Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
0d8b63380a
Answers four questions and starts build step 1. Q22 — the scoped deploy user does not exist: aws iam get-user returns NoSuchEntity. Recorded in §7 as NOT PROVISIONED and swept so that no file describes it as existing. §10 records that user/pouya, the broadly- permissioned personal user that has been authenticating to this account, must never be used in CI; scripts/deploy-local.sh refuses to run as it. Q23 — the Gitea instance reports 1.27.2, well above the vars-context floor, so the first-step guard is belt-and-braces rather than load-bearing. What remains is not a fact but a dependency: the instance is jointly administered, so enabling Actions and registering a runner both need a second admin. Hence npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh), which performs exactly what the workflow performs — same guard, same three passes, same headers, same invalidation. Documented as the current path, not as a workaround. §10 gains the risk that follows: the deploy secret will live on jointly administered infrastructure, where an instance admin can reach repo secrets. That does not change the plan, but it makes the scoped IAM policy the actual control between a shared Gitea instance and an AWS account holding another business's client-database backups. Never widen it. Q27 — response time is two business days, in site.ts with a derived short form so the confirmation email cannot drift from the page. Q28 — OBA sections confirmed, stamped "for now"; membership renews yearly, tracked as R10. Build step 1: dependencies installed and package-lock.json created, closing the npm ci blocker. ESLint flat config and Prettier config added; npm run lint, check and build all pass. Prettier deliberately excludes *.md and tokens.css — reasons recorded in .prettierignore. npm audit reports 7 high-severity advisories, all requiring an Astro major upgrade. Not applied; escalated in AGENTS.md entry (s) as a decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF
105 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
105 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# adr.smlcompany.ca
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The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
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A static site built with [Astro](https://astro.build), built for deployment to
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Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is
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not yet proven.
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## Quick start
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```bash
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nvm use # Node 22
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npm install
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npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
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```
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## Scripts
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| Command | Does |
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|---|---|
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| `npm run dev` | Development server with hot reload |
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| `npm run build` | Static build to `./dist` |
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| `npm run preview` | Serve the built site locally |
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| `npm run check` | `astro check` — type and template errors |
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| `npm run lint` | ESLint + Prettier check |
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| `npm run format` | Prettier — rewrite files in place |
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| `npm run lighthouse` | Lighthouse CI — **not yet wired**; nothing to measure until pages exist |
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| `npm run deploy` | Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
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## Before you contribute
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Read **`AGENTS.md`** first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
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record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
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**`CLAUDE.md`** for the working rules, and the specs in `docs/`.
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The single hardest rule: **no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
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experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
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`AGENTS.md` §4.** This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
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contained fabricated credentials.
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## How work is done here
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Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
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work. Run **`/build <task>`** for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
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runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
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changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
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`AGENTS.md`. `/review` runs the review pass alone; `/wrap` closes a session.
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Full protocol and prompt guidance: `docs/08-execution-protocol.md`.
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## Deployment
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**Today, deploys run locally: `npm run deploy`** (`scripts/deploy-local.sh`).
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It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
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and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
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changes only *how* a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` are one artefact in two places: change one, change
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both.
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` is the CI pipeline — **Gitea Actions**, not GitHub
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Actions. **It has never run**, for two reasons that are not oversights:
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- The scoped IAM user does not exist. `aws iam get-user --user-name
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adr-sml-deploy` returns `NoSuchEntity` (`AGENTS.md` Q22).
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- Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is
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jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
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Its **first** step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any
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required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no
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value is echoed.
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The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
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`docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example` in case the project ever moves
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to a forge that supports it. It sits outside `.github/workflows/` on purpose:
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Gitea falls back to that directory when `.gitea/workflows` is absent, so a
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workflow file left there with a `push` trigger would be only conditionally
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inert. As an `.example` under `docs/` it cannot be picked up at all.
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**The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and it does not
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exist yet.** Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role to assume:
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deploys are *to* authenticate as a scoped IAM user, `adr-sml-deploy`, with its
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access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. `aws iam get-user`
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confirms that user has not been created (Q22). In the meantime the local script
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**refuses to run as `user/pouya`**, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
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see `AGENTS.md` §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
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place yet:
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- **The policy must stay narrow.** Four actions: `s3:ListBucket` on one bucket,
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`s3:PutObject` and `s3:DeleteObject` on that bucket's contents, and
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`cloudfront:CreateInvalidation` on one distribution. No `Action: "*"`, no
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`Resource: "*"`, nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution.
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The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose
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name indicates another business's production database backups — that
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narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is
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load-bearing rather than hygiene. See `AGENTS.md` §10. If a deploy step needs
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a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy.
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- **The key must be rotated quarterly, and nobody owns that yet.** Create a
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second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy succeeds, then
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delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active is not
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rotation. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is
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unavailable, so this is a standing calendar task still waiting on an owner.
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Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
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`docs/06-deployment.md`.
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