self-hosted font files are smaller again. Re-measure ./dist after the first successful build — that, not the repository, is what gets synced. No lifecycle rule exists; do not describe one as the mitigation, because it is not there.

Revisit if any single asset approaches 8 MB — a video, a large PDF, an un-optimised photograph. At that point either add an S3 lifecycle rule aborting incomplete multipart uploads after 7 days (preferred — it costs no IAM permission), or grant s3:AbortMultipartUpload on BUCKET_NAME/*.

Gitea configuration

Repository → Settings → Actions → Secrets:

Name	Value
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID	from the IAM user
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY	from the IAM user

Repository → Settings → Actions → Variables — not secrets. These are not sensitive, and keeping them as variables means they appear in run logs where they are useful for debugging.

Variable	Value
AWS_REGION	AGENTS.md §7 — Region
S3_BUCKET	§7 — S3 bucket
CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID	§7 — CloudFront

⚠️ INTAKE_ENDPOINT AND BOOKING_URL WERE ROWS HERE AND ARE GONE, 2026-08-31. Build step 8 moved the intake form to the same-origin path /api/intake, after which nothing in the build read either one — and both deploy paths were still refusing to run without INTAKE_ENDPOINT. The removal was made in the two scripts and not here, so this table went on telling an operator to set a variable no guard checked and no build consumed. Found by adversarial-reviewer round 2, whose sharper point is about the evidence: the removal was justified with git grep PUBLIC_INTAKE_ENDPOINT -- src/ — a path-scoped grep offered as proof of a repo-wide removal, and git grep additionally cannot see untracked files, which at that moment was most of the new work. That is CLAUDE.md's a sweep is a command, not a claim and sweep the vocabulary, not only the subject, both at once.

⚠️ AND ONE PLACE STILL CARRIES IT: .env.example sets PUBLIC_INTAKE_ENDPOINT to the full execute-api hostname, and PUBLIC_BOOKING_URL. That falsifies a live claim in src/data/intake.ts — which said the endpoint id "is not restated in the repo either" — and the claim has been corrected there rather than left standing. The file itself was not edited: this environment denies read access to it, and nothing in this repo may edit a file it cannot read. It is in the batched list for Pouya: delete both lines, and PUBLIC_ANALYTICS_* with them, since ANALYTICS is a literal in src/data/site.ts.

The three values above fill the IAM policy's BUCKET_NAME, ACCOUNT_ID and DISTRIBUTION_ID placeholders. They are deliberately not restated here — §7 is the single source of truth for operational facts, and the copy that goes stale is always the one nobody re-reads. scripts/aws-discover.sh regenerates them from AWS if §7 ever needs re-verifying.

Read this before creating the key. The AWS account is not a single-project account: it is shared with several unrelated sites and with a bucket whose name indicates another business's production client-database backups. AGENTS.md §10 has the specifics and the account identifier; they are kept there rather than repeated here. A static deploy key for a marketing site lives in that same account, and the scoped policy is what keeps a compromised Gitea runner from reaching any of it. Do not widen it, and never put the user/pouya credentials in CI.

A runner must exist

Gitea Actions needs act_runner registered to this repository or its organisation, and Actions enabled both site-wide in app.ini ([actions] ENABLED = true) and per-repository. Without a runner the workflow queues silently and never runs — which looks exactly like a broken pipeline.

The workflow installs the AWS CLI if the runner image lacks it, and runs aws sts get-caller-identity before touching anything. That check is narrower than it looks: sts:GetCallerIdentity requires no IAM permission at all, so it succeeds for any valid key regardless of policy. It catches a missing, malformed, or revoked key; it does not catch an under-scoped policy, which still fails halfway through a sync and leaves the bucket partially updated. Read it as a key check, not a permissions check.

The variable guard runs first

The workflow's first step — before checkout, before the build, before any AWS call — fails the run if AWS_REGION, S3_BUCKET, or CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID is empty.

This exists because Gitea only added the vars context in 1.21. On an older instance every ${{ vars.* }} interpolates to an empty string with no warning, the sync target becomes s3://, and the run dies halfway through with an error that names nothing useful. The guard converts that into a clean failure that says which variable is missing — on every Gitea version. A recorded version number would have gone stale; the guard does not.

Key rotation — an operational obligation

Rotate adr-sml-deploy quarterly. OIDC would have made this unnecessary; with a static key it is a standing task:

1. Create a second access key on the same user.
2. Update the Gitea secrets.
3. Run the workflow and confirm it succeeds.
4. Delete the old key. Rotation that leaves the old key active is not rotation.

Set a calendar reminder. A key that is never rotated is the failure mode this whole section exists to bound.

Finding the AWS identifiers

scripts/aws-discover.sh re-collects the inventory — bucket, distribution ID, regions, API endpoint, certificate, SES identities, and whether S3 versioning is on. Read-only; no call creates or mutates anything.

chmod +x scripts/aws-discover.sh
./scripts/aws-discover.sh > aws-inventory.txt

The output contains resource names and IDs but no secrets.

Why OIDC would have been better — and why it is unavailable

Do not execute this section. It describes the design that was rejected because Gitea cannot support it. The live procedure is Create the user above. Nothing here should be created in AWS. Following it would add an unused GitHub federation trust to the shared AWS account (AGENTS.md §10).

A static AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID never expires, is invisible once set, and grants its permissions to anyone who can reach the repository. OIDC issues a short-lived token per run, scoped to one repository and one branch — strictly better, and the reason the rotation schedule above is not optional here.

It needs an identity provider AWS will federate with. GitHub and GitLab both publish one; Gitea and Forgejo do not, so there is nothing for AWS to trust and no role to assume. That is the whole of the constraint (D3 as amended).

If the project ever moves to GitHub, the workflow to adopt is docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example, and the setup is: register token.actions.githubusercontent.com as an IAM OIDC provider with audience sts.amazonaws.com; create a role trusting it, conditioned on the sub claim matching the repository and refs/heads/main; attach the same four-action policy given above; then delete adr-sml-deploy and its key.

Cache policy

The mistake to avoid is caching HTML aggressively — a stale index page is a site that does not update.

Pattern	Cache-Control
*.html	public, max-age=0, must-revalidate
/_astro/* (hashed)	public, max-age=31536000, immutable
Fonts	public, max-age=31536000, immutable
Images	public, max-age=604800
robots.txt, sitemap*.xml	public, max-age=0, must-revalidate

Sync in three passes, in this order: hashed assets and fonts with the long TTL, then images, then everything else. Uploading HTML last means a user never fetches a new page whose assets have not landed yet.

Two ordering dependencies are load-bearing and easy to break:

• Pass 3 re-walks the whole tree; the image headers from pass 2 survive only because aws s3 sync skips objects it has just uploaded. Reordering the passes silently overwrites them with the HTML header.
• Pass 3's --exclude "_astro/*" --exclude "fonts/*" also excludes those prefixes from --delete, so hashed assets from previous deploys are kept deliberately — pages still in a browser cache need them. Do not "fix" it.

robots.txt and sitemap*.xml fall through to pass 3 and get the HTML header. That is the intended behaviour: both should be re-fetched, and the table above records what the pipeline actually does rather than an unimplemented ideal.

Invalidate /* on deploy. At this traffic volume the cost is nil, and partial invalidation paths are a reliable source of confusing bugs.

CloudFront configuration

• Origin: S3 with Origin Access Control, bucket not public. Verify the bucket policy grants access only to the CloudFront distribution's OAC principal and to nothing else, and that public access is still blocked.
• Redirect HTTP → HTTPS. TLS 1.2 minimum.
• Default root object index.html.
• Custom error response: 404 → /404.html with response code 404, not 200. Returning 200 for a missing page tells crawlers every bad URL is real content, and it is the single most common misconfiguration in this stack.
• Compression on. Response-headers policy from 05-backend-spec.md.
• A CloudFront Function for trailing-slash normalisation, so /about and /about/ do not both resolve as separate indexable URLs.

Branch model

main is production; a push to main is what triggers a deploy. Work on short-lived branches, open a PR, merge.

The CI pipeline has never run. Not for want of a lockfile — npm ci, astro check and astro build all work now — but because the deploy user does not exist (Q22) and Actions are not enabled with a runner registered (Q23). Treat "every push deploys" as the design; today the path is npm run deploy.

Pull request checks — planned, not implemented: npm run build · astro check · lint · Lighthouse CI against the budgets in 04-seo-spec.md · link check. .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml has no pull_request trigger (only push on main and workflow_dispatch), so nothing gates a merge today. npm run build, npm run check and npm run lint all run clean locally.

Lighthouse is still not one of the checks that can be wired — and the reason changed on 2026-08-31. npm run lighthouse exists again (step 7a, AGENTS.md §7), so the blocker is no longer a missing script: it is that standalone Lighthouse drives an installed browser and the runner has none. Wiring it would need Chrome on the act_runner host (Q23). Wire the other four; do not write a workflow step that shells out to a browser that is not there. The gate lives locally and on the cutover checklist below.

Tag every production deploy v<year>.<n> so a rollback has something to name.

Rollback

1. Re-run the workflow at the last good tag, or
2. git revert and push, or
3. Restore from S3 object versioning — already Enabled on the site bucket (AGENTS.md §7). It is the difference between a rollback and a rebuild; do not turn it off.

Then invalidate /*.

Cutover checklist — D11 is a single shot, so run all of it

The commands are in docs/09-cutover-runbook.md. This list is what must be true; that file is how, in order, with each command's verification and the output to expect. It also records the order dependency this list cannot show: the distribution work goes first and the site sync goes last, because reversing them puts 22 of 23 pages behind a 403 for as long as a CloudFront deployment takes.

🛑 ONE THING BLOCKS THIS ENTIRE LIST AS AT 2026-09-02, AND IT IS A WAITING PERIOD RATHER THAN A TASK: Q60.

✅ THE READ-THROUGH IS COMPLETE — Pouya, 2026-09-02, and it returned ONE FINDING WHICH WAS NOT COPY. public/favicon.ico shipped with no transparency; fixed and verified the same day (see Favicon set complete below). His read carried the approvals with it, in terms: the /legal/privacy/ §Who can see it wording, the SML Company Ltd consent line, and /med-arb/ as shipped. That discharges blocker 2 and every wording sign-off that had been routed into it.

⚠️ THE COUNT NOW READS ONE AGAIN, AND THE EARLIER ONE WAS A DEFECT — READ THE REASON, NOT THE NUMBER. It said ONE earlier on 2026-09-02 because an approval had gone missing from the list; it says ONE now because the pass that approval was routed into has been done. A tally cannot tell those apart, which is the point the note below has been making all day.

⚠️ (The count has moved repeatedly in one day and the DIRECTION is the only part worth reading — the number of moves is deliberately not stated, because a tally of how often a tally changed is the same trap one level up. It said ONE for part of 2026-09-02 and that was a defect — the wording approval Pouya reserved had been recorded only inside records marked closed, the TODO(pouya) deleted, Q62 struck, this callout ticked, so nothing would have stopped unapproved copy publishing (adversarial-reviewer, D20 pass round 1). Q63 was then answered in three limbs by ruling, which is a gate closed by an answer rather than by deletion — and answering it opened Q64, one paragraph lower on the same page. Q64 then left the list a third way: the paragraph it was about was deleted, so the question is moot rather than answered. Closed, deleted, and moot look identical in a count and nowhere else, which is why the count is never the record. The second slot is no longer a question at all — it is the human pass, promoted here from the checklist below because that is where the last reserved approval went missing.)

1. Q60 — the retention MECHANISM has still not been observed. TTL is ENABLED and no record has been watched to disappear, and /legal/privacy/ asserts the mechanism, not merely the period. docs/09 Part 10 is the test; its earliest useful reading is 48 hours after the record is written and it does not call failure before 7 days, so start it before anything else on this page. It is the one blocker that is a waiting period rather than a task.
2. ✅ DONE 2026-09-02 — Pouya read every page against AGENTS.md §4. The human pass, the other half of D20 and not delegable. It was also where the §Who can see it approval was routed, and his ruling that the read-through is the approval means that sign-off is now discharged rather than pending. Sole finding: the favicon's opaque ground. No copy finding on any of the 23 pages.

✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — Q64, MOOT. It asked whether anyone else holds the AWS root password or its MFA device, because the page published "has no programmatic key, and I hold it" one paragraph below "the small number of people who administer it with me", where a reader takes it as sole custody. Pouya's second ruling that day deleted the sentence — the section is now four plain statements and says nothing about root — so the question no longer gates anything. ⚠️ The underlying fact is unchanged and unestablished: §7 records root as held by Pouya, which is not held only by Pouya, and nothing measured can settle it. Nothing may be published about root custody without asking again.

✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — Q63, all three limbs, by ruling. (a) The §Who can see it wording is approved with two trims — the editorial closing sentence struck, and the mailbox clause rewritten per (b). (b) info@smlcompany.ca is a delegated mailbox read by Pouya and by administrative staff, and the page now says so instead of "anyone who can reach that mailbox". (c) The account root credential is held by Pouya; it has no programmatic key and MFA is on, and the page now states the first two of those. ⚠️ AND THE ANSWER CHANGED THE HEADLINE SENTENCE: Pouya's attestation is that "two people is an exaggeration… a handful is accurate", because the simulation counts identities and the page was reading them as humans. No numeric human headcount ships; the page attributes read access to "the account's administrators — me, and the small number of people who administer it with me". §12 R21 is re-scoped to match. ⚠️ (Superseded the same day in its details, not in its rulings: the ruling below cut the section to four plain statements, so the sentence quoted above is no longer the shipped one and root is not mentioned at all. Each limb of Q63 still stands — no headcount, the mailbox named, root attested in §7.)

✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — THE SECTION IS GENERIC, by a second ruling the same day. "It over-explains technical mechanics that belong in the evidence file, not in front of an inquirer." §Who can see it is now four short statements — who can read it, that the receiving system can only add a record, where the notification goes and who reads it, and that the confirmation sits with the reader's own provider. Deleted from §Who can see it: the measurement paragraph, the root-credential sentence, the single-sign-on and federated- login enumeration, the resource-policy clause, the "company that runs a database" aside, the deploy-credential sentence and the three-copies summary. ⚠️ THE SHARED-ACCOUNT CLAUSE WAS CUT WITH THEM AND THEN RESTORED — to §Where it is stored, where it belongs. It is a storage disclosure rather than mechanics, the ruling did not name it, and without it no page told a reader their intake sits in an account that also runs unrelated systems (adversarial-reviewer, round 1). These lists must stay identical — there were four of them and they named four different sets. None of that verified material was lost — all of it stays in AGENTS.md §7 and docs/reference/intake-table-access-verification.md, and the section comment in src/pages/legal/privacy.astro bars restoring it to the page. The risk moved in the right direction: every deleted sentence was a claim about a system outside this repository that nothing reports on, which is what §12 R21 exists for — R21 is re-scoped from five live claims to two.

✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — THE CONSENT STRING NAMES THE CORPORATION. "I consent to SML Company Ltd storing and using the information in this form…", per ruling, replacing the natural person. It is the one sentence a submitter actually agrees to and it is the PIPEDA basis, and the policy it links to describes a mailbox read by administrative staff — a corporation is the party that matches, and /legal/privacy/ now names it in terms under §Why it is collected. The NAME ONLY: §4 verifies the federal incorporation, records it as not published, and cautions that it must never be read beside the licence-status row. docs/05 §Consent text carries the string verbatim and moved with it.

✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — Q62. /legal/privacy/ no longer states anything false about who can read the intake table. Pouya's ruling was state the truth, not remove the second administrator's access: the page attributes read access to the account's administrators and names their role. (It said "two people can read it" until the Q63 ruling later the same day replaced the count, and the ruling after that cut the section to four plain statements — of the two stronger facts this entry originally credited it with, the writing function's add-only access still ships and the deploy credential's lack of access does not. See the two blocks above.) The sole-administrator-q62 tripwire in check-claims.mjs stays permanently by the same ruling, extended from two alternatives to five: the clause the first form could not see two sections up the same page, the summary that would have re-asserted the struck number four lines below the corrected paragraph, and the sentence that carried the false count. Proven both ways against the pre-correction page rebuilt from bd282aa — exit 1 with 5 matches, exit 0 on the corrected page, and re-proven both ways after the Q63 rewrite, same 5 matches at the same lines.

✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — the /med-arb/ gloss. Struck, with no replacement and no competence claim, per ruling; ratified as shipped on 2026-09-02 with no credential line restored. Pouya's note, recorded because it is the reason and not a detail: med-arb is a service he provides, not a designation. That is what makes the struck gloss unrecoverable rather than merely unsourced — there is no designation to cite for it. The ADRIC-sourced material carries the section.

Cutover prep — deferred maintenance, done BEFORE the checklist below

This group exists because deferring a thing and forgetting it look identical three weeks later. Each item carries the date it was deferred and the reason, so the decision is re-readable rather than re-litigated.

• ⚠️ TWO DEPENDENCY MAJORS ARE ONE BEHIND, DEFERRED 2026-09-01 BY RULING. @astrojs/mdx ^7.0.8 → 8.0.0 and typescript ^6.0.3 → 7.0.2. Pouya's reasoning: "npm audit is clean and majors mid-walkthrough add churn without user value." npm audit reports 0 vulnerabilities [verified 2026-09-01], so this is a churn decision and not a security one — and it would become a security decision the moment that stops being true. Take both majors here, before cutover, and read the changelogs rather than the version numbers: an MDX major can change how docs/03's copy renders, and a TypeScript major can change what astro check accepts, which is a gate on both deploy paths. AGENTS.md R11 keeps firing at every phase boundary as designed — this item is the deferral, not a replacement for the reminder, and R11 is what will raise the next pin that drifts. The sweep behind this item, npm view <pkg> version across all 19 pins [verified 2026-09-01]: those two are the only majors behind. Four are a minor or patch behind and are already satisfied by their own carets, so they need no edit — astro 7.2.9 → 7.2.10, @astrojs/sitemap 3.7.3 → 3.7.4, globals 17.11.0 → 17.12.0, typescript-eslint 8.68.0 → 8.69.0. The remaining 13 are current. Re-run the sweep here rather than trusting this list: it is dated for that reason

Content and compliance

⚠️ THE FIRST TWO ITEMS ARE THE PROJECT'S ONLY FULL CLAIMS PASS — D20, Pouya, 2026-08-30. claims-auditor no longer runs per build step; /build Phase 3 is adversarial-reviewer alone. Everything the register is meant to prevent therefore lands here. AGENTS.md D20 records both the reasoning and what deferring it costs — read it before treating either item as a formality, and do not tick one because npm run check:claims is green. That script is a greppable tripwire; it cannot read a page.

• claims-auditor run over EVERY page in dist/, findings resolved. This is the project's only full claims pass. Nothing publishes until it is clean. Not per-page in isolation — the pass exists here because the defects worth catching late are the ones that only exist once the pages sit next to each other. Give it the whole built site and the reading order a visitor takes.

  ✅ **IT HAS RUN ONCE, 2026-09-01, OVER ALL 23 PAGES — AND IT RETURNED
  FAIL WITH EIGHT FINDINGS, WHICH IS THE ARGUMENT FOR D20 RATHER THAN
  AGAINST IT.** Five are corrected (`/practice/energy/`'s lede asserted a
  change to how *generation* connects, which the extract's own quotation
  denies; `/practice/insurance/` stated an absolute adjudicator
  disqualification where LAT Rule 14.3 says *"except with the consent of the
  parties"*, and glossed one permissive sentence as *"the Tribunal's own
  materials point parties toward mediation"*; `/practice/technology/` asserted
  *"no federal or Ontario statute"* — a universal over the **four**
  instruments its extract checked — and its own note then disclaimed that
  conclusion as the Commissioner's words; `/med-arb/` said the ADRIC Med-Arb
  Rules were presented to the membership where the source says a **discussion
  draft** was). ✅ **Two of the three remaining were ruled and closed
  2026-09-02** — Q62 (the page now states the measured truth) and the
  `/med-arb/` gloss (struck, no replacement).
  
  ⚠️ **AND THE PASS WAS RE-RUN OVER THOSE TWO FIXES ON 2026-09-02, WHICH IS
  WHAT MAKES THE ITEM CLOSEABLE — IT RETURNED FAIL WITH EIGHT MORE.** This is
  the same pass completing, not a per-step audit reinstated: a FAIL whose
  fixes are never re-audited leaves *"findings resolved"* asserted rather than
  checked. **Five of the eight were in the fixes themselves** — the
  replacement copy reintroduced an absolute third-party negative of the
  shape struck from this page on 2026-08-31, claimed an enumeration the
  evidence file did not support, asserted *"the one other place a copy
  exists"* when the inquirer's confirmation carries the whole submission,
  left `LAST_UPDATED` at 31 August on the change set that rewrote the page's
  central disclosure, and left *"your IP address"* standing when `docs/09`
  Part 7.2 had said in terms to fold it into the Q62 edit. Two were on
  `/med-arb/`: the struck gloss left *"the section above"* pointing at the
  ADRIC rule set and *"the agreement"* with no antecedent, and the bare
  designations line was left sitting directly under ADRIC's competence
  quotation. One was declined with a reason (§Rules' heading — see the
  Change Log). **All corrected or declined; the pass is clean on findings
  and the item is open only on the human halves above.**
  
  **Two things about that result are worth carrying forward.** The pass found
  no defect in any claim about Pouya, his credentials or his designations —
  every one traced. What it found was **five over-reaches in glosses on
  sourced legal material**, which is the failure mode a per-step claims run on
  a single page is least able to see and the one `check:claims` cannot grep
  for at all. **And it re-derived a stale instruction inside its own brief:**
  `.claude/agents/claims-auditor.md` still tells it Q.Arb is *"commenced
  August 2026"*, which §4 struck on 2026-08-29 — applied literally it would
  have flagged correct copy and demanded the struck form. It read §4 instead.
  That is the fifth stale claim found in that file and it is not the agent's
  to fix
  

• ✅ THE §Who can see it WORDING APPROVAL IS DISCHARGED — Pouya's ruling, 2026-09-02: "the read-through is the approval." Q62 settled what the section must say and he reserved the wording; he then ruled twice on it the same day — Q63(a) approving with two trims, and the second ruling cutting the section to four plain statements — and directed in terms that nothing be held open waiting on a separate sign-off. ⚠️ THIS TICK IS NOT "THE TEXT HAS BEEN READ". It records that the reserved approval has moved, to the read-through blocker in the callout above and the item below. Two ticked boxes stood here for one round — one for the ruling, one for the text — because a single tick over changed copy is how an approval requirement went missing the first time (adversarial-reviewer, round 2). They collapse into this one only because the ruling collapsed them, and the gate did not disappear: it is blocker 2 in the callout above, which is the most-read place on this page rather than the least.

• ✅ CLOSED 2026-09-02 — Q64 IS MOOT: THE PARAGRAPH WAS DELETED. It asked whether anyone else holds the AWS root password or its MFA device, because /legal/privacy/ published "has no programmatic key, and I hold it" one paragraph below "the small number of people who administer it with me" — where a reader takes it as sole custody, which nothing establishes. Pouya's second ruling that day struck the sentence along with the rest of the mechanics, so no page says anything about root and the question gates nothing. The TODO(pouya) is gone from src/pages/legal/privacy.astro with the paragraph that carried it. ⚠️ THE FACT IS STILL UNESTABLISHED AND THAT DID NOT CHANGE. §7 records root as held by Pouya, which is not held only by Pouya; root is not an IAM principal and cannot be simulated. Nothing about root custody may be published without asking him again — the section comment in the page source carries that bar, because "we deleted it" and "we checked it" are the same green tick from three weeks away.

• ✅ Q63(b) ANSWERED 2026-09-02 — info@smlcompany.ca is a DELEGATED MAILBOX: Pouya and administrative staff read it. The page said "anyone who can reach that mailbox", which was true either way and answered the mail half of the question on a lower standard than the table half. It now states who reads it. The fact is in AGENTS.md §7 and §12 R21's trigger covers it — like the AWS enumeration, nothing reports when a delegation changes. ⚠️ The answer reached FOUR sentences, not the one the question named — §Where it is stored twice, §How long it is kept once, §Who can see it once — because "my mailbox" had been written as a personal one throughout. That is the fifth partial sweep on this page's who-can-see-it set; the section comment in src/pages/legal/privacy.astro enumerates them by opening phrase rather than by count — deliberately, because the count has been wrong twice, and this line carried "eight" for a round after the comment itself had been corrected to nine (adversarial-reviewer, round 2). Read the list, not a number

• ✅ DONE 2026-09-02 — Pouya has read every page against AGENTS.md §4. The human pass, the other half of D20 and not delegable — his reading is what the per-step audit was traded for. It returned one finding across 23 pages and that finding was not copy: the favicon shipped with an opaque cream ground. The /legal/privacy/ §Who can see it wording, the SML Company Ltd consent line and /med-arb/ as shipped are approved by this read, per his ruling that the read-through is the approval. ⚠️ This does NOT discharge claims-auditor's cutover pass, which is a separate item on this list: D20 traded the per-step machine audit for the human pass plus one machine pass over the finished site, and one of those two has now happened. ⚠️ START WITH /legal/privacy/ §Who can see it. IT IS BLOCKER 2 IN THE CALLOUT ABOVE, AND THIS READ IS THE APPROVAL — struck 2026-09-02: the pass is DONE, and an unstruck imperative on a ticked item told an operator to begin a read this page also records as finished, pointing at a blocker that no longer exists (adversarial-reviewer, round 2). What it said remains true of what happened: Pouya ruled on 2026-09-02 that nothing waits on a separate wording sign-off, and he read §Who can see it first. Every sentence in it changed three times that day — Q62's ruling, Q63's, then the ruling that cut it to four plain statements — and it is the only section on the site whose subject lives entirely outside this repository. It is now four sentences and should take a minute; that is the point of the cut. The verified material behind them is in docs/reference/intake-table-access-verification.md and AGENTS.md §7 if he wants to check any of it, and the page deliberately no longer cites it. Then read the two /contact/ sentences against it, which is a judgement rather than a defect — /contact/received/ says "email me directly at info@smlcompany.ca — that reaches me whether or not the receipt did" and /contact/ says "Send the form below, or email me directly". Neither is false and neither asserts exclusivity; the mail does reach him. But /legal/privacy/ now discloses that administrative staff read that mailbox, and a party who has just been told to send dispute detail "directly" to the neutral may take more from the word than is true. A sweep of all 23 built pages found these two as the only other surfaces touching the point. Raised as consider, not blocking, by adversarial-reviewer round 1. ✅ THE THIRD SURFACE IS DECIDED — the CONSENT string now names the corporation. "I consent to SML Company Ltd storing and using the information in this form…", Pouya's ruling 2026-09-02, replacing the natural person. It is the one sentence a submitter actually agrees to and it is the PIPEDA basis, and the policy it links to describes a mailbox read by administrative staff — a corporation is the party that matches, and /legal/privacy/ now names it in terms under §Why it is collected. The sweep that had missed it was anchored on mailbox vocabulary ("email me directly", "reaches me"), which is R8's sharpest edge: the right command, the wrong anchor. ⚠️ THE PAGE AROUND IT STILL SAYS "me" AND "I", AND THAT IS DELIBERATE, NOT AN OVERSIGHT — read the two together and say if it reads wrong. The ruling changed the consent sentence and nothing else; /legal/privacy/ is written in the first person throughout ("whatever you send me", "in your hands rather than mine"), and /contact/ is too. Nothing is false either way — he is the accountable individual, the corporation holds the systems — but the checkbox and the prose beside it now name different parties, and that is a judgement about voice which is his and not a reviewer's.

• ✅ MEMBERSHIPS RE-CONFIRMED 2026-09-02 — Pouya: ADRIC, ADRIO, the three OBA sections and the CTF are all current. §4 and src/data/site.ts are re-stamped [verified 2026-09-02 — Pouya]. ⚠️ THERE ARE TWO ARRAYS AND RE-STAMPING DOES NOT CHECK THAT THEY AGREE. CREDENTIALS.memberships feeds /about/'s visible list and /bio/; MEMBERSHIP_ORGS feeds /process/ §Confidentiality and the memberOf triples, and site.ts records that the two differ on three of four lines. _MembershipParity compares their lengths only, so a substitution passes npm run check in silence. An earlier form of this line said schema.ts emitted from the same constant (adversarial-reviewer, round 1). RE-ARM THIS FOR THE NEXT REPUBLISH — the row does not close. AGENTS.md §12 R10, which is an event trigger and cutover is one of its two events. Q44 closed 2026-08-28 and the group is published on /about/ (ADRIC, ADRIO, the three OBA sections, the CTF, [verified 2026-08-28 — Pouya]), so this item is no longer "publish them" — it is "ask him again, then re-stamp §4 with the cutover date." Pouya declined renewal-date tracking, which is exactly why this sits on the checklist: there is no date on which anyone would otherwise re-check. OCNI lapsed quietly and §4 records it as "not current, do not publish" — found roughly a year late. A stamp is not a renewal receipt. Do NOT add a currency sentence to the page while you are here — his ruling is "list the memberships; promise nothing about their future state", and the struck sentence stays struck. memberOf IS EMITTED on /about/ — Q53 answered 2026-08-28 and the withholding is dropped, so the graph asserts the same four memberships the page shows. This item therefore covers both: re-confirming before cutover means src/data/schema.ts as well as the visible list, and they must not be allowed to diverge. §4 records yearly renewal for the OBA sections and the CTF only — it says nothing about ADRIC's or ADRIO's period, and an earlier version of this line asserted "all renew yearly", which §4 does not support. ⚠️ ASKED AND ANSWERED ON 2026-09-02 — that is why this is ticked, and the distinction is the whole of R10. It was ticked against a fresh one-line confirmation from Pouya, not against the 2026-08-28 stamp: a stamp is not a renewal receipt. The question to ask next time is unchanged — "are ADRIC, ADRIO, the three OBA sections and the CTF all still current?" — and the answer is followed by re-stamping all four stamp-bearing sites: §4, src/data/site.ts, src/data/schema.ts and src/pages/about.astro, which is the page that renders the group and is therefore the file an editor most plausibly reads to check currency. ⚠️ It was missing from this list and carried a stale date in the present tense (adversarial-reviewer, round 2). ⚠️ NO RUNNING TALLY OF WHAT WAITS ON POUYA IS KEPT HERE ANY MORE. This line said "the only cutover item", was corrected to "one of three", and was then rewritten as "the one item still waiting… is his own read-through" in the same change set that opened Q64 — wrong three times, in the same direction each time: a count written while the change set was still adding items. The checkbox column is the tally. Unticked items above are what waits on him.

• ✅ THE SEVEN VOLATILE docs/reference/ EXTRACTS RE-CHECKED — AGENTS.md §12 R18, whose trigger is the same "before any cutover" event R10 uses. ⚠️ THIS ITEM DID NOT EXIST UNTIL 2026-09-02 AND THAT WAS THE DEFECT: R18 names a cutover as its trigger and the cutover checklist carried no item to fire it, which is Q22's shape — a documented control living somewhere it cannot run. R10 was on this list; R18 was not. Re-checked 2026-09-01 by Pouya. All seven hold and no shipped sentence changed. Three were re-verified against a source and four are held unchanged on a cadence judgement rather than a fresh retrieval — the distinction is stamped per limb in AGENTS.md §12 R18 and in each extract, because "re-checked" and "not looked at, judged slow" are not the same stamp and collapsing them is how OCNI lapsed. Re-fire this on the next republish that turns on one of them, and note that the fastest mover — Bill C-36 — needs no page edit while it sits at second reading and needs one the day it does not.

• The OBA sections stay listed; the LSO stays out — a check that nobody has tidied the two into one list, not an open question. AGENTS.md Q51 answered 2026-08-28: the Law Society is the regulator, so membership is licensure; the OBA is a voluntary association, which admits members it does not license. Structural, and independent of eligibility details — which is what made the question unanswerable inside this repo before the ruling. R1 is still live: same page, same subject, different question

• No TODO(pouya) remains in any shipped page

• No matter counts, rates, dollar figures, or testimonials anywhere

• Q.Arb described as held everywhere it appears — Q.Arb (ADRIC / ADRIO), no acquisition date. Every stage form is barred: "commenced", "in progress", "pathway", "not yet" (amended 2026-08-29). npm run check:claims enforces the stage words and a date near the designation, on dist/, in both deploy paths. It cannot catch a stage expressed without naming the designation; that gap is claims-auditor's to close, and it is stated in the pattern itself

• C.Med-Arb appears nowhere in dist/ — struck entirely 2026-08-29

• /fees/ carries the rates confirmed in D14 and docs/07-fees.md, or the page does not ship. And the reservation sentence sits adjacent to the overtime row — Q59, ruled 2026-08-31: a reader who takes the $500 and skips "a full day reserves the day; half-day overtime is subject to availability" has read a different offer, and the arithmetic then makes the full-day rate look strictly worse

• Privacy policy matches the backend as actually built. Three of its statements are derived and cannot drift — the collected-data list from INTAKE_FIELDS, the retention period from the handler's own figure, the analytics paragraph from ANALYTICS.installed. If analytics are installed, that flag flips and the policy's last-updated date moves on the same build; a policy naming a processor that processes nothing is a false disclosure

• /insights/ — check which state it is in. While no article is published the page emits noindex (derived from the collection) and SiteHeader keeps Insights out of the primary nav until two are live. Both clear themselves on publication. D9 means the flip is Pouya's: src/content.config.ts refuses draft: false without reviewedByPouya: true

• ⚠️ AND PUBLISHING THE SECOND ARTICLE IS GATED — AGENTS.md R20, ruled 2026-09-01. The flip that makes /insights/ indexable is the same flip that adds the seventh nav item, and with seven items under fallback font metrics the masthead measures 141 px across 1056–1091 px: a 60 px layout shift on every page and 44 px of #main behind the sticky header after the skip link, both at the default text size. No seventh nav item ships until that is fixed, so the fix is a prerequisite of article #2 — not a follow-up to it. The measurements and the two candidate fixes are on the seventh-nav-item item under Technical below

• The five drafted articles are draft: true and therefore invisible to check:claims, which reads dist/. They were checked once, on 2026-08-31, by temporarily publishing all five and running it — clean on 27 pages. Re-run it that way before any of them publishes, because a draft that changes in between is unchecked

Technical

• npm run lighthouse on the full built site, from a machine with Chrome — it is not in CI and cannot be (see above). Read the exit status. Every category ≥ 95 on every page; the accessibility figure is measured with prefers-reduced-motion forced and that qualification is reported with it (AGENTS.md §7). ✅ Run 2026-09-01 on the 23-page build: exit 0, worst of 23 is 99 / 100 / 100 / 100. Re-run at cutover — this is dated, not discharged. ⚠️ The script was enumerating 22 of 23 and its header claimed it enumerated the site. It collected index.html only, and 404.astro is emitted as dist/404.html, outside build.format: 'directory'. So the budget would have been asserted over every page except the new one, and silently. og:proof had the identical blind spot and reported it backwards — as the 404 card being orphaned ("generated, but no built page references it") rather than the page being unmeasured. Both fixed; the two use different path forms for the same file on purpose, and each says why beside the code. check:claims was never affected — it takes any .html, so the new page's copy was inside the claim register from its first build. One instrument of three saw the page, which is the argument for having three. ⚠️ One reported number sits at its budget: LCP on / is 2.03 s against docs/04's < 2.0 s. The script reports LCP and CLS without asserting them, deliberately — simulated throttling on a loopback server is not the Slow 4G field measurement docs/04 budgets against — so this is not a failing gate and must not be reported as a passing one either. CLS is 0.000 on all 23

• Every page renders fully with JavaScript disabled

• curl of each URL returns real content, not a shell

• All internal links resolve; no orphan pages

• Sitemap generated and correct; robots.txt served, not 403

• Rich Results Test passes; OG previews render in LinkedIn and Slack

• npm run og:proof — every page's og:image resolves to a file in dist/, and every generated card's headline is its page's own <h1>. R15 is discharged (step 7b) so this is a regression check rather than a blocker on the interim; it stays on the list because a broken preview image is invisible from inside the repo, and because card text cannot be reached by check:claims. Run npm run og:proof -- --sheet and look at the contact sheet as well — the check compares strings, not rendering

• 404 returns a 404 status AND serves the 404 page. Both halves, and until 2026-09-01 neither existed. There was no 404 page in the site at all — no src/pages/404.astro, 22 pages, and docs/04 had asked for one ("Real, styled, with search-intent links out") since before build step 1 — and no custom error response on the distribution, so a missing URL returned S3's AccessDenied XML. Measured, not inferred: /about/ and /definitely-not-a-page/ both answered 403, application/xml, 111 bytes on the live distribution. The page now exists (/404/, noindex, out of the sitemap, with its own OG card because the registry has one rule and no exceptions) and docs/09 Parts 1–3 configure the distribution. Tick this after docs/09 Part 8.4, which checks the status and greps the body for the page's own <h1> — a 404 status serving an empty body passes the status half and fails the point

• Security headers present (securityheaders.com A or better)

• SES identities verified for sending — VerifiedForSendingStatus: true, DkimAttributes.Status: SUCCESS, signing enabled, and no custom MAIL FROM (so DMARC rests on DKIM alignment, which is what §7 records) [re-verified 2026-09-01 — sesv2 get-email-identity]

• ✅ SES bounce/complaint alarms DO notify someone — R9 DISCHARGED, 2026-09-01. aws sns list-subscriptions-by-topic on ses-alerts returns the email subscription to info@smlcompany.ca with a real subscription ARN, not PendingConfirmation. §7 recorded it as pending, and §12 R9 said "this is the first thing to check if /contact/ ships" — it had been confirmed at some point before this reading and the record had not moved, which is the same staleness in the safe direction. (SES production access itself is granted — Q19 closed.)

• THE INTAKE FORM DOES NOT WORK YET, AND THREE THINGS HAVE TO HAPPEN BEFORE IT DOES — build step 8 shipped the page and not the pipe. ⚠️ THE COMMANDS ARE docs/09-cutover-runbook.md PARTS 5 AND 6, AND WRITING THEM FOUND TWO MORE THINGS, EACH OF WHICH WOULD HAVE LOST EVERY SUBMISSION. Both were found by reading the running system rather than the specs, which is the only way either could have been found. (a) The handler wrote the wrong key. It built its item with pk: INTAKE#<uuid> / sk: <timestamp> from docs/05's table, and the live table's key schema is submissionId (S), no sort key — a PutItem missing the key attribute fails the whole write with ValidationException, which the handler catches and answers with the failure page. The form would have looked broken to every inquirer while the record went nowhere, from the moment /api/* was wired. A DynamoDB key schema cannot be altered after creation, so the handler moved to the table; docs/05 §Storage records the alternative that was declined. (b) The Lambda's invoke permission is SourceArn-scoped to the OLD route. The one statement on the function conditions apigateway.amazonaws.com on …/4tl0m5igkj/*/*/submissions. Add a route at /api/intake without adding a permission and API Gateway is refused: the caller gets a 500, and the Lambda logs nothing at all because it is never entered — the hardest possible thing to diagnose from CloudWatch, which is where anyone would look first. 1. A CloudFront behaviour routing /api/* to the HTTP API origin AGENTS.md §7 records. The form posts to the same-origin path /api/intake — deliberately, so the CSP can be form-action 'self', so there is no cross-origin POST, so the endpoint id stays out of the HTML, and so submitting the form from a laptop does nothing. Without this behaviour the form 404s. 2. Deploy backend/intake/handler.mjs + backend/intake/fields.mjs, replacing the hand-built adr-intake-handler §7 records. It needs SIX variables — INTAKE_TABLE, SITE_ORIGIN, NOTIFY_TO, MAIL_FROM, RESPONSE_TIME and NO_RETAINER_NOTICE; it throws at cold start on any missing one, on purpose. ⚠️ This list said five until 2026-08-31 and the handler required six. NO_RETAINER_NOTICE became a requireEnv in the same change set and was added to no document, so an operator working this list would have set five, and the Lambda would have thrown on every invocation — API Gateway answering 5xx and every inquiry from counsel lost from the moment /api/* was wired. Loud in CloudWatch, silent to Pouya, who has no reason to submit his own form. Found by adversarial-reviewer round 2. Two of the six must be verbatim from src/data/site.ts: RESPONSE_TIME from CONTACT.responseTime and NO_RETAINER_NOTICE from NO_RETAINER_NOTICE. Both are published commitments — the first is §4/Q27's two-business-day response, the second is the no-retainer notice docs/01 §/contact/ requires, including its fourth clause about not itself creating a conflict check, which a hand-typed copy in the handler had dropped. RESPONSE_TIME must read identically on /contact/, in the confirmation email, and in the bio. 3. An AGGREGATE API Gateway route throttle — docs/09 Part 6.3. Not expressible in handler code, and it carries load the unimplementable 3-second timing check was specified to carry (docs/05 §Three deviations). ⚠️ THIS ITEM SAID "5 requests / 5 minutes per source IP" AND THAT IS NOT BUILDABLE AT API GATEWAY — throttling there is per route and per stage across all callers. It contradicted this same file's own correction further down the list, and it is a to-do list an operator works through, so it would have cost an hour in the API Gateway console looking for a control that is not there. Per-IP needs AWS WAF, which is a cost decision and has its own item.

  ✅ **BOTH DEPLOY PATHS NOW WARN IF ITEM 1 IS MISSING**, so this does not
  rest on someone reading this list. `scripts/deploy-local.sh` and
  `.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` each end with an **Intake route check**.
  ⚠️ **AND THIS PARAGRAPH DESCRIBED A PROBE THE SCRIPTS NO LONGER RUN.** It
  said the probe was *"a `POST` to `/api/intake` with **no `Origin`**"* where
  *"404 means not routed, 403 means routed and refused… therefore a pass"*.
  Both scripts send **`Origin: https://adr.smlcompany.ca`** and assert **303
  to `/contact/could-not-send/`**; 403 is a **warning**, not a pass, because
  it cannot be told apart from CloudFront rejecting a disallowed method. A
  stale description of a live control, in the spec that governs it — found by
  `adversarial-reviewer`, 2026-09-01.
  **What the probe actually is:** the handler validates, finds an empty
  submission, and redirects — which happens **before any DynamoDB write and
  before any email**, and is what makes it safe against production. It warns
  rather than fails, because by that point the site is deployed and failing
  the job would not un-deploy it. **404 is ambiguous between three causes**
  and `docs/09` Part 7.1 lists them with the one command that separates them.
  This replaced an `INTAKE_ENDPOINT` guard that blocked deploys on a variable
  nothing read.
  

• DYNAMODB TTL ENABLED ON THE TABLE, AND VERIFIED BY A TEST RECORD. THIS ONE BACKS A PUBLISHED PROMISE AND MUST NOT BE TICKED FROM THE HANDLER CODE. /legal/privacy/ states that a record is "deleted automatically by the database rather than by someone remembering to do it" after 24 months. The handler writes the ttl attribute; TTL must also be enabled on the table — ⚠️ §7 records whether it is, and it has not always been, which is why this item cannot be ticked from the handler code: the handler only writes the attribute. On a privacy policy an unbacked mechanism is a false statement to the public. aws dynamodb describe-time-to-live --table-name <the table §7 records> and confirm TimeToLiveStatus: ENABLED — then, because ENABLED proves the setting and not the behaviour, write a record with a near-future ttl and confirm it actually disappears. Both halves, or the item stays open. §9 Q60 and §12 R19 track it; src/pages/legal/privacy.astro carries the matching TODO(pouya). ✅ THE SETTING IS RE-CONFIRMED AND THE PROCEDURE NOW EXISTS: TimeToLiveStatus: ENABLED on attribute ttl [re-verified 2026-09-01 — describe-time-to-live], and docs/09-cutover-runbook.md Part 10 is the behaviour test — write a row with a near-future ttl, record its id to a file, and check on a different day. ⚠️ START IT EARLY. DynamoDB's TTL sweeper is not prompt and AWS does not promise that it is — deletion typically lands within a couple of days of the timestamp passing, so the runbook sets the earliest useful check at 48 hours and refuses to call a failure before 7 days. A check run five minutes after the ttl that finds the row present has measured nothing. This is the one blocking item on this list whose answer cannot be hurried, so it should be started before anything else here, not last. ⚠️ And get-item on a missing key exits 0 with an empty body — read the output, not the exit status; a script checking only the status reports present and absent identically.

• npm run check:intake — the form's field table and the Lambda's agree on names, requiredness, caps and option sets. They are two independent tables on purpose (docs/05); this is what stops them drifting

• Both POST-redirect-GET landing pages reachable and noindex — /contact/received/ and /contact/could-not-send/. Both are excluded from the sitemap in astro.config.mjs

• Regenerate and re-commit the bio PDF — npm run build && npm run bio:pdf. Nothing in the build does this, so a change to /bio/, to §4, to the rate card or to the print styles leaves the committed PDF stale. It asserts one page and writes nothing if the count is wrong (R16). ⚠️ It is not byte-reproducible — Chrome stamps a /CreationDate, so two runs of identical content differ in digest and every re-render is a binary diff. Re-commit it when something actually changed, and say what in the message

• X-Robots-Tag: noindex on *.pdf, via a CloudFront response-headers policy. This is the PDF half of a decision already taken for the page. /bio/ is noindex and excluded from the sitemap because it is a condensed duplicate of /about/ and /fees/, and "two URLs competing on the same content is the one thing docs/04 is most concerned with." The committed PDF is a rendering of that same page, it is linked from /about/ which is index,follow, robots.txt allows everything, and Google indexes PDFs — so the duplicate the page-level noindex prevents arrives as a file instead. A Disallow will not do it: a blocked URL can still be listed. Found by adversarial-reviewer, 2026-08-31

• Booking link works, including the no-JavaScript fallback — conditional on R6; booking is parked and CONTACT.bookingUrl is null, so nothing renders and this passes vacuously until a tool is chosen. Nothing on /contact/ mentions booking, deliberately

• ✅ Favicon set complete, and REGENERATED 2026-09-02 — it had shipped with no transparency at all. Pouya's read-through finding. All three frames (16/32/48) declared a 32-bit alpha channel and then carried alpha = 255 on every pixel, the ground opaque cream — so the tab icon showed as a cream rectangle on any dark tab strip. public/favicon.ico is now transparent, regenerated by npm run icons from the committed master and verified programmatically and by eye, on dark grounds and light. ⚠️ public/apple-touch-icon.png STAYS OPAQUE CREAM AND MUST NOT BE "FIXED" TO MATCH. The reason is a platform behaviour — iOS composites a transparent touch icon onto black — stated by Pouya on 2026-09-02 and not re-tested on a handset; the item directly below is where it would be. The touch icon is byte-identical across this change. ⚠️ AND THE CHANGE IS NOT FREE ON DARK. The maroon half of the ribbon effectively drops out against a dark tab strip; the champagne half carries the mark. The figures are deliberately NOT repeated here — they live in docs/reference/brand-assets.md §The icon set, with the method, and a copy on this page had already gone stale within a day by quoting the 32 px row as if it were the general case (adversarial-reviewer, round 2). Read them there.

• Tested on iOS Safari, Android Chrome, desktop Safari/Chrome/Firefox

• Tested at 320 px and at 200% zoom

• ✅ THE 200%-TEXT NAV OVERFLOW IS FIXED, 2026-09-01 — THIS ITEM IS DISCHARGED. Pouya reopened the step-1 header decision and ruled fix, do not accept. flex-wrap: nowrap is gone from .header-inner (the necessary and sufficient one, measured) and from .nav-list, and the masthead is sticky only while it is one row — a saturating clamp() gate in two bands, 66 rem and 76 rem. Measured across 22 pages × 16 widths, before and after on the same grid: root-style 32 px went from 175 of 352 page-widths over to 0; minimum font size from 219 to 88, all of the remainder being the footer; default font size stays 0. Nav items and CTA on-screen in 1408 of 1408 measurements. The shipped rendering at the default size is geometry-identical — 0 differences on 352 page-widths, header 81.00 px, CTA on the content edge, with six nav items and with a seventh. ⚠️ AND IT WAS VERIFIED ACROSS THE INTERMEDIATE ROOT SIZES, WHICH IS WHAT ROUND 1 DID NOT DO. WCAG 1.4.4 is a requirement up TO 200 %, not AT 200 %: round 1 sampled root 16 and root 32 only, both clean, and shipped a gate that left #main behind the header at 20 of 300 grid points across roots 18–30. And round 2 found the gate was one-sided: Chrome's "Font size" has five presets (9 / 12 / 16 / 20 / 24 px) and only 16 had been swept, so at 9 px the masthead wrapped for the opposite reason — the 80rem content cap shrinks while the header's px minimums do not — leaving 65 px of #main behind the header on 21 of 22 pages at every width. A second gate term (1rem - 16px) closes it, and closes a pre-existing 12 px shortfall on all 22 pages at that setting as well. Now 0 failing across 762 points: roots 9–15 (70), roots 16–32 (300), the band seam (198), both thresholds (144) and all five default-font-size presets (50). Both findings by adversarial-reviewer; docs/02 §Reflow carries all of it

• ✅ THE FOOTER REFLOW RESIDUAL IS FIXED, 2026-09-01. Document overflow of 14 px at 320, 38 px at 1024, 30 px at 1056 and 19 px at 1100 CSS px on all 22 pages under Chrome's minimum-font-size setting, 0 from 1200 px up. One cause at all four: info@smlcompany.ca has no break opportunity, so its min-content width is 310 px. One declaration closes it — .footer-contact a[href^='mailto:'] { overflow-wrap: anywhere } — measured 88 of 352 → 0 of 352, the other three enlargement methods unchanged at 0 of 352, and the normal-settings identity check at 0 differences on 352 page-widths across 8 metrics. It also closed 57 cases of the link overrunning its own box at root style 26–32 px that the document-level table reports as clean. ⚠️ The earlier note here said the 320 px half "is a column-sizing question and is not the same fix" — that was wrong; the column sizing at 320 px is that same 310 px min-content, arriving through .footer-grid's auto track instead of through text spilling out of a minmax(0, 1fr) one. docs/02 §Reflow carries both mechanisms, the negative control proving break-word would not have worked, and the candidates declined as broader than the cause

• ✅ THE MINIMUM-FONT-SIZE SC 2.4.11 (AA) FAILURE IS FIXED, 2026-09-01 — Q61 RULED fix now AND CLOSED. Two declarations on html inside the existing @media (min-width: 66rem) block: the plain calc(var(--header-h) + var(--space-4)) first, then max(calc(var(--header-h) + var(--space-4)), calc(10lh - 83px)). 1lh and not rem, because the font-metric units read the USED font size — that is the mechanism the earlier ruling's premise denied existed. Measured, with the pre-fix build rebuilt in a worktree and put through the identical probe: the Shift+Tab walk over 6 pages × 5 widths ≥ 1056 px goes from 290 entirely-hidden focus stops of 1,455 to 0 — same grid, same 1,455 steps, same 344 header-internal stops skipped — while the pre-fix control still reports 290 (footer 254, #main 36), so the probe is proven able to see the failure it now reports gone. The default-settings rendering is unchanged: 0 differences across 352 page-widths × 17 fields = 5,984 comparisons, full-page geometry fingerprint included, with a positive control detecting exactly 1 injected difference. scroll-padding-top computes to 97 px at the default and 287 px under the setting against a 270.56 px header; 1lh on <html> is 18 px / 37 px with every .woff2 blocked, identical, because <html> keeps the UA family — the property that the ch candidate could not claim. A wider grid than the ruling asked for, and it found a residual: 777 cells over 37 settings went from 63 failing to 12, and nothing got worse in any cell. The remainder is the next item, it is pre-existing, and it was deliberately not fixed — Pouya's instruction was to stop and report anything beyond the one declaration's blast radius

• ⚠️ MINIMUM FONT SIZE AT 16 AND 20 STILL LEAVES #main BEHIND THE HEADER — PRE-EXISTING, REDUCED BY Q61'S FIX, AND OUTSIDE ITS MECHANISM. At minimumFontSize=16, 52 px of #main sits behind the sticky header after "Skip to content" on /about/ and /contact/ at 1280, 1440 and 1920 px — 6 cells; at minimumFontSize=20, 14 px on the same 6. Before Q61's fix the same grid gave 6 cells at 52 px, 12 at 64 px, 15 at 75 px and 15 at 174 px, so every remaining cell is unchanged or better and none is new. Why the lh ramp cannot see it, and this is the interesting part: the setting floors computed sizes, so at minimumFontSize=16 the root is genuinely 16 and 1lh on <html> is 18 px — identical to the default — while the header grows to 149.38 px because the sub-16 px type (the 11 px tagline, the 14 px eyebrow and nav) is floored up. The ramp reads a quantity the setting did not move. A different measurement would be needed — 1lh taken from an element that actually carries the small type, or a floor on the header — and that is a header change with site-wide reach, which is why it is filed rather than taken inside a capped review loop. Not a conformance failure of the same shape as Q61: a partial obscuring is not SC 2.4.11, which is about a component entirely hidden. docs/02 §Reflow carries the 777-cell grid

• ✅ THE /med-arb/ GLOSS — RULED AND STRUCK, 2026-09-02. Pouya: "strike the gloss sentence. The ADRIC-sourced material carries the page. No replacement claim, no competence claim." Applied: the definitional gloss is struck. ⚠️ AND SO IS THE DESIGNATIONS CLAUSE THAT THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS ITEM SAID WAS "NOW THE LEDE" — corrected 2026-09-02, adversarial-reviewer round 2, which found this line describing a page state the same change set had deleted. Round 1 of the closing claims pass found that a bare DESIGNATIONS_HELD_LINE sitting directly beneath §Rules' quotation of ADRIC requiring "a high level of practitioner competence" read as meeting that bar. §Why this practice now carries an acceptance sentence and no credential claim at all; /about/ publishes the designations and the JSON-LD carries them. The constraint is recorded in the section's own comment in src/pages/med-arb.astro. The original finding is kept below unstruck, because it is the reasoning behind a paragraph that is deliberately thin, and a later reader who cannot see why will fill it. claims-auditor, D20 pass, finding 1: §Why this practice said "Med-arb is not a third service bolted onto mediation and arbitration; it is the two of them run under one agreement", and one section above the page publishes ADRIC's own words: med-arb is "not merely the merging of separate mediation and arbitration processes, but a unique process designed to meet the needs of particular disputants". The gloss asserts what its own cited authority denies in terms, on the same page. Remove one of the two — either the "not merely the merging" clause from the quotation, or the "it is the two of them run under one agreement" sentence. ⚠️ Do not resolve it by adding a competence claim: ADRIC answers its own competence sentence with the Chartered Med-Arb designation and the Med-Arb Foundational Course, neither of which is held, and C.Med-Arb is struck from this site entirely (§4). The 2026-08-30 fix took the competence proposition out of the heading and left it in the body, which is why this is a second pass at the same paragraph

• ⚠️ FOUR PRE-EXISTING DYNAMODB ITEMS HAVE NO ttl AND WILL NEVER EXPIRE. The table held 4 items before any of this work [verified 2026-09-01 — describe-table ItemCount], written by the hand-built handler, whose code is in docs/reference/AWS-Hosting-Guide.md Part 8.3 and writes no ttl attribute at all. So they are retained indefinitely while /legal/privacy/ says a record is deleted automatically after 24 months. Pouya's call and not scriptable, because it turns on something no agent can determine: whether they are the guide's own smoke test (Test User) or real inquiries that arrived through the old site. Read them, then delete the test rows or write a ttl onto the real ones. docs/09 Part 7.3

• ⚠️ PER-IP RATE LIMITING NEEDS AWS WAF AND IS A COST DECISION — NOT A LAUNCH BLOCKER. docs/05 asked for "5 requests / 5 minutes per source IP at API Gateway"; API Gateway throttling is aggregate, not per-IP, so that spec line is struck and an aggregate route throttle ships instead (docs/09 Part 6.3). A rate-based WAF rule on the distribution is what would do per-IP. Decide it on price, not on the spec's old wording — and do not let anything describe the throttle that ships as per-IP

• ⚠️ A FOOTER NAV LABEL OVERRUNS ITS COLUMN BY 24 px AT 640 px UNDER MINIMUM FONT SIZE, WITH 7.7 px OF CLEARANCE TO THE NEXT COLUMN. No document overflow at any width, so it fails no success criterion and is cosmetic today — filed because 7.7 px is one label rename away from two columns colliding, and nothing in the build measures it. .footer-col a "Construction & Infrastructure" overruns its 176 px box by 24 px at 640 px and by 4 px at 700 px (clearance 27.7 px); "Shareholder & Family Business" by 2 px at 640 px, and — at widths that 12-column grid steps over — 17 px at 660 px and 11 px at 680 px. Clean at every other width sampled, including 768 and 834 px; minimumFontSize=32, 22 pages × 12 widths = 264 rows. A fourth case of the same family: nav.crumbs > ol on /practice/construction/ @320 px overruns its own 272 px box by 7 px, also with zero document overflow. Rule on both together — if .footer-col a { overflow-wrap: anywhere } is ruled in, the same call covers .crumbs; if it is declined, decline both and the record is complete. .footer-col a { overflow-wrap: anywhere } is measured to close it and to be inert at normal settings, and is not applied because it changes how six practice-area names break on a marketing surface under enlargement — a copy-adjacent call, not a technical one. ⚠️ And it falsified the reason given for scoping the email fix to the address ("every other footer string has spaces"): min-content is set by the longest word, not by whether a space exists. Corrected in docs/02 §Reflow. Raised by adversarial-reviewer, 2026-09-01

• ⚠️ THE SEVENTH NAV ITEM PLUS FALLBACK FONT METRICS — A LAYOUT SHIFT AND A SKIP-LINK FAILURE, AT THE DEFAULT TEXT SIZE, ARMING ITSELF WHEN THE SECOND INSIGHTS ARTICLE PUBLISHES. No reader setting is involved: with every .woff2 blocked — what a reader on the Slow 4G profile docs/04 budgets against sees first, since the fonts are font-display: swap — and a seventh nav item present, the header measures 141 px at every width from 1056 to 1091 px (a contiguous 36 px band) and 81 px from 1092 px up; with the webfonts loaded it is 81 px throughout. Two consequences: (i) a 60 px collapse when Geist swaps in, on all 22 pages, against the CLS < 0.05 budget — larger, not new, since the previous build shifts ~5.6 px in the same band; and (ii) 44 px of #main behind the sticky header after "Skip to content", because 141 px exceeds the 97 px scroll-padding-top — this half IS new, the previous build's 86.97 px stayed under 97 px and covered 0. Latent, not shipped: six items never wrap, and showInsights turns the seventh on at two published articles. Two candidate fixes, both Pouya's call because both are outside "the header and its consumers": raise the desktop breakpoint past 1091 px, which changes the normal-settings layout in that band, or give Geist a metric-matched size-adjust fallback. Raised by adversarial-reviewer, 2026-09-01; docs/02 §Reflow carries the measurements.

  ⚠️ **THIS IS NOT A CUTOVER BLOCKER AND IT IS NOT TICKABLE HERE — IT IS A HARD
  PRE-PUBLICATION GATE. Pouya's ruling, 2026-09-01: no seventh nav item ships
  until the fallback-metrics defect is fixed**, which makes fixing it a
  **prerequisite of publishing the second Insights article**, since that is what
  adds the item. It is left unchecked on purpose: a checklist that fires once, at
  cutover, cannot discharge a defect that arms itself later on an editorial
  decision. ⚠️ **AND THE GATE IS A BUILD FAILURE, NOT THIS CHECKLIST AND NOT A
  COMMENT.** `SiteHeader.astro` throws when `published.length >= 2`, with the
  measurements and the instruction in the message, so it fires on both deploy
  paths on the machine of whoever publishes. **Proven rather than assumed:** two
  articles were temporarily flipped to `draft: false` and `npm run build` exited
  **1** naming R20; the files were restored and the restoration verified by
  `git diff --exit-code` and an unchanged `dist` digest. It was first written as
  three prose cross-references and **did not gate** — the build and all five
  checks passed while both defects shipped. **Owner: `AGENTS.md` R20**
  

Infrastructure

• S3 versioning enabled — Status: Enabled [re-verified 2026-09-01 — get-bucket-versioning]. This is what makes pass 3's --delete recoverable at cutover
• Bucket not publicly readable; OAC in force — all four public-access blocks true, and a direct GET on the S3 hostname returns 403 [re-verified 2026-09-01 — get-public-access-block, curl]. ⚠️ Re-check this after docs/09 Part 1, which adds an s3:ListBucket statement for the CloudFront service principal so that missing keys return 404 rather than 403. Part 1 asserts the two facts that actually make the grant safe: no viewer path resolves to the bucket root (the default root object, then the router, always turn / into a key), and the default behaviour forwards no query strings to the origin with no origin request policy overriding that. ⚠️ This line used to prescribe curl "$SITE/?list-type=2" as "the check that matters" — and Part 1 was rewritten in the same change set to explain that that check cannot fail and is therefore evidence of nothing. Two documents, one fix, and the discarded check survived in the one an operator ticks. Found by adversarial-reviewer round 2
• ACM certificate valid; Namecheap validation CNAME still present
• CloudWatch alarms: Lambda Errors, API Gateway 5xx. ⚠️ "DLQ depth" was on this line and is struck: a dead-letter queue on this function would never receive anything. DeadLetterConfig applies to asynchronous invocations, and API Gateway invokes synchronously — so the alarm would have sat permanently green while telling everyone it was watching, which is this project's most expensive recurring shape (AGENTS.md Q22, the Lighthouse row, and now this). docs/05 §Notification carries the replacement and why there are two alarms rather than one: Lambda Errors catches a synchronous failure, and API Gateway 5xx catches the case where the function is never entered at all
• Billing budget/alarm still active — aws budgets describe-budgets --account-id "$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text)". docs/reference/AWS-Hosting-Guide.md set up an AWS Budget, which cloudwatch describe-alarms will never return. Whether one was actually created is not recorded anywhere: confirm, do not assume

Post-cutover, same day

• Sitemap submitted to Google Search Console and Bing Webmaster Tools
• Live site fetched as an anonymous crawler to confirm indexable content
• LinkedIn profile and ADRIC/ADRIO listings updated to point here
• Archive the old single-file build to _archive/ — do not delete it
• AGENTS.md Change Log entry recording the cutover