Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
c576b9a85f
Applies Pouya's rulings on Q42, Q41(a)(b)(c), Q43 and Q40, then builds `/about/` — six of docs/01's seven items. `/about/` ships WITHOUT a memberships group. R10 is a prohibition on shipping a page that lists memberships before they are re-confirmed; the re-confirmation is a fact only Pouya holds and was not obtained. The first version published all four and disclosed the gap in five places instead; both review agents rejected that. Q44 carries the question. Rulings: - Q42 — ENE, dispute-system design and pre-dispute technical advisory rowed; settlement counsel struck as a partisan role. The strike exposed a hole in the offering test, which now states the prior question it was missing. - Q41(a) — Q37 reaches prose, and prose is held to a higher bar. The sentence is now one constant, ASYMMETRY_LINE, because two hand-typed copies had already diverged inside one session. - Q41(b) — not restored; the implication turned out to be in three places, two of which survived the sweep that closed it. - Q41(c) — verified against the LAT's own Rules and extracted into docs/reference/lat-case-conference.md. Rule 2.4 makes "Pre-Hearing Conference" the Tribunal's own term for a case conference; the Rules contain zero occurrences of `mediat` in 66,593 characters. - Q43 — the timings are service commitments; PROCESS_FRAMING renders adjacent to them, not in a lede above. - Q40 — bundled to step 7 as R15, blocking cutover. Four review passes, 43 findings, nine of them defects in their own predecessors' fixes. The worst was mine: the false universal Q39 struck reached a public page. Also fixed a portrait ladder that upscaled 1.93x at 1024/DPR2 on BOTH pages — the shipped home page included — because its 960 ceiling was derived from the layout range where the image is narrowest. Verified: check/lint/build/audit clean; 0 upscaling across 11 device profiles; 0 overflow and 0 over-wide elements at 13 widths; 0 contrast failures across 127 and 88 painted pairs; 0 print failures against white paper; reveal 0 hidden under reduced-motion and print; zero JavaScript. Lighthouse NOT RUN — tool unavailable until step 7 (R11). HTML validator NOT RUN. Opens Q44 (memberships), Q45 (PDF bio), Q46 (offering-test gating; the glossary standard), Q47 (jobTitle without worksFor). Adds R15. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0148NztQskLKKApP5SzAA78e
adr.smlcompany.ca
The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
A static site built with Astro, built for deployment to Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is not yet proven.
Quick start
nvm use # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
npm install
npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
Scripts
| Command | Does |
|---|---|
npm run dev |
Development server with hot reload |
npm run build |
Static build to ./dist |
npm run preview |
Serve the built site locally |
npm run check |
astro check — type and template errors |
npm run lint |
ESLint + Prettier check |
npm run format |
Prettier — rewrite files in place |
npm run deploy |
Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
Before you contribute
Read AGENTS.md first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
CLAUDE.md for the working rules, and the specs in docs/.
The single hardest rule: no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
AGENTS.md §4. This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
contained fabricated credentials.
How work is done here
Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
work. Run /build <task> for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
AGENTS.md. /review runs the review pass alone; /wrap closes a session.
Full protocol and prompt guidance: docs/08-execution-protocol.md.
Deployment
Today, deploys run locally: npm run deploy (scripts/deploy-local.sh).
It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
changes only how a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml are one artefact in two places: change one, change
both.
.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml is the CI pipeline — Gitea Actions, not GitHub
Actions. It has never run, for two reasons that are not oversights:
- The scoped IAM user does not exist.
aws iam get-user --user-name adr-sml-deployreturnsNoSuchEntity(AGENTS.mdQ22). - Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
Its first step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no value is echoed.
The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example in case the project ever moves
to a forge that supports it. It sits outside .github/workflows/ on purpose:
Gitea falls back to that directory when .gitea/workflows is absent, so a
workflow file left there with a push trigger would be only conditionally
inert. As an .example under docs/ it cannot be picked up at all.
The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and it does not
exist yet. Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role to assume:
deploys are to authenticate as a scoped IAM user, adr-sml-deploy, with its
access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. aws iam get-user
confirms that user has not been created (Q22). In the meantime the local script
refuses to run as user/pouya, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
see AGENTS.md §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
place yet:
- The policy must stay narrow. Four actions:
s3:ListBucketon one bucket,s3:PutObjectands3:DeleteObjecton that bucket's contents, andcloudfront:CreateInvalidationon one distribution. NoAction: "*", noResource: "*", nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution. The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose name indicates another business's production database backups — that narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is load-bearing rather than hygiene. SeeAGENTS.md§10. If a deploy step needs a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy. - The key must be rotated quarterly, and nobody owns that yet. Create a second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy succeeds, then delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active is not rotation. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is unavailable, so this is a standing calendar task still waiting on an owner.
Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
docs/06-deployment.md.