Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
364b09632e
Q32 — the traced mark was a WRONG SHAPE and had shipped. Pouya compared it against the master and rejected it. Two grounds reproduce from the path and are verified here: all four cubic branches meet the origin at exactly 90 degrees, so the loops are tangent rather than crossing and at stroke-width 28 render as two kissing circles (signed crossing number 0; the strokes fuse across 61% of the mark's height at 2rem); and the master's ink bbox is 2668x1704 = 1.5657:1. The path is deleted, not kept as a fallback. Pouya's 1.23:1 figure is reconciled rather than left dangling: it is the bounding box of the path's COORDINATES, not the curve. Control points sit at y +/-160 where the curve reaches +/-120, so the hull is 400x320 and with stroke 428x348 = 1.2299. A trap rather than a slip — x is monotone, so the control points give the right width and a 33% inflated height, and the "does the width look right" check passes. The real artwork is now in the repo: master, tight crop (the render source, so the file's aspect ratio IS the mark's), full lockup, and the SVG. InfinityMark renders AVIF/WebP; a Retina device takes 3,063 B. Favicons regenerated; favicon.svg deleted. Q33/Q36 — Pouya accepts arbitration appointments now. §4 gains an Offerings category: competence for an offering, permission for a credential, with an explicit boundary so it cannot become a route around D13. The masthead tagline is restored, and the footer designation strip now carries "Q.Arb — commenced August 2026" so §4's paired-disclosure condition is actually met on every page rather than only asserted. Two conventions added to CLAUDE.md, both earned this session: anything a spec makes a claim about must be reachable from the repo (R14 — the traced mark survived two review passes because the artwork was not here to compare against); and a command that did not run is not evidence of absence (`timeout` is not installed on macOS, so four Drive reads never executed and were reported as an empty directory). Reviews: claims-auditor FAIL/13 and adversarial-reviewer 2 blocking, all resolved. The severe one was self-inflicted — `flex: none` landed on the <img> while <Picture>'s <picture> wrapper is the flex item, so the logo compressed to 28.5x32 at 1024px with seven nav items. The page-level overflow check passed throughout because the brand block absorbed the deficit by crushing the mark. Harness now asserts rendered aspect ratio. Opened: Q38, Q39. Closed: Q32, Q33, Q36. Narrowed: Q35. Added: R13, R14. AGENTS.md entry (v) carries a RESUME HERE section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF
adr.smlcompany.ca
The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
A static site built with Astro, built for deployment to Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is not yet proven.
Quick start
nvm use # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
npm install
npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
Scripts
| Command | Does |
|---|---|
npm run dev |
Development server with hot reload |
npm run build |
Static build to ./dist |
npm run preview |
Serve the built site locally |
npm run check |
astro check — type and template errors |
npm run lint |
ESLint + Prettier check |
npm run format |
Prettier — rewrite files in place |
npm run deploy |
Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
Before you contribute
Read AGENTS.md first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
CLAUDE.md for the working rules, and the specs in docs/.
The single hardest rule: no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
AGENTS.md §4. This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
contained fabricated credentials.
How work is done here
Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
work. Run /build <task> for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
AGENTS.md. /review runs the review pass alone; /wrap closes a session.
Full protocol and prompt guidance: docs/08-execution-protocol.md.
Deployment
Today, deploys run locally: npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh).
It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
changes only how a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml are one artefact in two places: change one, change
both.
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml is the CI pipeline — Gitea Actions, not GitHub
Actions. It has never run, for two reasons that are not oversights:
- The scoped IAM user does not exist.
aws iam get-user --user-name adr-sml-deployreturnsNoSuchEntity(AGENTS.mdQ22). - Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
Its first step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no value is echoed.
The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example in case the project ever moves
to a forge that supports it. It sits outside .github/workflows/ on purpose:
Gitea falls back to that directory when .gitea/workflows is absent, so a
workflow file left there with a push trigger would be only conditionally
inert. As an .example under docs/ it cannot be picked up at all.
The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and it does not
exist yet. Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role to assume:
deploys are to authenticate as a scoped IAM user, adr-sml-deploy, with its
access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. aws iam get-user
confirms that user has not been created (Q22). In the meantime the local script
refuses to run as user/pouya, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
see AGENTS.md §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
place yet:
- The policy must stay narrow. Four actions:
s3:ListBucketon one bucket,s3:PutObjectands3:DeleteObjecton that bucket's contents, andcloudfront:CreateInvalidationon one distribution. NoAction: "*", noResource: "*", nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution. The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose name indicates another business's production database backups — that narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is load-bearing rather than hygiene. SeeAGENTS.md§10. If a deploy step needs a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy. - The key must be rotated quarterly, and nobody owns that yet. Create a second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy succeeds, then delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active is not rotation. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is unavailable, so this is a standing calendar task still waiting on an owner.
Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
docs/06-deployment.md.