Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
79b19a7bd0
Step 5 ships /practice/ and the six practice-area pages (construction,
technology, energy, insurance, shareholder, cross-border) from one route, and
adds the mechanical §4 gate Pouya ruled for.
check:claims — §4 Forbidden becomes a build error
scripts/check-claims.mjs greps dist/**/*.html for 10 patterns, each carrying
the incident that put it there. It strips <style> and non-JSON-LD <script>
first (a bare sweep for "leading" returned 26 hits, 25 of them
var(--leading-body)), self-tests every pattern against fixtures before
sweeping, and refuses a missing, empty or stale dist/. Wired into /build
Phase 5 and both deploy paths.
Q54 — six conduct undertakings publish, and §4 gains a third class
Conduct undertakings sit apart from credentials and offerings: the gate is
that Pouya said it in terms. The strings live in CONDUCT_UNDERTAKINGS so a
softening is one visible diff. (e) and (f) replace the third-person sentences
already on /arbitration/ rather than joining them.
Q49, Q50 recorded as rulings. §7 records the SES us-east-1 stray identity's
deletion. R11 holds typescript at its current major, with the peer-range
reason recorded.
Three facts corrected, two of them already shipped
- The LAT gloss said mediation "before filing and continuing after filing";
the Tribunal names mediation for "Before you apply" only and its second
sentence is about negotiation. An ellipsis in docs/01 had deleted it.
- "Connection allocation" is not an Ontario term.
- "The 2026 privacy statute" does not exist — Bill C-27 died without royal
assent. Struck from docs/03 rather than corrected in place.
ADR Chambers struck from /arbitration/ and from docs/01 item 3 (Pouya,
2026-08-30): the source establishes what the firm publishes, not that an
outside neutral can be appointed under its rules.
claims-auditor gains a second lens — for every quoted source, whether the
sentence beneath stays inside what the quotation establishes. Four shipped
defects had that shape and none of them is greppable.
CLAUDE.md gains a convention: never truncate the output of a check you intend
to believe. `npm run check | tail -3` returns warnings, hints and a blank line
and drops the errors line; it was reported as passing four times while
astro check was exiting 1 with 10 type errors.
Gates, exit status read directly, not through a pipe:
npm run check exit=0
npm run lint exit=0
npm run build exit=0
npm run check:claims exit=0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
adr.smlcompany.ca
The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
A static site built with Astro, built for deployment to Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is not yet proven.
Quick start
nvm use # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
npm install
npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
Scripts
| Command | Does |
|---|---|
npm run dev |
Development server with hot reload |
npm run build |
Static build to ./dist |
npm run preview |
Serve the built site locally |
npm run check |
astro check — type and template errors |
npm run lint |
ESLint + Prettier check |
npm run format |
Prettier — rewrite files in place |
npm run deploy |
Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
Before you contribute
Read AGENTS.md first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
CLAUDE.md for the working rules, and the specs in docs/.
The single hardest rule: no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
AGENTS.md §4. This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
contained fabricated credentials.
How work is done here
Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
work. Run /build <task> for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
AGENTS.md. /review runs the review pass alone; /wrap closes a session.
Full protocol and prompt guidance: docs/08-execution-protocol.md.
Deployment
Today, deploys run locally: npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh).
It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
changes only how a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml are one artefact in two places: change one, change
both.
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml is the CI pipeline — Gitea Actions, not GitHub
Actions. It has never run, for two reasons that are not oversights:
- Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
(It previously listed a second reason — that the scoped IAM user did not exist.
It exists: adr-sml-deploy, created 2026-08-26, Q22 closed 2026-08-28. See
AGENTS.md §7 for the inventory and the least-privilege verification.)
Its first step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no value is echoed.
The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example in case the project ever moves
to a forge that supports it. It sits outside .github/workflows/ on purpose:
Gitea falls back to that directory when .gitea/workflows is absent, so a
workflow file left there with a push trigger would be only conditionally
inert. As an .example under docs/ it cannot be picked up at all.
The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and that
credential now exists. Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role
to assume: deploys authenticate as a scoped IAM user, adr-sml-deploy, with its
access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. The user was created
2026-08-26 and verified least-privilege by execution — AGENTS.md §7, Q22 closed
2026-08-28. Its access key has never been used (LastUsed null), because
deploys still run locally. (This paragraph asserted the user "has not been
created" until 2026-08-28.) In the meantime the local script
refuses to run as user/pouya, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
see AGENTS.md §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
place yet:
- The policy must stay narrow. Four actions:
s3:ListBucketon one bucket,s3:PutObjectands3:DeleteObjecton that bucket's contents, andcloudfront:CreateInvalidationon one distribution. NoAction: "*", noResource: "*", nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution. The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose name indicates another business's production database backups — that narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is load-bearing rather than hygiene. SeeAGENTS.md§10. If a deploy step needs a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy. - The key must be rotated quarterly. It now has an owner and a date: first
rotation due 2026-11-26 (key created 2026-08-26) —
AGENTS.md§12 R17. Create a second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy succeeds, then delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active is not rotation, and deleting before verifying leaves no way to authenticate the fix. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is unavailable, so this is a standing calendar task. (It read "nobody owns that yet" until 2026-08-28; R17 is the owner, and the date is the whole point of the row.)
Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
docs/06-deployment.md.