Respect provider rate limits and preserve bank connections on throttling

This commit is contained in:
Lars Nolden
2026-09-10 17:25:09 +02:00
parent 2259db3e85
commit ba3ea6ae5a
14 changed files with 1250 additions and 95 deletions
+87
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"finance-duck/internal/analytics"
"finance-duck/internal/classification"
@@ -86,6 +89,90 @@ func TestFailedClassificationStillImportsAndRetryIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("import not visible in analytics: %+v", dash.Totals)
}
}
func TestPreviewCooldownProtectsLaterPreviewsAndImports(t *testing.T) {
a, s := testApp(t)
s = seed(t, a, s)
before := domain.Clone(s.Data)
var calls atomic.Int32
provider := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "300")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}))
defer provider.Close()
a.classifier = classification.Client{APIKey: "test", Model: "test/model", BaseURL: provider.URL}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
for _, model := range []string{"test/model", "test/another-model"} {
preview, err := a.Preview(ctx, PreviewRequest{
Revision: s.Revision, From: "2026-09-01", To: "2026-09-30",
Model: model, Fields: Fields{Category: true},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if preview.Analysed != 2 || len(preview.Errors) != 2 || len(preview.Changes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("rate-limited preview did not preserve both records: %+v", preview)
}
}
unchanged, err := a.Snapshot(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before, unchanged.Data) {
t.Fatal("rate-limited previews changed canonical data")
}
a.mu.Lock()
result, err := a.importFacts(ctx, unchanged, []domain.Facts{sampleFacts("ALDI", "2026-09-10", "-12.34")})
a.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Imported != 1 || len(result.State.Data.Transactions) != 3 {
t.Fatal("provider cooldown lost the newly imported record")
}
for _, tx := range result.State.Data.Transactions {
if tx.Facts.ExternalID == hex.EncodeToString([]byte("ALDI")) {
if tx.Enrichment.Classification.Error == "" || tx.Enrichment.CategoryID != domain.ExpenseFallback {
t.Fatal("cooldown did not leave imported facts editable and unclassified")
}
}
}
if got := calls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("previews and imports bypassed shared provider cooldown: %d requests", got)
}
}
func TestCancelledLastClassificationDoesNotProducePreview(t *testing.T) {
a, s := testApp(t)
s = seed(t, a, s)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
provider := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
cancel()
}))
defer provider.Close()
a.classifier = classification.Client{APIKey: "test", Model: "test/model", BaseURL: provider.URL}
p, err := a.Preview(ctx, PreviewRequest{
Revision: s.Revision, From: "2026-09-09", To: "2026-09-09",
Model: "test/model", Fields: Fields{Category: true},
})
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || p.ID != "" {
t.Fatalf("cancelled final record produced a preview: id=%q, error=%v", p.ID, err)
}
after, err := a.Snapshot(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(s.Data, after.Data) {
t.Fatal("cancelled preview changed canonical data")
}
}
func mockClassifier(t *testing.T, a *App, inspect ...func(*http.Request)) {
t.Helper()
mock := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+11 -4
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ type backfillBank struct {
fetchErr error
}
func (b *backfillBank) Status(ctx context.Context, id string) (banking.Session, error) {
func (b *backfillBank) Status(ctx context.Context, id string) (banking.SessionStatus, error) {
b.statusIDs = append(b.statusIDs, id)
if b.statusErr != nil {
return banking.Session{}, b.statusErr
return banking.SessionStatus{}, b.statusErr
}
return b.historyBank.Status(ctx, id)
}
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ func TestBackfillRejectsUnsafePrerequisitesBeforeProviderContact(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestBackfillProviderFailuresDoNotImportPartialData(t *testing.T) {
for _, scenario := range []string{"not configured", "unavailable", "revoked", "provider expired", "account absent", "partial retrieval"} {
for _, scenario := range []string{"not configured", "unavailable", "revoked", "provider expired", "account absent", "partial retrieval", "status rate limit", "retrieval rate limit"} {
t.Run(scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
a, s, b := backfillApp(t)
s = seed(t, a, s)
@@ -221,6 +221,10 @@ func TestBackfillProviderFailuresDoNotImportPartialData(t *testing.T) {
b.session.Accounts = []domain.Account{{ID: s.Data.Accounts[0].ID, ExternalAccountID: "wrong_uid"}}
case "partial retrieval":
b.fetchErr = errors.New("private provider response")
case "status rate limit":
b.statusErr = bankRateError(t)
case "retrieval rate limit":
b.fetchErr = bankRateError(t)
}
beforeOps, err := json.Marshal(a.ops)
if err != nil {
@@ -233,7 +237,10 @@ func TestBackfillProviderFailuresDoNotImportPartialData(t *testing.T) {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private provider response") {
t.Fatal("provider error exposed private response data")
}
if scenario != "partial retrieval" && len(b.accounts) != 0 {
if strings.Contains(scenario, "rate limit") && (!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "429") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "retry") || errors.Is(err, banking.ErrReconnect)) {
t.Fatal("backfill obscured rate limiting or falsely required reconnect")
}
if scenario != "partial retrieval" && scenario != "retrieval rate limit" && len(b.accounts) != 0 {
t.Fatal("unavailable consent reached transaction retrieval")
}
current, err := a.Snapshot(context.Background())
+3 -3
View File
@@ -185,11 +185,11 @@ func TestRenewedConsentWakesSchedulerAndAutomaticallyImports(t *testing.T) {
type recoveryBank struct{ historyBank }
func (b *recoveryBank) Status(ctx context.Context, id string) (banking.Session, error) {
func (b *recoveryBank) Status(ctx context.Context, id string) (banking.SessionStatus, error) {
if id != b.session.ID {
return banking.Session{}, banking.ErrReconnect
return banking.SessionStatus{}, banking.ErrReconnect
}
return b.session, nil
return b.historyBank.Status(ctx, id)
}
func TestInterruptedRenewalDiscardsSupersededConsentDuringRecovery(t *testing.T) {
+47 -19
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"finance-duck/internal/banking"
"finance-duck/internal/classification"
"finance-duck/internal/domain"
"finance-duck/internal/ratelimit"
)
type ImportResult struct {
@@ -136,27 +137,19 @@ func (a *App) Backfill(ctx context.Context, rev, accountID string, historyMonths
}
current, err := a.bank.Status(ctx, session.ID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, banking.ErrReconnect) {
return ImportResult{}, banking.ErrReconnect
}
return ImportResult{}, errors.New("bank connection unavailable; retry importing history")
return ImportResult{}, bankFailure(err, "bank connection unavailable; retry importing history")
}
expiry, err = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, current.ValidUntil)
if err != nil || !expiry.After(time.Now()) {
return ImportResult{}, banking.ErrReconnect
}
if !slices.ContainsFunc(current.Accounts, func(linked domain.Account) bool {
return linked.ExternalAccountID == account.ExternalAccountID
}) {
if !slices.Contains(current.AccountIDs, account.ExternalAccountID) {
return ImportResult{}, banking.ErrReconnect
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
facts, err := a.bank.Transactions(ctx, account, now.AddDate(0, -historyMonths, 0).Format("2006-01-02"), now.Format("2006-01-02"))
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, banking.ErrReconnect) {
return ImportResult{}, banking.ErrReconnect
}
return ImportResult{}, errors.New("transaction retrieval failed; retry importing history")
return ImportResult{}, bankFailure(err, "transaction retrieval failed; retry importing history")
}
// Use normal import processing without changing sync cursors or saved consent
// settings, including when the requested range adds no transactions.
@@ -302,6 +295,20 @@ func (a *App) Balances(ctx context.Context, id string) ([]banking.Balance, error
}
return nil, errors.New("account is not connected")
}
// Only typed, locally generated errors are safe to expose; provider errors may
// wrap private response data even when their underlying cause is recognizable.
func bankFailure(err error, fallback string) error {
var limited *ratelimit.RateLimitError
if errors.As(err, &limited) {
return fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking: %w", limited)
}
if errors.Is(err, banking.ErrReconnect) {
return banking.ErrReconnect
}
return errors.New(fallback)
}
func (a *App) Sync(ctx context.Context) (State, error) {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
@@ -343,25 +350,35 @@ func (a *App) Sync(ctx context.Context) (State, error) {
}
validAccounts := map[string]bool{}
accountSession := map[string]string{}
failedSessions := map[string]bool{}
for i, session := range a.ops.Sessions {
for _, account := range session.Accounts {
accountSession[account.ID] = session.ID
}
meta := a.ops.Consents[session.ID]
current, e := a.bank.Status(ctx, session.ID)
if e == nil {
expiry, parseErr := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, current.ValidUntil)
if parseErr != nil || !expiry.After(time.Now()) {
e = banking.ErrReconnect
}
}
if e != nil {
meta.Error = e.Error()
meta.Error = bankFailure(e, "bank connection unavailable; retry synchronization").Error()
meta.NeedsReconnect = errors.Is(e, banking.ErrReconnect)
a.ops.Consents[session.ID] = meta
failures = append(failures, meta.Institution+": "+meta.Error)
failedSessions[session.ID] = true
continue
}
meta.Error = ""
meta.NeedsReconnect = false
a.ops.Consents[session.ID] = meta
a.ops.Sessions[i].ValidUntil = current.ValidUntil
for _, account := range current.Accounts {
validAccounts[account.ExternalAccountID] = true
for _, account := range session.Accounts {
if account.ExternalAccountID != "" && slices.Contains(current.AccountIDs, account.ExternalAccountID) {
validAccounts[account.ID] = true
}
}
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
@@ -370,8 +387,18 @@ func (a *App) Sync(ctx context.Context) (State, error) {
if !account.Active || account.ExternalAccountID == "" {
continue
}
if !validAccounts[account.ExternalAccountID] {
sessionID := accountSession[account.ID]
if failedSessions[sessionID] {
continue
}
if !validAccounts[account.ID] {
failures = append(failures, account.DisplayName+": bank connection unavailable")
if sessionID != "" {
meta := a.ops.Consents[sessionID]
meta.Error = banking.ErrReconnect.Error()
meta.NeedsReconnect = true
a.ops.Consents[sessionID] = meta
}
continue
}
var from string
@@ -383,10 +410,11 @@ func (a *App) Sync(ctx context.Context) (State, error) {
}
facts, e := a.bank.Transactions(ctx, account, from, to)
if e != nil {
meta := a.ops.Consents[accountSession[account.ID]]
meta.Error = "Transaction retrieval failed; retry synchronization"
a.ops.Consents[accountSession[account.ID]] = meta
failures = append(failures, account.DisplayName+": transaction retrieval failed")
meta := a.ops.Consents[sessionID]
meta.Error = bankFailure(e, "transaction retrieval failed; retry synchronization").Error()
meta.NeedsReconnect = meta.NeedsReconnect || errors.Is(e, banking.ErrReconnect)
a.ops.Consents[sessionID] = meta
failures = append(failures, account.DisplayName+": "+meta.Error)
continue
}
result, e := a.importFacts(ctx, s, facts)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (a *App) Preview(ctx context.Context, r PreviewRequest) (Preview, error) {
}
a.mu.Lock()
s, err := a.snapshot(ctx)
client := a.classifier
client := a.classifier.WithModel(r.Model)
a.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
return Preview{}, err
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ func (a *App) Preview(ctx context.Context, r PreviewRequest) (Preview, error) {
if r.Revision != s.Revision {
return Preview{}, errors.New("revision conflict: reload before analysing")
}
client.Model = r.Model
p := Preview{ID: domain.NewID("preview"), Revision: s.Revision, Changes: []Change{}, Errors: []ClassificationError{}, created: time.Now()}
baseMerchants := len(s.Data.Merchants)
for _, t := range s.Data.Transactions {
@@ -90,6 +89,9 @@ func (a *App) Preview(ctx context.Context, r PreviewRequest) (Preview, error) {
}
p.Analysed++
proposal, e := client.Classify(ctx, t.Facts, s.Data, true)
if err = ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return Preview{}, err
}
if e != nil {
p.Errors = append(p.Errors, ClassificationError{t.Facts.ID, e.Error()})
continue
+205 -3
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,17 @@ package app
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"finance-duck/internal/banking"
"finance-duck/internal/domain"
"finance-duck/internal/ratelimit"
)
type bankScenario struct {
@@ -22,11 +27,15 @@ func (b *bankScenario) Authorize(context.Context, string, string, string) (strin
func (b *bankScenario) Exchange(context.Context, string) (banking.Session, error) {
return b.session, nil
}
func (b *bankScenario) Status(context.Context, string) (banking.Session, error) {
func (b *bankScenario) Status(context.Context, string) (banking.SessionStatus, error) {
if b.fail {
return banking.Session{}, errors.New("expired")
return banking.SessionStatus{}, errors.New("expired")
}
return b.session, nil
status := banking.SessionStatus{ValidUntil: b.session.ValidUntil}
for _, account := range b.session.Accounts {
status.AccountIDs = append(status.AccountIDs, account.ExternalAccountID)
}
return status, nil
}
func (b *bankScenario) Balances(context.Context, string) ([]banking.Balance, error) {
return []banking.Balance{{Amount: "100.00", Currency: "EUR", Type: "CLBD"}}, nil
@@ -110,3 +119,196 @@ func TestReconnectReplacesOldConsentWithoutDuplicatingLocalAccount(t *testing.T)
t.Fatal("authorization state replay was accepted")
}
}
// Exercise the controller's typed error without contacting a provider or waiting.
func bankRateError(t *testing.T) error {
t.Helper()
var controller ratelimit.Controller
ctx := context.Background()
if err := controller.Acquire(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer controller.Release()
_, err := controller.Do(ctx, func(context.Context) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusTooManyRequests,
Header: http.Header{"Retry-After": []string{"300"}},
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("private provider response")),
}, nil
}, false)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("rate limit response was accepted")
}
return fmt.Errorf("private provider response: %w", err)
}
type sessionBank struct {
bankScenario
statuses map[string]banking.SessionStatus
failures map[string]error
fetched []string
}
func (b *sessionBank) Status(_ context.Context, id string) (banking.SessionStatus, error) {
return b.statuses[id], b.failures[id]
}
func (b *sessionBank) Transactions(ctx context.Context, account domain.Account, from, to string) ([]domain.Facts, error) {
b.fetched = append(b.fetched, account.ID)
return b.bankScenario.Transactions(ctx, account, from, to)
}
func TestSyncSessionRateLimitPreservesBindingsAndRecovers(t *testing.T) {
a, s := testApp(t)
ctx := context.Background()
s, err := a.Mutate(ctx, s.Revision, func(d *domain.Dataset) error {
d.Accounts[0].ExternalAccountID = "main_uid"
for _, id := range []string{"mwst", "tax", "independent"} {
d.Accounts = append(d.Accounts, domain.Account{ID: id, DisplayName: id, Currency: "EUR", Active: true, ExternalAccountID: id + "_uid"})
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
expiry := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339)
limited := banking.Session{ID: "limited", ValidUntil: expiry}
healthy := banking.Session{ID: "healthy", ValidUntil: expiry}
for _, account := range s.Data.Accounts {
if account.ID == "independent" {
healthy.Accounts = append(healthy.Accounts, account)
} else {
limited.Accounts = append(limited.Accounts, account)
}
}
a.ops.Sessions = []banking.Session{limited, healthy}
a.ops.Consents["limited"] = Consent{Institution: "N26", Country: "DE", HistoryMonths: 24}
a.ops.Consents["healthy"] = Consent{Institution: "Other", Country: "DE", HistoryMonths: 12}
b := &sessionBank{
statuses: map[string]banking.SessionStatus{
"limited": {ValidUntil: expiry, AccountIDs: []string{"main_uid", "mwst_uid", "tax_uid"}},
// Another consent must not authorize an account whose own status failed.
"healthy": {ValidUntil: expiry, AccountIDs: []string{"independent_uid", "main_uid"}},
},
failures: map[string]error{},
}
a.bank = b
before, err := a.Sync(ctx)
if err != nil || len(before.Data.Transactions) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("initial sync: transactions=%d, error=%v, sync error=%s", len(before.Data.Transactions), err, before.Status.SyncError)
}
old := time.Now().Add(-48 * time.Hour).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
a.ops.LastSync = old
for _, account := range before.Data.Accounts {
a.ops.AccountSync[account.ID] = old
}
b.fetched = nil
b.failures["limited"] = bankRateError(t)
failed, err := a.Sync(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Count(failed.Status.SyncError, "429") != 1 || strings.Contains(failed.Status.SyncError, "bank connection unavailable") || strings.Contains(failed.Status.SyncError, "private provider response") || !strings.Contains(failed.Status.SyncError, "retry") {
t.Fatal("session rate limit was duplicated, obscured, or exposed private data")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(b.fetched, []string{"independent"}) {
t.Fatal("failed consent authorized retrieval or independent consent stopped syncing")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before.Data, failed.Data) || !reflect.DeepEqual(before.Sessions, failed.Sessions) || a.ops.LastSync != old {
t.Fatal("rate limit changed existing facts, bindings, metadata, or last successful sync")
}
for _, account := range before.Data.Accounts {
if account.ID != "independent" && a.ops.AccountSync[account.ID] != old {
t.Fatal("failed account advanced its cursor")
}
}
if a.ops.AccountSync["independent"] == old || a.ops.Consents["limited"].NeedsReconnect || a.ops.Consents["limited"].HistoryMonths != 24 {
t.Fatal("rate limit lost consent settings, required reconnect, or stopped the healthy cursor")
}
a = reopenBankingApp(t, a)
a.bank = b
if a.ops.Consents["limited"].NeedsReconnect || a.ops.LastSync != old || a.ops.AccountSync["mwst"] != old {
t.Fatal("rate failure state did not survive restart safely")
}
delete(b.failures, "limited")
b.fetched = nil
recovered, err := a.Sync(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if recovered.Status.SyncError != "" || a.ops.Consents["limited"].Error != "" || a.ops.Consents["limited"].NeedsReconnect || a.ops.LastSync == old {
t.Fatal("successful retry did not clear the transient failure")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before.Data, recovered.Data) || len(b.fetched) != 4 {
t.Fatal("recovery duplicated facts or skipped an account")
}
for _, account := range recovered.Data.Accounts {
if a.ops.AccountSync[account.ID] == old {
t.Fatal("recovered account cursor did not advance")
}
}
}
func TestSyncMissingMembershipStillRejectsAccount(t *testing.T) {
a, s, b := backfillApp(t)
b.session.Accounts = []domain.Account{s.Data.Accounts[1]}
before := domain.Clone(s.Data)
last := a.ops.LastSync
after, err := a.Sync(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.Contains(after.Status.SyncError, s.Data.Accounts[0].DisplayName+": bank connection unavailable") || !a.ops.Consents["current"].NeedsReconnect {
t.Fatal("missing account membership was treated as authorized")
}
if len(b.accounts) != 1 || b.accounts[0].ID != "other" || a.ops.AccountSync[s.Data.Accounts[0].ID] != last || a.ops.LastSync != last {
t.Fatal("missing member was fetched or advanced its cursor, or valid member was skipped")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before.Accounts, after.Data.Accounts) || len(after.Data.Transactions) != 1 || after.Data.Transactions[0].Facts.AccountID != "other" {
t.Fatal("missing membership changed bindings or imported unauthorized facts")
}
}
func TestSyncTransactionFailuresPreserveProgressAndSafeErrors(t *testing.T) {
for _, scenario := range []string{"rate limit", "reconnect", "private response"} {
t.Run(scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
a, s, b := backfillApp(t)
s = seed(t, a, s)
old := a.ops.LastSync
cursors := map[string]string{}
for id, cursor := range a.ops.AccountSync {
cursors[id] = cursor
}
switch scenario {
case "rate limit":
b.fetchErr = bankRateError(t)
case "reconnect":
b.fetchErr = fmt.Errorf("private provider response: %w", banking.ErrReconnect)
case "private response":
b.fetchErr = errors.New("private provider response")
}
failed, err := a.Sync(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta := a.ops.Consents["current"]
if failed.Status.SyncError == "" || meta.Error == "" || strings.Contains(failed.Status.SyncError+meta.Error, "private provider response") {
t.Fatal("transaction failure was lost or exposed provider data")
}
if scenario == "rate limit" && (!strings.Contains(failed.Status.SyncError, "429") || !strings.Contains(meta.Error, "429") || !strings.Contains(meta.Error, "retry")) {
t.Fatal("transaction rate error was obscured")
}
if meta.NeedsReconnect != (scenario == "reconnect") {
t.Fatal("transaction failure classified consent incorrectly")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(s.Data, failed.Data) || !reflect.DeepEqual(cursors, a.ops.AccountSync) || a.ops.LastSync != old {
t.Fatal("failed retrieval imported partial data or advanced synchronization")
}
b.fetchErr = nil
recovered, err := a.Sync(context.Background())
if err != nil || recovered.Status.SyncError != "" || a.ops.Consents["current"].Error != "" || a.ops.Consents["current"].NeedsReconnect {
t.Fatal("successful retrieval did not clear the failure")
}
})
}
}
+49 -43
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import (
"time"
"finance-duck/internal/domain"
"finance-duck/internal/ratelimit"
)
// ErrReconnect identifies inactive bank consent, not application authentication
@@ -34,6 +35,13 @@ type Session struct {
ValidUntil string `json:"valid_until"`
Accounts []domain.Account `json:"accounts"`
}
// SessionStatus contains only the current consent expiry and external account
// membership. Full account metadata is captured once by Exchange.
type SessionStatus struct {
ValidUntil string
AccountIDs []string
}
type Balance struct {
Amount domain.Money `json:"amount"`
Currency string `json:"currency"`
@@ -43,7 +51,7 @@ type Balance struct {
type Provider interface {
Authorize(context.Context, string, string, string) (string, error)
Exchange(context.Context, string) (Session, error)
Status(context.Context, string) (Session, error)
Status(context.Context, string) (SessionStatus, error)
Balances(context.Context, string) ([]Balance, error)
Transactions(context.Context, domain.Account, string, string) ([]domain.Facts, error)
}
@@ -53,6 +61,7 @@ type EnableBanking struct {
appID string
key *rsa.PrivateKey
redirectURL string
requests ratelimit.Controller
}
var _ Provider = (*EnableBanking)(nil)
@@ -125,9 +134,10 @@ func (p *EnableBanking) jwt() (string, error) {
return unsigned + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature), nil
}
func (p *EnableBanking) request(ctx context.Context, method, path string, input, output any) error {
// Enforce a deadline even when a caller injects a client without Timeout.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := p.requests.Acquire(ctx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking: %w", err)
}
defer p.requests.Release()
token, err := p.jwt()
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -157,17 +167,27 @@ func (p *EnableBanking) request(ctx context.Context, method, path string, input,
if p.HTTPClient != nil {
client = *p.HTTPClient
}
// Cap each attempt, including response reads, without timing out retry waits.
if client.Timeout <= 0 || client.Timeout > 30*time.Second {
client.Timeout = 30 * time.Second
}
// Never forward signed credentials or financial requests through redirects.
client.CheckRedirect = func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }
response, err := client.Do(req)
response, err := p.requests.Do(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) (*http.Response, error) {
response, err := client.Do(req.Clone(ctx))
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return nil, context.Canceled
}
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request timed out: %w", context.DeadlineExceeded)
}
return nil, errors.New("connection failed")
}
return response, nil
}, method == http.MethodGet)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return context.Canceled
}
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking request timed out")
}
return fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking connection failed")
return fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking: %w", err)
}
defer response.Body.Close()
if response.StatusCode < 200 || response.StatusCode >= 300 {
@@ -176,6 +196,12 @@ func (p *EnableBanking) request(ctx context.Context, method, path string, input,
const limit = 16 << 20
b, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, limit+1))
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return context.Canceled
}
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking response timed out: %w", context.DeadlineExceeded)
}
return fmt.Errorf("read Enable Banking response")
}
if len(b) > limit {
@@ -311,54 +337,34 @@ func (p *EnableBanking) Exchange(ctx context.Context, code string) (Session, err
}
return result, nil
}
func (p *EnableBanking) Status(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) (Session, error) {
func (p *EnableBanking) Status(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) (SessionStatus, error) {
if sessionID == "" {
return Session{}, fmt.Errorf("session ID is required")
return SessionStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("session ID is required")
}
var response struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
Accounts []string `json:"accounts"`
AccountsData []accountDTO `json:"accounts_data"`
Access accessDTO `json:"access"`
ASPSP institutionDTO `json:"aspsp"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Accounts []string `json:"accounts"`
Access accessDTO `json:"access"`
}
if err := p.request(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/sessions/"+url.PathEscape(sessionID), nil, &response); err != nil {
return Session{}, err
return SessionStatus{}, err
}
if response.Status != "AUTHORIZED" {
return Session{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking session is not authorized: %w", ErrReconnect)
return SessionStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking session is not authorized: %w", ErrReconnect)
}
expires, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, response.Access.ValidUntil)
if err != nil {
return Session{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking returned invalid session expiry")
return SessionStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking returned invalid session expiry")
}
if !expires.After(time.Now()) {
return Session{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking session expired: %w", ErrReconnect)
}
result := Session{ID: sessionID, ValidUntil: response.Access.ValidUntil, Accounts: []domain.Account{}}
hashes := map[string]string{}
for _, a := range response.AccountsData {
hashes[a.UID] = a.IdentificationHash
return SessionStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking session expired: %w", ErrReconnect)
}
for _, id := range response.Accounts {
if id == "" {
return Session{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking returned empty account identifier")
return SessionStatus{}, fmt.Errorf("Enable Banking returned empty account identifier")
}
var details accountDTO
if err := p.request(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/accounts/"+url.PathEscape(id)+"/details", nil, &details); err != nil {
return Session{}, err
}
details.UID = id
if details.IdentificationHash == "" {
details.IdentificationHash = hashes[id]
}
a, err := details.account(response.ASPSP.Name)
if err != nil {
return Session{}, err
}
result.Accounts = append(result.Accounts, a)
}
return result, nil
return SessionStatus{ValidUntil: response.Access.ValidUntil, AccountIDs: response.Accounts}, nil
}
type amountDTO struct {
+200 -3
View File
@@ -13,11 +13,15 @@ import (
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"finance-duck/internal/ratelimit"
)
func testProvider(t *testing.T, handler http.HandlerFunc) (*EnableBanking, *rsa.PrivateKey) {
@@ -138,7 +142,8 @@ func TestEnableBankingDocumentedFlowAndPagination(t *testing.T) {
case "/sessions/session-1":
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"AUTHORIZED","access":{"valid_until":%q},"aspsp":{"name":"N26","country":"DE"},"accounts":["uid-one"],"accounts_data":[{"uid":"uid-one","identification_hash":"stable-hash"}]}`, expiry)
case "/accounts/uid-one/details":
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"account_id":{"iban":"DE02120300000000202051"},"details":"Main account","currency":"EUR"}`)
t.Error("session membership must not require account details")
http.Error(w, "account details unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
case "/accounts/uid-one/balances":
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"balances":[{"name":"Booked","balance_amount":{"currency":"EUR","amount":"1234.5678"},"balance_type":"CLBD","reference_date":"2026-09-01"}]}`)
case "/accounts/uid-one/transactions":
@@ -180,8 +185,8 @@ func TestEnableBankingDocumentedFlowAndPagination(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(status.Accounts) != 1 || status.Accounts[0].ID != session.Accounts[0].ID || status.Accounts[0].ExternalAccountID != "uid-one" {
t.Fatalf("account identity changed between session DTOs: %+v", status)
if len(status.AccountIDs) != 1 || status.AccountIDs[0] != session.Accounts[0].ExternalAccountID || status.ValidUntil != expiry {
t.Fatalf("incorrect consent membership or expiry: %+v", status)
}
balances, err := p.Balances(context.Background(), "uid-one")
if err != nil || len(balances) != 1 || balances[0].Amount.String() != "1234.5678" || balances[0].Type != "CLBD" {
@@ -265,6 +270,198 @@ func TestEnableBankingExpiredConsentRequiresReconnect(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestEnableBankingRejectsInvalidSessionMembership(t *testing.T) {
for name, payload := range map[string]string{
"empty UID": `{"status":"AUTHORIZED","accounts":[""],"access":{"valid_until":"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"}}`,
"non-string UID": `{"status":"AUTHORIZED","accounts":[{}],"access":{"valid_until":"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"}}`,
"invalid expiry": `{"status":"AUTHORIZED","accounts":["uid"],"access":{"valid_until":"not-a-date"}}`,
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
p, _ := testProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprint(w, payload)
})
status, err := p.Status(context.Background(), "session")
if err == nil || status.ValidUntil != "" || status.AccountIDs != nil || errors.Is(err, ErrReconnect) {
t.Fatalf("invalid response returned usable membership or claimed revoked consent: %+v %v", status, err)
}
})
}
}
type bankingRoundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f bankingRoundTripFunc) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return f(r)
}
type bankingClosedBody struct {
io.ReadCloser
closed *atomic.Int32
onClose func()
}
func (b *bankingClosedBody) Close() error {
b.closed.Add(1)
err := b.ReadCloser.Close()
if b.onClose != nil {
b.onClose()
}
return err
}
func TestEnableBankingGETRecoversAfterRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
for _, endpoint := range []string{"status", "transactions"} {
t.Run(endpoint, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
var calls, closed atomic.Int32
var first atomic.Int64
p, _ := testProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if calls.Add(1) == 1 {
first.Store(time.Now().UnixNano())
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
http.Error(w, "private provider response", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
if time.Since(time.Unix(0, first.Load())) < time.Second {
t.Error("retried before provider cooldown elapsed")
}
if closed.Load() != 1 {
t.Error("retried without closing the rate-limit response")
}
if endpoint == "status" {
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"status":"AUTHORIZED","accounts":["uid"],"access":{"valid_until":"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"}}`)
} else {
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"transactions":[{"entry_reference":"entry","transaction_amount":{"amount":"1.00","currency":"EUR"},"credit_debit_indicator":"CRDT","status":"BOOK","booking_date":"2026-09-01"}]}`)
}
})
transport := p.HTTPClient.Transport
p.HTTPClient.Timeout = 500 * time.Millisecond
p.HTTPClient.Transport = bankingRoundTripFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
response, err := transport.RoundTrip(r)
if err == nil && response.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
response.Body = &bankingClosedBody{ReadCloser: response.Body, closed: &closed}
}
return response, err
})
if endpoint == "status" {
status, err := p.Status(context.Background(), "session")
if err != nil || len(status.AccountIDs) != 1 || status.AccountIDs[0] != "uid" {
t.Fatalf("session membership did not recover: %+v %v", status, err)
}
} else {
account := fixtureDataset().Accounts[0]
account.ExternalAccountID = "uid"
rows, err := p.Transactions(context.Background(), account, "", "")
if err != nil || len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].ExternalID != "entry" || rows[0].Amount.String() != "1.00" {
t.Fatalf("transaction retrieval did not recover: %+v %v", rows, err)
}
}
if calls.Load() != 2 || closed.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected retry requests or response leaks: calls=%d closed=%d", calls.Load(), closed.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestEnableBankingCooldownCoversAllEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
var calls atomic.Int32
p, _ := testProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "300")
http.Error(w, "private provider response", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
})
_, err := p.Status(context.Background(), "session")
var initial *ratelimit.RateLimitError
if !errors.As(err, &initial) || !initial.RetryAt().After(time.Now()) || errors.Is(err, ErrReconnect) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") {
t.Fatalf("unsafe or missing rate-limit error: %v", err)
}
account := fixtureDataset().Accounts[0]
account.ExternalAccountID = "uid"
for name, request := range map[string]func() error{
"status": func() error { _, err := p.Status(context.Background(), "other-session"); return err },
"balances": func() error { _, err := p.Balances(context.Background(), "uid"); return err },
"transactions": func() error { _, err := p.Transactions(context.Background(), account, "", ""); return err },
"exchange": func() error { _, err := p.Exchange(context.Background(), "once-only-code"); return err },
"authorize": func() error { _, err := p.Authorize(context.Background(), "N26", "DE", "state"); return err },
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := request()
var limit *ratelimit.RateLimitError
if !errors.As(err, &limit) || !limit.RetryAt().Equal(initial.RetryAt()) || errors.Is(err, ErrReconnect) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") {
t.Fatalf("cooldown was lost or unsafe: %v", err)
}
if calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("provider contacted during cooldown: %d requests", calls.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestEnableBankingNeverReplaysMutationAfterRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
for _, endpoint := range []string{"exchange", "authorize"} {
t.Run(endpoint, func(t *testing.T) {
var posts atomic.Int32
p, _ := testProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/aspsps" {
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"aspsps":[{"name":"N26","country":"DE","maximum_consent_validity":3600}]}`)
return
}
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
t.Error("unexpected non-mutation request")
}
posts.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
http.Error(w, "private once-only exchange failure", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
})
var err error
if endpoint == "exchange" {
_, err = p.Exchange(context.Background(), "once-only-code")
} else {
_, err = p.Authorize(context.Background(), "N26", "DE", "state")
}
var limit *ratelimit.RateLimitError
if !errors.As(err, &limit) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") || errors.Is(err, ErrReconnect) {
t.Fatalf("mutation rate limit was lost or unsafe: %v", err)
}
if posts.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("mutation replayed %d times", posts.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestEnableBankingCanceledRetryRetainsCooldown(t *testing.T) {
var calls, closed atomic.Int32
p, _ := testProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
http.Error(w, "private provider response", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
transport := p.HTTPClient.Transport
p.HTTPClient.Transport = bankingRoundTripFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
response, err := transport.RoundTrip(r)
if err == nil && response.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
response.Body = &bankingClosedBody{ReadCloser: response.Body, closed: &closed, onClose: cancel}
}
return response, err
})
_, err := p.Status(ctx, "session")
var original *ratelimit.RateLimitError
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || !errors.As(err, &original) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") {
t.Fatalf("cancellation lost safe rate-limit evidence: %v", err)
}
_, err = p.Balances(context.Background(), "uid")
var retained *ratelimit.RateLimitError
if !errors.As(err, &retained) || !retained.RetryAt().Equal(original.RetryAt()) {
t.Fatalf("cancellation discarded provider cooldown: %v", err)
}
if calls.Load() != 1 || closed.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("cancellation retried or leaked a response: calls=%d closed=%d", calls.Load(), closed.Load())
}
}
func TestEnableBankingValidatesUploadedCredentials(t *testing.T) {
_, key := testProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Error("credential validation must not call provider")
+85 -17
View File
@@ -11,18 +11,63 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"finance-duck/internal/domain"
"finance-duck/internal/ratelimit"
)
// Client configuration must not be mutated concurrently with classification.
// Do not copy a Client after use; use WithModel to share its rate control safely.
type Client struct {
APIKey string
Model string
IncludeAmount bool
HTTPClient *http.Client
BaseURL string
rate atomic.Pointer[ratelimit.Controller]
}
// WithModel snapshots the configuration while sharing the original client's
// in-flight request gate and provider cooldown, including across model choices.
func (c *Client) WithModel(model string) *Client {
snapshot := &Client{
APIKey: c.APIKey,
Model: model,
IncludeAmount: c.IncludeAmount,
HTTPClient: c.HTTPClient,
BaseURL: c.BaseURL,
}
snapshot.rate.Store(c.rateControl())
return snapshot
}
func (c *Client) rateControl() *ratelimit.Controller {
if gate := c.rate.Load(); gate != nil {
return gate
}
gate := &ratelimit.Controller{}
if c.rate.CompareAndSwap(nil, gate) {
return gate
}
return c.rate.Load()
}
// Keep context identity without exposing transport errors containing URLs or
// response details, including deadlines enforced by http.Client itself.
func requestContextError(ctx context.Context, err error) error {
if cause := ctx.Err(); cause != nil {
return cause
}
for _, cause := range []error{context.Canceled, context.DeadlineExceeded} {
if errors.Is(err, cause) {
return cause
}
}
return nil
}
type Proposal struct {
@@ -41,9 +86,12 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
}
}
p := Proposal{Enrichment: domain.Fallback(facts)}
failError := func(err error) (Proposal, error) {
p.Enrichment.Classification = domain.Provenance{Source: "fallback", Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), Error: err.Error()}
return p, err
}
fail := func(message string) (Proposal, error) {
p.Enrichment.Classification = domain.Provenance{Source: "fallback", Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), Error: message}
return p, errors.New(message)
return failError(errors.New(message))
}
if _, err := facts.Amount.Minor(); err != nil {
return fail("invalid transaction amount")
@@ -64,9 +112,16 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
return p, nil
}
}
if strings.TrimSpace(c.APIKey) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(c.Model) == "" {
apiKey, model := c.APIKey, c.Model
includeAmount, baseURL, configuredHTTPClient := c.IncludeAmount, c.BaseURL, c.HTTPClient
if strings.TrimSpace(apiKey) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(model) == "" {
return fail("AI classification is not configured")
}
gate := c.rateControl()
if err := gate.Acquire(ctx); err != nil {
return failError(err)
}
defer gate.Release()
clean := newSanitizer(facts, data, false)
merchantClean := newSanitizer(facts, data, true)
candidates := retrieve(localDescription, p.Enrichment.Kind, data, clean, merchantClean)
@@ -78,7 +133,7 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
Amount *domain.Money `json:"amount,omitempty"`
Currency string `json:"currency,omitempty"`
}{Description: clean(facts.RawDescription), Categories: candidates.categories, Tags: candidates.tags, Merchants: candidates.merchants}
if c.IncludeAmount {
if includeAmount {
prompt.Amount = &facts.Amount
// Currency is validated separately rather than copied from arbitrary bank text.
if len(facts.Currency) != 3 || strings.IndexFunc(facts.Currency, func(r rune) bool { return r < 'A' || r > 'Z' }) >= 0 {
@@ -91,7 +146,7 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
return fail("cannot encode classification request")
}
request := map[string]any{
"model": c.Model,
"model": model,
"stream": false,
"max_tokens": 512,
// Fail closed: never retry without these controls. No plugins/tools are enabled.
@@ -108,7 +163,7 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
if err != nil {
return fail("cannot encode classification request")
}
base := strings.TrimRight(c.BaseURL, "/")
base := strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/")
if base == "" {
base = "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1"
}
@@ -119,24 +174,34 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
if endpoint.Scheme != "https" && !(endpoint.Scheme == "http" && (endpoint.Hostname() == "localhost" || endpoint.Hostname() == "127.0.0.1" || endpoint.Hostname() == "::1")) {
return fail("AI endpoint must use HTTPS")
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, base+"/chat/completions", bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return fail("cannot create classification request")
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.APIKey)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
client := http.Client{Timeout: 45 * time.Second}
if c.HTTPClient != nil {
client = *c.HTTPClient
if configuredHTTPClient != nil {
client = *configuredHTTPClient
if client.Timeout == 0 {
client.Timeout = 45 * time.Second
}
}
// Redirects could send sensitive prompts to endpoints with different policies.
client.CheckRedirect = func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }
resp, err := client.Do(req)
resp, err := gate.Do(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) (*http.Response, error) {
// Each attempt uses identical serialized bytes, credentials and controls.
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, base+"/chat/completions", bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("cannot create classification request")
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+apiKey)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
if cause := requestContextError(ctx, err); cause != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AI request canceled: %w", cause)
}
return nil, errors.New("AI request failed")
}
return resp, nil
}, true)
if err != nil {
return fail("AI request failed")
return failError(err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
@@ -145,6 +210,9 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
const maxResponse = 64 * 1024
raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponse+1))
if err != nil || len(raw) > maxResponse {
if cause := requestContextError(ctx, err); cause != nil {
return failError(fmt.Errorf("AI request canceled: %w", cause))
}
return fail("invalid AI response size")
}
var envelope struct {
@@ -202,7 +270,7 @@ func (c *Client) Classify(ctx context.Context, facts domain.Facts, data domain.D
e.MerchantID = proposed.ID
}
}
e.Classification = domain.Provenance{Source: "openrouter", Model: c.Model, Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}
e.Classification = domain.Provenance{Source: "openrouter", Model: model, Timestamp: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}
validationData := data
if proposed != nil {
validationData.Merchants = append(append([]domain.Merchant{}, data.Merchants...), *proposed)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ func TestUnsafeMerchantProposalRejected(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestProviderErrorsNeverRelaxPolicyOrEchoResponse(t *testing.T) {
for _, status := range []int{302, 400, 401, 404, 429, 500, 503} {
for _, status := range []int{302, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 500, 503} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(status), func(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
calls := 0
+341
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
package classification
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestRateLimitRetryPreservesPrivateRequest(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
f.Counterparty = "Alice Privateperson"
f.CounterpartyIBAN = "DE89370400440532013000"
f.RawDescription = "Coffee House Alice Privateperson DE89370400440532013000 private_external -918.27 reference secretpayment"
var requests [][]byte
var arrivals []time.Time
var mu sync.Mutex
c := mockClient(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
arrivals = append(arrivals, time.Now())
body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
requests = append(requests, body)
if r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != "/chat/completions" || r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer test-secret" || r.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "application/json" {
t.Error("retry changed authenticated JSON endpoint")
}
if len(requests) == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "2")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "sensitive-provider-response")
return
}
reply(w, validAnswer)
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 8*time.Second)
defer cancel()
p, err := c.Classify(ctx, f, d, true)
if err != nil || p.Enrichment.Classification.Source != "openrouter" || p.Enrichment.Classification.Error != "" {
t.Fatalf("retry did not recover: %+v, %v", p, err)
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if len(requests) != 2 || !bytes.Equal(requests[0], requests[1]) {
t.Fatalf("retry did not reuse identical serialized request: %d attempts", len(requests))
}
if gap := arrivals[1].Sub(arrivals[0]); gap < 1950*time.Millisecond {
t.Fatalf("retried before provider's two-second delay: %v", gap)
}
var request struct {
Provider struct {
DataCollection string `json:"data_collection"`
ZDR bool `json:"zdr"`
Require bool `json:"require_parameters"`
} `json:"provider"`
Messages []struct{ Role, Content string } `json:"messages"`
ResponseFormat struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Schema struct {
Strict bool `json:"strict"`
} `json:"json_schema"`
} `json:"response_format"`
Plugins json.RawMessage `json:"plugins"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(requests[0], &request); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if request.Provider.DataCollection != "deny" || !request.Provider.ZDR || !request.Provider.Require || request.ResponseFormat.Type != "json_schema" || !request.ResponseFormat.Schema.Strict || len(request.Plugins) != 0 {
t.Fatal("retry relaxed private structured routing")
}
if len(request.Messages) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected message count: %d", len(request.Messages))
}
for _, secret := range []string{"alice", "privateperson", "3704", "private_external", "918", "secretpayment", "tx_private", "account_private"} {
if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(request.Messages[1].Content), secret) {
t.Errorf("retried prompt leaked %q", secret)
}
}
}
func TestRateLimitBackoffExhaustionRetainsSharedCooldown(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
var arrivals []time.Time
var mu sync.Mutex
c := mockClient(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
arrivals = append(arrivals, time.Now())
// An invalid hint must not bypass exponential fallback delays.
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "not-a-delay")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "sensitive-provider-response")
})
snapshot := c.WithModel("test/preview-model")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
defer cancel()
p, err := c.Classify(ctx, f, d, true)
assertSafeRateLimit(t, err, p.Enrichment.Classification.Error)
mu.Lock()
observed := append([]time.Time(nil), arrivals...)
mu.Unlock()
if len(observed) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("expected four bounded attempts, got %d", len(observed))
}
for i, delay := range []time.Duration{time.Second, 2 * time.Second, 4 * time.Second} {
if gap := observed[i+1].Sub(observed[i]); gap < delay-50*time.Millisecond {
t.Errorf("backoff %d retried too early: %v, need %v", i+1, gap, delay)
}
}
for _, client := range []*Client{snapshot, c} {
probeCtx, probeCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
p, err := client.Classify(probeCtx, f, d, true)
probeCancel()
assertSafeRateLimit(t, err, p.Enrichment.Classification.Error)
mu.Lock()
calls := len(arrivals)
mu.Unlock()
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || calls != 4 {
t.Fatalf("retained cooldown waited or contacted provider: %v, attempts=%d", err, calls)
}
}
}
func TestRateLimitHTTPDateDoesNotRetryEarly(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
var retryAt time.Time
var arrivals []time.Time
var mu sync.Mutex
c := mockClient(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
arrivals = append(arrivals, time.Now())
if len(arrivals) == 1 {
retryAt = time.Now().UTC().Add(3 * time.Second).Truncate(time.Second)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt.Format(http.TimeFormat))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
reply(w, validAnswer)
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 8*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if p, err := c.Classify(ctx, f, d, true); err != nil || p.Enrichment.Classification.Source != "openrouter" {
t.Fatalf("HTTP-date retry failed: %+v, %v", p, err)
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
if len(arrivals) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected one HTTP-date retry, got %d attempts", len(arrivals))
}
if arrivals[1].Before(retryAt.Add(-25 * time.Millisecond)) {
t.Fatalf("retried at %v before HTTP-date %v", arrivals[1], retryAt)
}
}
func TestRateLimitLongHintsFailFastAndLocalRulesBypassCooldown(t *testing.T) {
for _, hint := range []string{"600", time.Now().UTC().Add(10 * time.Minute).Format(http.TimeFormat), "9223372036854775807"} {
t.Run(hint, func(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
var calls atomic.Int32
c := mockClient(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", hint)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "sensitive-provider-response")
})
snapshot := c.WithModel("test/preview-model")
for _, client := range []*Client{c, snapshot} {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
p, err := client.Classify(ctx, f, d, true)
cancel()
assertSafeRateLimit(t, err, p.Enrichment.Classification.Error)
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("long hint waited or permitted an early request: %v, attempts=%d", err, calls.Load())
}
}
d.Merchants[0].UseDefaults = true
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
defer cancel()
p, err := snapshot.Classify(ctx, f, d, false)
if err != nil || p.Enrichment.Classification.Source != "rule" || p.Enrichment.MerchantID != "mer_coffee" || calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("cooldown blocked local rule: %+v, %v, attempts=%d", p, err, calls.Load())
}
})
}
}
func TestRateLimitCancellationClosesBodyAndRetainsCooldown(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
var calls atomic.Int32
lateRequest := make(chan struct{}, 4)
c := mockClient(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if calls.Add(1) > 1 {
lateRequest <- struct{}{}
}
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "sensitive-provider-response")
})
closed := make(chan struct{})
var closeOnce sync.Once
transport := c.HTTPClient.Transport
c.HTTPClient.Transport = rateLimitRoundTripFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
response, err := transport.RoundTrip(r)
if err == nil && response.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
response.Body = &rateLimitNotifyingBody{ReadCloser: response.Body, closed: closed, once: &closeOnce}
}
return response, err
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := c.Classify(ctx, f, d, true)
done <- err
}()
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("429 response body was not closed before retry waiting")
}
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sensitive") {
t.Fatalf("waiting cancellation did not preserve safe context identity: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("retry wait ignored cancellation")
}
probeCtx, probeCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
defer probeCancel()
p, err := c.WithModel("test/preview-model").Classify(probeCtx, f, d, true)
assertSafeRateLimit(t, err, p.Enrichment.Classification.Error)
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("cancelled retry lost cooldown or made a late request: %v, attempts=%d", err, calls.Load())
}
select {
case <-lateRequest:
t.Fatal("cancelled retry made a request after its timer expired")
case <-time.After(1200 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
func TestRateLimitQueuedSnapshotCancellationMakesNoLateRequest(t *testing.T) {
f, d := fixture()
entered := make(chan struct{})
release := make(chan struct{})
var releaseOnce sync.Once
unblock := func() { releaseOnce.Do(func() { close(release) }) }
var calls atomic.Int32
models := make(chan string, 4)
c := mockClient(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var request struct{ Model string }
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&request); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
models <- request.Model
if calls.Add(1) == 1 {
close(entered)
select {
case <-release:
case <-r.Context().Done():
return
}
}
reply(w, validAnswer)
})
defer unblock()
snapshot := c.WithModel("test/preview-model")
activeCtx, activeCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer activeCancel()
activeDone := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := c.Classify(activeCtx, f, d, true)
activeDone <- err
}()
select {
case <-entered:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("first AI request did not start")
}
queueCtx, queueCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
_, err := snapshot.Classify(queueCtx, f, d, true)
queueCancel()
if !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || calls.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("queued snapshot contacted provider or ignored cancellation: %v, attempts=%d", err, calls.Load())
}
unblock()
select {
case err := <-activeDone:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("queued cancellation disrupted active request: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("active request did not complete")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
p, err := snapshot.Classify(ctx, f, d, true)
if err != nil || p.Enrichment.Classification.Model != "test/preview-model" || calls.Load() != 2 {
t.Fatalf("cancelled waiter leaked a request or blocked successor: %+v, %v, attempts=%d", p, err, calls.Load())
}
if original, preview := <-models, <-models; original != "test/strict-model" || preview != "test/preview-model" {
t.Fatalf("serialized requests used wrong models: %q, %q", original, preview)
}
}
func assertSafeRateLimit(t *testing.T, err error, provenance string) {
t.Helper()
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "429") || provenance == "" || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sensitive") || strings.Contains(provenance, "sensitive") {
t.Fatalf("unsafe or missing rate-limit failure: %v, provenance=%q", err, provenance)
}
}
type rateLimitRoundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f rateLimitRoundTripFunc) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return f(r)
}
type rateLimitNotifyingBody struct {
io.ReadCloser
closed chan struct{}
once *sync.Once
}
func (b *rateLimitNotifyingBody) Close() error {
err := b.ReadCloser.Close()
b.once.Do(func() { close(b.closed) })
return err
}
+183
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
// Package ratelimit coordinates bounded HTTP 429 retries for one provider client.
package ratelimit
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
const (
maxRateAttempts = 4
maxRateWait = 2 * time.Minute
)
// Controller serializes provider calls and retains their HTTP 429 cooldown.
// Its zero value is ready for use. A Controller must not be copied after use.
// The active caller owns retries; other callers fail fast during known cooldowns.
type Controller struct {
once sync.Once
active chan struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
limit *RateLimitError
}
// RateLimitError is a safe provider HTTP 429 error. Its message contains only
// the status and retry timing, never provider response text or request details.
// Use errors.As with *RateLimitError to identify it through wrapped errors.
type RateLimitError struct {
next time.Time
unbounded bool
}
func (r *RateLimitError) Error() string {
if r.unbounded {
return "provider rate limit (HTTP 429): retry time exceeds the supported range; automatic retry disabled"
}
return "provider rate limit (HTTP 429): retry allowed at " + r.next.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
}
// RetryAt returns the earliest allowed retry time. Zero means the provider's
// delay exceeded the supported range and automatic retries remain disabled.
func (r *RateLimitError) RetryAt() time.Time {
return r.next
}
func (g *Controller) cooldown() error {
g.mu.Lock()
defer g.mu.Unlock()
if g.limit != nil && (g.limit.unbounded || time.Now().Before(g.limit.next)) {
return g.limit
}
return nil
}
// Acquire waits for the active call, unless canceled or a cooldown is known.
// A successful acquisition must be paired with Release, including on errors.
func (g *Controller) Acquire(ctx context.Context) error {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("provider request canceled: %w", err)
}
if err := g.cooldown(); err != nil {
return err
}
g.once.Do(func() { g.active = make(chan struct{}, 1) })
select {
case g.active <- struct{}{}:
case <-ctx.Done():
return fmt.Errorf("provider request canceled: %w", ctx.Err())
}
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
g.Release()
return fmt.Errorf("provider request canceled: %w", err)
}
// The preceding request may have established a cooldown while we queued.
if err := g.cooldown(); err != nil {
g.Release()
return err
}
return nil
}
// Release relinquishes a successful acquisition.
func (g *Controller) Release() {
<-g.active
}
// retryLimit never converts a positive overflowing delay into a short wait.
// Delays beyond time.Duration's range disable retries rather than truncate the
// provider's instruction. HTTP dates retain their absolute timestamp unchanged.
func retryLimit(header string, now time.Time, fallback time.Duration) *RateLimitError {
limit := &RateLimitError{next: now.Add(fallback)}
header = strings.TrimSpace(header)
if header == "" {
return limit
}
digits := true
for _, c := range header {
if c < '0' || c > '9' {
digits = false
break
}
}
if digits {
seconds, err := strconv.ParseUint(header, 10, 64)
if err != nil || seconds > uint64((1<<63-1)/int64(time.Second)) {
return &RateLimitError{unbounded: true}
}
if delay := time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second; delay > fallback {
limit.next = now.Add(delay)
}
return limit
}
if date, err := http.ParseTime(header); err == nil && date.After(limit.next) {
limit.next = date
}
return limit
}
// Do executes an attempt under an already-acquired Controller. Only HTTP 429
// responses are retried, and only when retry is true (safe/idempotent requests).
// Each 429 body is closed here; other response bodies remain caller-owned.
// The callback must honor ctx and return errors safe to expose to the caller.
// Its per-attempt timeout must not include this controller's retry waiting.
func (g *Controller) Do(ctx context.Context, attempt func(context.Context) (*http.Response, error), retry bool) (*http.Response, error) {
remainingWait := maxRateWait
var lastLimit error
canceled := func(err error) error {
if lastLimit != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", lastLimit, err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("provider request canceled: %w", err)
}
for number := range maxRateAttempts {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, canceled(err)
}
resp, err := attempt(ctx)
if err != nil {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil, canceled(ctx.Err())
}
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return nil, canceled(err)
}
return nil, err
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
return resp, nil
}
limit := retryLimit(resp.Header.Get("Retry-After"), time.Now(), time.Second<<number)
g.mu.Lock()
g.limit = limit
g.mu.Unlock()
// Never read or expose provider errors, and release each response before
// any sleep or retry. Other responses are processed by the caller.
resp.Body.Close()
lastLimit = limit
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, canceled(err)
}
delay := time.Until(limit.next)
if !retry || number == maxRateAttempts-1 || limit.unbounded || delay > remainingWait {
return nil, limit
}
if delay <= 0 {
continue
}
remainingWait -= delay
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, canceled(ctx.Err())
case <-timer.C:
}
}
return nil, lastLimit
}