Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
13b97841b9
Two pages, 14 in dist/ (was 12), zero JavaScript, one <h1> each, no skipped heading levels. Both were dangling links in SECONDARY_NAV since step 1; the footer is now whole on every page. /process/ — the five steps from intake to minutes of settlement or an award, with PROCESS_FRAMING rendered adjacent to the timings rather than in a section lede above them, which is the condition Q43 attached to publishing them at all. Conflicts says WHEN the check runs and WHAT it needs, and then stops: any sentence naming the outcome would be a seventh conduct undertaking, and §4's gate requires that Pouya has made it in terms. Logged as Q57. /for-parties/ — second person, grade 9, for a party arriving without counsel. NEUTRAL_ROLE_LINE gets its own section above the FAQ rather than a slot in it. Eight questions in one array feeding both the visible page and the FAQPage node, so a question cannot reach the structured data without appearing on the page. The word "lawyer" appears nowhere, deliberately, and the reason is in the file header. Three defects worth recording. The link colour on a dark band measured 1.88:1, and 1.10:1 on hover. `--link` is documented at 8.95:1 ON CREAM and was never overridden for an inverse ground; SiteFooter sets its own colour, which is the only reason this had not fired before — /process/ shipped the site's first body link on a dark band. That is worse than the gold-on-cream 2.10:1 this project treats as canonical. Fixed in global.css, where the next inverse-ground link will hit the same hole. The `:not(.btn)` guard is load-bearing, not tidiness: the new rule's specificity (0,2,1) beats `.btn-gold`'s (0,2,0), so without it the repair would have recoloured every gold button on a dark band. The fee shipped as "with preparation included", which docs/07 forbids in terms: the allowance is CAPPED, so the unqualified form sells an uncapped one, and /mediation/ already promises the site does the opposite. `prepIncluded` had been declared in site.ts with no consumer anywhere. /process/ §Confidentiality asserted that confidentiality is settled in the terms of appointment — a claim about Pouya's engagement documents that §4 does not row and no reader can check. Replaced with ADRIC's Code of Ethics quoted from the committed extract, plus the §4-verified membership rendered from MEMBERSHIP_ORGS. The replacement then said "on this it is one sentence", a completeness claim about a third party's Code that the extract cannot support — the same file records a separate instrument eighteen lines above. The cited source supplied its own counter-example. check:claims failed the build on compliant copy: five uses of "lawyer" about the READER, which §4 permits since it bars the word used OF Pouya. There is no allowlist, and the freeze bars narrowing the pattern, so the copy moved — the same call and the same direction as "my client" to "our client" on /med-arb/. Both replacements are better than what they replaced. Q58 opened rather than guessed: docs/07 reads "up to 3.5 h, INCLUDING 2 h preparation", which makes 3.5 the billed envelope and the room time 1.5 h, against which 3.5 and 7 being exactly 2x makes no sense. A draft had answered "What happens on the day?" with "about 3.5 hours" — the envelope presented as the day, to the reader least able to check it. The sentence was removed. Two review rounds, 16 findings, all applied. Verified: check 0 errors, lint 0, build 0 (14 pages), check:claims 0, npm audit 0, minifier tripwire clean. Lighthouse not run — tool unavailable until build step 7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
adr.smlcompany.ca
The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
A static site built with Astro, built for deployment to Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is not yet proven.
Quick start
nvm use # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
npm install
npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
Scripts
| Command | Does |
|---|---|
npm run dev |
Development server with hot reload |
npm run build |
Static build to ./dist |
npm run preview |
Serve the built site locally |
npm run check |
astro check — type and template errors |
npm run lint |
ESLint + Prettier check |
npm run format |
Prettier — rewrite files in place |
npm run deploy |
Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
Before you contribute
Read AGENTS.md first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
CLAUDE.md for the working rules, and the specs in docs/.
The single hardest rule: no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
AGENTS.md §4. This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
contained fabricated credentials.
How work is done here
Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
work. Run /build <task> for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
AGENTS.md. /review runs the review pass alone; /wrap closes a session.
Full protocol and prompt guidance: docs/08-execution-protocol.md.
Deployment
Today, deploys run locally: npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh).
It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
changes only how a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml are one artefact in two places: change one, change
both.
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml is the CI pipeline — Gitea Actions, not GitHub
Actions. It has never run, for two reasons that are not oversights:
- Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
(It previously listed a second reason — that the scoped IAM user did not exist.
It exists: adr-sml-deploy, created 2026-08-26, Q22 closed 2026-08-28. See
AGENTS.md §7 for the inventory and the least-privilege verification.)
Its first step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no value is echoed.
The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example in case the project ever moves
to a forge that supports it. It sits outside .github/workflows/ on purpose:
Gitea falls back to that directory when .gitea/workflows is absent, so a
workflow file left there with a push trigger would be only conditionally
inert. As an .example under docs/ it cannot be picked up at all.
The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and that
credential now exists. Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role
to assume: deploys authenticate as a scoped IAM user, adr-sml-deploy, with its
access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. The user was created
2026-08-26 and verified least-privilege by execution — AGENTS.md §7, Q22 closed
2026-08-28. Its access key has never been used (LastUsed null), because
deploys still run locally. (This paragraph asserted the user "has not been
created" until 2026-08-28.) In the meantime the local script
refuses to run as user/pouya, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
see AGENTS.md §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
place yet:
- The policy must stay narrow. Four actions:
s3:ListBucketon one bucket,s3:PutObjectands3:DeleteObjecton that bucket's contents, andcloudfront:CreateInvalidationon one distribution. NoAction: "*", noResource: "*", nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution. The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose name indicates another business's production database backups — that narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is load-bearing rather than hygiene. SeeAGENTS.md§10. If a deploy step needs a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy. - The key must be rotated quarterly. It now has an owner and a date: first
rotation due 2026-11-26 (key created 2026-08-26) —
AGENTS.md§12 R17. Create a second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy succeeds, then delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active is not rotation, and deleting before verifying leaves no way to authenticate the fix. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is unavailable, so this is a standing calendar task. (It read "nobody owns that yet" until 2026-08-28; R17 is the owner, and the date is the whole point of the row.)
Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
docs/06-deployment.md.