debugging gateway internet access
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# Gateway MQTT connectivity — debugging findings (July 2026)
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Why the ACRIOS `ACR_CV_101N_W_D2` gateway (SIM7022 NB-IoT modem) could not
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connect to `ingest.gebos.online:8883`, how we proved it, and what to do next.
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**TL;DR: the bundled SIM lives in a private ACRIOS APN (`acrios.iot`) with no
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public-internet breakout. The broker, TLS setup, and gateway firmware are all
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fine.** No packet from the gateway ever reached our host; every failure
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happened inside the carrier/APN network.
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## Root cause
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The modem's own PDP-context diagnostics (see step 6) show:
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```
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+CGDCONT: 0,"IP","acrios.iot","10.10.111.184"
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+CGPADDR: 0,"10.10.111.184"
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+CGCONTRDP: 0,5,"acrios.iot","10.10.111.184.255.255.255.0",,"10.65.0.1","10.65.0.2",,,,,1430
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```
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- APN `acrios.iot` — a private APN; the SIM (IMSI prefix 901-28, a global
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IoT-roaming range) is provisioned for ACRIOS's walled garden only.
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- Private device IP (`10.10.111.184`) and private DNS servers (`10.65.0.x`).
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- Result: DNS for public names fails (`+CMQTTCONNECT: 0,25`) and raw TCP to a
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public IP fails (`+CMQTTCONNECT: 0,3`). Signalling-plane features (network
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registration, NITZ time sync, CSQ) all work, which made the SIM *look* fine.
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- `APN = "auto"` in the Lua config is not the bug: `acrios.iot` is almost
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certainly the only APN this SIM subscription allows, so overriding the APN
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string alone cannot fix it.
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This also explains the firmware's `acrios/` topic prefix — these gateways are
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normally sold talking to ACRIOS's own MQTT cloud inside that APN.
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## Debugging steps (in order, with what each eliminated)
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1. **Verified the broker from the outside.** From a dev machine:
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`openssl s_client -connect ingest.gebos.online:8883` (valid Let's Encrypt
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RSA-2048 chain, TLS 1.2 + 1.3 OK) and
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`mosquitto_pub ... -u bender -P <device pw>` → `CONNACK 0`, publish
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accepted. ⇒ EMQX, its ACME cert, and the device credentials all work; the
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problem is specific to the gateway's path.
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2. **Read the serial log symptom precisely.** `AT+CMQTTCONNECT` returned `OK`
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(command accepted) but the result URC never arrived before the script's
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20 s timeout — indistinguishable from a TLS stall at that point.
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3. **Checked EMQX for handshake errors.** `docker logs` showed nothing — but a
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deliberately failed cipher probe from the dev machine *also* logged nothing,
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proving EMQX's default log level swallows TLS failures. Inconclusive, not
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exonerating. (`emqx ctl listeners` shutdown counters were similarly
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ambiguous; `emqx ctl log set-level debug` enables visibility.)
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4. **tcpdump on the ingest host** (`tcpdump -i any 'tcp port 8883'`) while the
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gateway retried: zero packets from the gateway, ever. ⇒ nothing above the
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IP layer (TLS version, ciphers, cert chain, EMQX config) could be the cause.
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5. **Script changes to force better diagnostics** (v1.8 → v1.10, see below):
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- `mqtt_timeout` 20 s → 60 s: the modem finally had time to report real
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result codes instead of being abandoned mid-attempt.
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⇒ surfaced `+CMQTTCONNECT: 0,25` = **DNS error**.
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- `mqtt_server` hostname → IP literal `178.104.178.108`: bypassed DNS.
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⇒ error changed to `+CMQTTCONNECT: 0,3` = **socket connect fail**.
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DNS *and* TCP both dead, registration fine → no data breakout.
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- `authmode 1 → 0` (skip server-cert verification): ruled out the modem
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rejecting our CA chain; made no difference (never reached TLS). Note the
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stock ACRIOS script enables cert verification whenever an MQTT username
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is set, yet configures no CA — with this SIM it never got far enough to
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matter, but it could never have verified successfully anyway.
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- Added PDP-context dump (`AT+CGDCONT?`, `AT+CGPADDR`, `AT+CGCONTRDP`)
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before every connect attempt. ⇒ produced the root-cause evidence above.
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6. **SIMCom CMQTT result codes seen** (for future reference):
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`+CMQTTCONNECT: 0,25` = DNS error · `0,3` = socket connect fail ·
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`+CMQTTPUB: 0,26` = socket closed / not connected (follow-on noise, not a
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distinct fault). No URC before timeout usually means the command was still
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waiting — raise the wait, don't guess.
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## Current state of `mbus_mqtt_gebos.lua` (v1.10) — temporary changes to revert
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| Change | Why it's there | Revert when |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `mqtt_server = "178.104.178.108"` | bypass private-APN DNS | breakout exists **and** public DNS resolves |
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| `AT+CSSLCFG="authmode",0,0` | no CA provisioned on modem | ISRG Root X1 loaded (`AT+CCERTDOWN`) + `cacert` configured → set authmode 1 |
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| `mqtt_timeout = 60000` | see real modem result codes | after measuring real handshake time on a working network |
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| PDP-context dump in `MQTT_SSL_Start()` | root-cause evidence | once connectivity is stable (costs battery/airtime per connect) |
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## Options to get data flowing
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1. **Preferred: ask ACRIOS** (SIM contract holder) to enable internet breakout
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on the APN, or whitelist `ingest.gebos.online` / `178.104.178.108:8883`
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for our SIMs. Hardware untouched.
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2. **Own SIM:** any IoT SIM with public breakout (1NCE, EMnify, local carrier
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NB-IoT, …); set `APN = "<provider apn>"` explicitly in the Lua config.
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Check provider NB-IoT coverage on bands 3/5/8/20 (what the firmware
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configures).
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3. Fallback: ACRIOS cloud bridge/forwarding — reintroduces the vendor
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dependency the self-hosted ingest stack exists to avoid.
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## Verified-good along the way
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- EMQX 5.8.6 (oci-container, host network) serving MQTTS :8883 with the ACME
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(HTTP-01) RSA-2048 cert; hot-reloads renewed PEMs.
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- Broker auth: `bender` device login + ACL, external end-to-end publish test.
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- Note for MQTTX/dashboard tests: EMQX default log level logs neither TLS
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handshake failures nor connects; use `emqx ctl log set-level debug`
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temporarily, and `emqx ctl listeners` for connection/shutdown counters.
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