Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
7514a49803
Amends D1 to pin the major explicitly (v7.x) rather than inherit it. The ^5.0.0 pin was recalled rather than checked and was two majors stale the day it was written, which meant shipping a framework carrying high-severity XSS advisories. CLAUDE.md now requires every version pin to be verified against the registry, and R11 requires re-checking at each build-order boundary. npm audit now reports 0 vulnerabilities, down from 16. Every Astro advisory is cleared; the residual 10 all traced to @lhci/cli, which is removed — it was the sole source of 7 high-severity findings, 0.15.1 is latest so there was no clean upgrade, and it cannot run without pages or a lighthouserc. Re-added at build step 7 with a freshly verified pin. Content collections migrated to the Content Layer API: src/content.config.ts, loader: glob(), z from astro/zod. Two review passes found seven defects in the fix itself, all now closed: - z.coerce.date() read an unquoted 20260801 as epoch milliseconds and yielded 1970-01-01 silently; the first replacement then accepted 2026-13-45 as an Invalid Date and rolled 2026-02-30 over to 2026-03-02. Dates are now anchored, date-only, parsed as UTC and round-tripped. - The title bound applied the SEO spec's 50-60 to the headline rather than the rendered <title>, which guaranteed 68-78 on every article and rejected all five planned launch headlines. Articles are now the documented exception: the headline is the <title>, no suffix. - An article could ship an image with no alt text, or whitespace-only alt. - Two schema comments asserted controls nothing enforced; both are now real refinements, each tested with a failing and a passing case. - PRACTICE_SLUGS and PRACTICE_AREAS could drift silently; a compile-time check now catches both directions. - eslint.config.js imported globals and @eslint/js undeclared, resolving by hoisting accident. - scripts/deploy-local.sh claimed parity with CI while skipping npm run check and two credential guards — on the only path this site can ship today. Accessibility linting is on (36 jsx-a11y rules) before step 1 writes the layout. An earlier claim in §7 that none was possible was wrong twice, and is corrected in AGENTS.md entry (t) along with the reasoning. Opens Q30 and Q31 for two unregistered claims in src/data/site.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012XquaEq4BgWMCwUqLEyNkF
104 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
104 lines
4.9 KiB
Markdown
# adr.smlcompany.ca
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The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
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A static site built with [Astro](https://astro.build), built for deployment to
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Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is
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not yet proven.
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## Quick start
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```bash
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nvm use # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
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npm install
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npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
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```
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## Scripts
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| Command | Does |
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|---|---|
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| `npm run dev` | Development server with hot reload |
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| `npm run build` | Static build to `./dist` |
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| `npm run preview` | Serve the built site locally |
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| `npm run check` | `astro check` — type and template errors |
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| `npm run lint` | ESLint + Prettier check |
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| `npm run format` | Prettier — rewrite files in place |
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| `npm run deploy` | Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
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## Before you contribute
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Read **`AGENTS.md`** first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
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record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
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**`CLAUDE.md`** for the working rules, and the specs in `docs/`.
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The single hardest rule: **no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
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experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
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`AGENTS.md` §4.** This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
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contained fabricated credentials.
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## How work is done here
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Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
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work. Run **`/build <task>`** for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
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runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
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changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
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`AGENTS.md`. `/review` runs the review pass alone; `/wrap` closes a session.
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Full protocol and prompt guidance: `docs/08-execution-protocol.md`.
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## Deployment
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**Today, deploys run locally: `npm run deploy`** (`scripts/deploy-local.sh`).
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It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
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and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
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changes only *how* a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` are one artefact in two places: change one, change
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both.
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` is the CI pipeline — **Gitea Actions**, not GitHub
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Actions. **It has never run**, for two reasons that are not oversights:
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- The scoped IAM user does not exist. `aws iam get-user --user-name
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adr-sml-deploy` returns `NoSuchEntity` (`AGENTS.md` Q22).
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- Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is
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jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
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Its **first** step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any
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required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no
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value is echoed.
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The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
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`docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example` in case the project ever moves
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to a forge that supports it. It sits outside `.github/workflows/` on purpose:
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Gitea falls back to that directory when `.gitea/workflows` is absent, so a
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workflow file left there with a `push` trigger would be only conditionally
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inert. As an `.example` under `docs/` it cannot be picked up at all.
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**The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and it does not
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exist yet.** Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role to assume:
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deploys are *to* authenticate as a scoped IAM user, `adr-sml-deploy`, with its
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access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. `aws iam get-user`
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confirms that user has not been created (Q22). In the meantime the local script
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**refuses to run as `user/pouya`**, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
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see `AGENTS.md` §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
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place yet:
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- **The policy must stay narrow.** Four actions: `s3:ListBucket` on one bucket,
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`s3:PutObject` and `s3:DeleteObject` on that bucket's contents, and
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`cloudfront:CreateInvalidation` on one distribution. No `Action: "*"`, no
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`Resource: "*"`, nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution.
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The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose
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name indicates another business's production database backups — that
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narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is
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load-bearing rather than hygiene. See `AGENTS.md` §10. If a deploy step needs
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a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy.
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- **The key must be rotated quarterly, and nobody owns that yet.** Create a
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second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy succeeds, then
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delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active is not
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rotation. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is
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unavailable, so this is a standing calendar task still waiting on an owner.
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Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
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`docs/06-deployment.md`.
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