Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
fd5f610982
D19 into §3 and swept to all six destinations Pouya named: both agent briefs
(scope + severity filter), /build Phases 2–4 (non-gating questions, scope, stop
signal, two-round cap), /wrap, and CLAUDE.md (comments record decisions, not
history). Sweep verified by command, not recalled.
Rulings applied:
Q46(a) PUBLISHABLE — three §4 Offerings rows flipped; gate 1 records
[Pouya's stated basis], never [verified]. Step 5 unblocked.
Q48 closed, not site-relevant.
Q49 one §4 row, "Mediator"; read as declining Q49(b), so worksFor stays out.
Q50 DEVIATES — ships as name + slogan, not the concatenation. Flagged.
Q51 OBA sections stay; the regulator/voluntary distinction recorded.
Q52 docs/reference/deploy-credential-verification.md — 18 read-only AWS
calls, re-run rather than transcribed, access key ID redacted.
Q53 memberOf emitted on /about/'s Person node.
Two review rounds. The headline finding was this session's own: the Q53 sweep
was asserted and never run, leaving six in-scope records saying memberOf was
withheld — including §12 R10, which is read aloud every session. Round 2 then
found that round 1's simplification had put memberOf on / as well; the per-page
opt-in is restored, because Pouya's ruling turns on /about/'s visible HTML.
Also fixed: MEMBERSHIP_ORGS had orphaned BOUTIQUE's D16 JSDoc; /'s title now
derives from the constants; §7's deploy row stated and retracted three facts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0148NztQskLKKApP5SzAA78e
560 lines
20 KiB
Markdown
560 lines
20 KiB
Markdown
# Deploy credential — verification output
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**What this is.** The tool output behind `AGENTS.md` §7's *Deploy credential —
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PROVISIONED* row and the two risk downgrades in `AGENTS.md` §10. It exists because the row
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was written on evidence that lived only in a terminal, which is the
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**Q24 / Q32 shape** R14 exists for: a claim whose supporting artefact is
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unreachable is unverifiable by construction, not merely unverified.
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`AGENTS.md` **Q52**, ruled 2026-08-28: *"YES — commit the simulate results, the
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inline policy, and the `NoSuchBucketPolicy` response, access key ID redacted."*
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## Provenance
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|---|---|
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| Subject | IAM user `adr-sml-deploy`, AWS account `327082975128` |
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| Retrieved | **2026-08-28**, re-run from the repository root |
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| Calling identity | `arn:aws:iam::327082975128:user/pouya` — the broadly-permissioned personal user, **at an interactive keyboard**. `AGENTS.md` §7 and §10: acceptable interactively, **never** as a CI credential |
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| Calls | 18 — all **read-only**. No `create`, `put`, `attach`, `delete`, or `update` |
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| Redaction | The access key ID is replaced with `AKIA…REDACTED` throughout. Nothing else is redacted; `UserId` (`AIDA…`) is retained because it is the durable principal identifier that appears in CloudTrail and grants nothing. The **secret** access key was never requested and cannot be retrieved from the API at all |
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| Method | `aws-cli/2.34.53`. Every command's exit status was read, and **no `2>/dev/null` anywhere** — see the `NoSuchBucketPolicy` section, where the error *is* the result |
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**Re-run it.** Every command below is copy-pasteable. Nothing here is
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transcribed from a session; this file was generated from the captured output.
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---
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## 1. The user
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```console
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$ aws iam get-user --user-name adr-sml-deploy
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{
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"User": {
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"Path": "/",
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"UserName": "adr-sml-deploy",
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"UserId": "AIDAUYJ5KD6MHAAC4BOKD",
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"Arn": "arn:aws:iam::327082975128:user/adr-sml-deploy",
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"CreateDate": "2026-08-26T15:45:18+00:00"
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}
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}
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```
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Created **2026-08-26T15:45:18+00:00**, path `/`, no tags.
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## 2. Nothing attached, no groups, one inline policy
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```console
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$ aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name adr-sml-deploy
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{
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"AttachedPolicies": []
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}
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$ aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name adr-sml-deploy
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{
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"Groups": []
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}
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$ aws iam list-user-policies --user-name adr-sml-deploy
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{
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"PolicyNames": [
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"adr-sml-deploy-minimal"
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]
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}
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```
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**This is the part policy-reading alone gets wrong.** An empty
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`AttachedPolicies` proves nothing on its own — permissions can arrive through a
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group, or through a resource-based policy that is invisible from the IAM side.
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Both are checked: `Groups` is empty here, and **§6 below** checks the resource
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side — §5 is the identity-side simulation and does not reach a bucket policy.
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## 3. The inline policy — `adr-sml-deploy-minimal`
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```console
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$ aws iam get-user-policy --user-name adr-sml-deploy \
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--policy-name adr-sml-deploy-minimal
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{
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"UserName": "adr-sml-deploy",
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"PolicyName": "adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"PolicyDocument": {
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"Version": "2012-10-17",
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"Statement": [
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{
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"Sid": "ListSiteBucket",
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"Effect": "Allow",
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"Action": "s3:ListBucket",
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"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site"
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},
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{
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"Sid": "WriteSiteObjects",
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"Effect": "Allow",
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"Action": [
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"s3:PutObject",
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"s3:DeleteObject"
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],
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"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/*"
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},
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{
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"Sid": "InvalidateOneDistribution",
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"Effect": "Allow",
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"Action": "cloudfront:CreateInvalidation",
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"Resource": "arn:aws:cloudfront::327082975128:distribution/E1OK7G98KNKUTA"
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}
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]
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}
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}
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```
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Four actions, one bucket, one distribution. **Never widen it** — `AGENTS.md` §10
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records why
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in terms: this is the control standing between a shared Gitea instance and an
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AWS account that also holds `mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128`. Treat any
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request to widen it as a security decision, not a convenience one.
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## 4. The access key — issued, never used
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```console
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$ aws iam list-access-keys --user-name adr-sml-deploy
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{
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"AccessKeyMetadata": [
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{
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"UserName": "adr-sml-deploy",
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"AccessKeyId": "AKIA…REDACTED",
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"Status": "Active",
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"CreateDate": "2026-08-26T15:45:19+00:00"
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}
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]
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}
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$ aws iam get-access-key-last-used --access-key-id AKIA…REDACTED
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{
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"UserName": "adr-sml-deploy",
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"AccessKeyLastUsed": {
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"ServiceName": "N/A",
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"Region": "N/A"
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}
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}
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```
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One key, `Active`, created **2026-08-26T15:45:19+00:00**.
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⚠️ **A correction to `AGENTS.md` §7's wording, found by re-running the call.**
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That row said
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*"one active access key, `LastUsed` null"*. The API does not return null — it
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returns `AccessKeyLastUsed` with **`ServiceName: "N/A"` and `Region: "N/A"`**,
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and there is no `LastUsedDate` key at all. Same conclusion (the key has never
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authenticated a request), different field shape, and a reader looking for a
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literal `null` would not find one.
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**Rotation is due 2026-11-26** — key created 2026-08-26, D3 commits to
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quarterly. `AGENTS.md` §12 R17 carries the date; `docs/06-deployment.md` §Key rotation
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carries the procedure. Create the second key, update the Gitea secrets, verify a
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deploy, **then** delete the first.
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## 5. `simulate-principal-policy` — nine checks, verified by execution
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The point of this section is that it tests the **negative** half. A policy that
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grants four actions is only a control if it can be shown not to grant the rest.
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```bash
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PRINCIPAL=arn:aws:iam::327082975128:user/adr-sml-deploy
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sim() { aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
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--policy-source-arn "$PRINCIPAL" --action-names "$1" --resource-arns "$2" ; }
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```
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| # | Action | Resource | `EvalDecision` |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 1 | `s3:PutObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/index.html` | **allowed** |
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| 2 | `s3:DeleteObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/old.html` | **allowed** |
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| 3 | `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site` | **allowed** |
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| 4 | `cloudfront:CreateInvalidation` | `arn:aws:cloudfront::327082975128:distribution/E1OK7G98KNKUTA` | **allowed** |
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| 5 | `s3:ListBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128` | **implicitDeny** |
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| 6 | `s3:GetObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128/anything` | **implicitDeny** |
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| 7 | `s3:DeleteBucket` | `arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site` | **implicitDeny** |
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| 8 | `s3:PutObject` | `arn:aws:s3:::meshkinilaw.ca/anything` | **implicitDeny** |
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| 9 | `iam:CreateUser` | `*` | **implicitDeny** |
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Four `allowed`, five `implicitDeny`. `implicitDeny` rather than `explicitDeny`
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is the correct and expected shape: the policy contains no `Deny` statement, so
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everything outside its three `Allow` statements falls through to IAM's
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default-deny. An `explicitDeny` here would mean a *different* policy was also in
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play.
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Raw output for each check, including the full `MatchedStatements` and
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`MissingContextValues`, follows in **§7 of this file**. *(Bare `§n` here means a
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section of this document; references to the working file are written
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`AGENTS.md` §n.)*
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## 6. The resource side — `NoSuchBucketPolicy`, and why the contrast call matters
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IAM simulation covers identity-based policy. It does **not** cover a
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resource-based grant on the backup bucket, which would be invisible from the
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principal's side. So:
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```console
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$ aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128
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# exit status: 254
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# stdout: 0 bytes
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# stderr:
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# aws: [ERROR]: An error occurred (NoSuchBucketPolicy) when calling the GetBucketPolicy operation: The bucket policy does not exist
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```
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**An error is the result here, and that is only legible because stderr was not
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suppressed.** `CLAUDE.md`'s convention, from Pouya's own 2026-08-28 correction:
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`2>/dev/null` converts *"it failed"* into *"it found nothing"*, and those are
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opposite results. The exit status is **254** and stdout is **empty** — read the
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status, not just stdout.
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**And an empty result needs a working instrument.** The same command against the
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site bucket, to prove the call itself resolves a policy when one exists:
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```console
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$ aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket adr-smlcompany-site
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{
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"Policy": "{\"Version\":\"2008-10-17\",\"Id\":\"PolicyForCloudFrontPrivateContent\",\"Statement\":[{\"Sid\":\"AllowCloudFrontServicePrincipal\",\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Principal\":{\"Service\":\"cloudfront.amazonaws.com\"},\"Action\":\"s3:GetObject\",\"Resource\":\"arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/*\",\"Condition\":{\"StringEquals\":{\"AWS:SourceArn\":\"arn:aws:cloudfront::327082975128:distribution/E1OK7G98KNKUTA\"}}}]}"
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}
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```
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Exit **0**, a real policy returned — the CloudFront OAC grant, scoped to
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distribution `E1OK7G98KNKUTA`. So `NoSuchBucketPolicy` on the backup bucket is a
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**genuine absence**, not a command that failed to run. That contrast is the
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whole reason this call is in the file: without it, an empty result from a broken
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command looks exactly like an empty result from a bucket with no policy.
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*(This contrast call was **not** part of the original Q22 verification. It was
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added on re-run, and it closes the gap that made the original evidence weaker
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than it read.)*
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## 7. Raw `simulate-principal-policy` responses
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### Check 1
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```json
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{
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"EvaluationResults": [
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{
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"EvalActionName": "s3:PutObject",
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/index.html",
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"EvalDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 6,
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"Column": 55
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 9,
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"Column": 57
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}
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}
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],
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"MissingContextValues": [],
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"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
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"ResourceSpecificResults": [
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{
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/index.html",
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"EvalResourceDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 6,
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"Column": 55
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 9,
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"Column": 57
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}
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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```
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### Check 2
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```json
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{
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"EvaluationResults": [
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{
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"EvalActionName": "s3:DeleteObject",
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/old.html",
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"EvalDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 6,
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"Column": 55
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 9,
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"Column": 57
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}
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}
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],
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"MissingContextValues": [],
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"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
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"ResourceSpecificResults": [
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{
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site/old.html",
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"EvalResourceDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 6,
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"Column": 55
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 9,
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"Column": 57
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}
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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```
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### Check 3
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```json
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{
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"EvaluationResults": [
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{
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"EvalActionName": "s3:ListBucket",
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site",
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"EvalDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 3,
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"Column": 17
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 6,
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"Column": 55
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}
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}
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],
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"MissingContextValues": [],
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"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
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"ResourceSpecificResults": [
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{
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site",
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"EvalResourceDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 3,
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"Column": 17
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 6,
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"Column": 55
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}
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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```
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### Check 4
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```json
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{
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"EvaluationResults": [
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{
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"EvalActionName": "cloudfront:CreateInvalidation",
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:cloudfront::327082975128:distribution/E1OK7G98KNKUTA",
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"EvalDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 9,
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"Column": 57
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 12,
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"Column": 83
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}
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}
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],
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"MissingContextValues": [],
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"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
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"ResourceSpecificResults": [
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{
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:cloudfront::327082975128:distribution/E1OK7G98KNKUTA",
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"EvalResourceDecision": "allowed",
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"MatchedStatements": [
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{
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"SourcePolicyId": "user_adr-sml-deploy_adr-sml-deploy-minimal",
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"SourcePolicyType": "IAM Policy",
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"StartPosition": {
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"Line": 9,
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"Column": 57
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},
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"EndPosition": {
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"Line": 12,
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"Column": 83
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}
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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```
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### Check 5
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```json
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{
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"EvaluationResults": [
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{
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"EvalActionName": "s3:ListBucket",
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128",
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"EvalDecision": "implicitDeny",
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"MatchedStatements": [],
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"MissingContextValues": [],
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"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
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"ResourceSpecificResults": [
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{
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128",
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"EvalResourceDecision": "implicitDeny"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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```
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### Check 6
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```json
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{
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"EvaluationResults": [
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{
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"EvalActionName": "s3:GetObject",
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"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128/anything",
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"EvalDecision": "implicitDeny",
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"MatchedStatements": [],
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"MissingContextValues": [],
|
|
"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
|
|
"ResourceSpecificResults": [
|
|
{
|
|
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::mlp-clientdb-prod-backups-327082975128/anything",
|
|
"EvalResourceDecision": "implicitDeny"
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Check 7
|
|
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"EvaluationResults": [
|
|
{
|
|
"EvalActionName": "s3:DeleteBucket",
|
|
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site",
|
|
"EvalDecision": "implicitDeny",
|
|
"MatchedStatements": [],
|
|
"MissingContextValues": [],
|
|
"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
|
|
"ResourceSpecificResults": [
|
|
{
|
|
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::adr-smlcompany-site",
|
|
"EvalResourceDecision": "implicitDeny"
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Check 8
|
|
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"EvaluationResults": [
|
|
{
|
|
"EvalActionName": "s3:PutObject",
|
|
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::meshkinilaw.ca/anything",
|
|
"EvalDecision": "implicitDeny",
|
|
"MatchedStatements": [],
|
|
"MissingContextValues": [],
|
|
"EvalDecisionDetails": {},
|
|
"ResourceSpecificResults": [
|
|
{
|
|
"EvalResourceName": "arn:aws:s3:::meshkinilaw.ca/anything",
|
|
"EvalResourceDecision": "implicitDeny"
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Check 9
|
|
|
|
```json
|
|
{
|
|
"EvaluationResults": [
|
|
{
|
|
"EvalActionName": "iam:CreateUser",
|
|
"EvalResourceName": "*",
|
|
"EvalDecision": "implicitDeny",
|
|
"MatchedStatements": [],
|
|
"MissingContextValues": []
|
|
}
|
|
]
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
## What this does and does not establish
|
|
|
|
**Establishes.** The user exists with the creation date `AGENTS.md` §7 records; it holds one
|
|
inline policy and nothing else; the policy grants four actions on one bucket and
|
|
one distribution; the four intended actions are `allowed`; five representative
|
|
out-of-scope actions — including two against the client-database backup bucket —
|
|
are denied; the backup bucket carries no resource-based policy that could grant
|
|
around IAM; and one key exists that has never authenticated a request.
|
|
|
|
**Does not establish.** That the key works (it has never been used, and testing
|
|
it would mean putting a real object in the bucket). That Gitea holds it —
|
|
`AGENTS.md` §7 records **`GITEA ACTIONS SECRETS: UNSET`**, and Q23 is open on whether a runner
|
|
exists at all. That the policy is sufficient for a deploy in practice: the
|
|
`s3:AbortMultipartUpload` omission is covered by asset sizes rather than by a
|
|
lifecycle rule, and `docs/06-deployment.md` records that with a revisit trigger.
|
|
|
|
**Not in scope of this file, and deliberately so.** The secret access key. It
|
|
must never reach the repository — D3, and `AGENTS.md` §10 on the jointly administered Gitea
|
|
instance, where an instance administrator can generally reach repository secrets
|
|
or register a runner that receives them.
|