Pouya LajevardiandClaude Opus 5
210bc25a26
Steps 7a through 10 as one authorised run. Nothing deployed (D11).
7a Lighthouse returns as `lighthouse@13.4.1` + `chrome-launcher`, NOT
`@lhci/cli`. AGENTS.md §7's advisory attribution was wrong: the carriers
were @lhci/cli's own `tmp` and @puppeteer/browsers' `extract-zip`, not
Lighthouse, which audits clean. A deliberate deviation from R11's literal
trigger, recorded with what it costs. Local gate; CI has no Chrome.
7b OG card generator (satori + sharp) discharges R15 — 20 typed cards plus
per-article cards; the portrait stays on / and /about/ by Q40. Insights
plumbing: ArticleCard, Prose, the index, the article route, articleGraph,
and /'s section 7. Card copy is constrained structurally because text in a
JPEG cannot be grepped by check:claims: every headline IS its page's <h1>,
enforced by `npm run og:proof`.
7c Five drafted launch articles, draft: true / reviewedByPouya: false. An
independent compliance audit returned 76 findings and 57 unsourced
assertions; all blocking and should-fix applied.
8 /contact/, the intake form, and backend/intake/ (undeployed). Plain HTML
POST to a same-origin /api/intake with a 303 redirect, so the form works
with zero JavaScript. docs/05 records three deliberate deviations.
9 /fees/ on Q59's ruling — overtime runs from the session cap, and the
reservation point ships adjacent to the rate. One-page PDF bio discharges
R16; /bio/ is its source, so the circulated artefact stays inside the
review apparatus.
10 /legal/privacy/ and /legal/terms/, written to the backend as built. Three
of the policy's statements are derived and cannot drift.
Also: /about/'s inverse credentials band (approved at step 6); Q59 closed;
R15 and R16 discharged; and a fix to shipped copy — /practice/energy/ asserted
the absence of a regulation the source extract says must not be asserted.
Review: adversarial-reviewer, two rounds (D20/D19). Round 1 returned 16
findings including two blocking — an invisible ghost button on /fees/ at
1.00:1 that Lighthouse scored 100, and a privacy policy that named one data
processor when there are two. All 16 acted on.
Lighthouse, 22 pages, mobile: performance 99-100, accessibility 100,
best practices 100, SEO 100 on every indexable page, CLS 0.000.
AGENTS.md entry (ah) has the detail, including four of my own verification
commands that were wrong and what each of them nearly caused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Md3GndFqWPzK78xAoebsg5
136 lines
7.1 KiB
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136 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
# adr.smlcompany.ca
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The dispute resolution practice of Pouya Lajevardi — Toronto.
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A static site built with [Astro](https://astro.build), built for deployment to
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Amazon S3 behind CloudFront by Gitea Actions — see Deployment; the pipeline is
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not yet proven.
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## Quick start
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```bash
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nvm use # Node 22 LTS — the floor is in package.json engines
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npm install
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npm run dev # http://localhost:4321
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```
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## Scripts
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| Command | Does |
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|---|---|
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| `npm run dev` | Development server with hot reload |
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| `npm run build` | Static build to `./dist` — 22 pages |
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| `npm run preview` | Serve the built site locally |
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| `npm run check` | `astro check` — type and template errors |
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| `npm run check:claims` | `AGENTS.md` §4 Forbidden, enforced on `dist/`. **Runs on every deploy** |
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| `npm run check:intake` | The intake form's field table against the Lambda's — two on purpose |
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| `npm run og:proof` | Every `og:image` resolves; every card headline **is** its page's `<h1>` |
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| `npm run lint` | ESLint + Prettier check |
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| `npm run format` | Prettier — rewrite files in place |
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| `npm run lighthouse` | The performance budget, all four categories. **Local only** |
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| `npm run bio:pdf` | Re-renders the committed one-page PDF from `/bio/`. **Local only** |
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| `npm run deploy` | Build and deploy from this machine — see Deployment |
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**Two of those cannot run in CI, and that is stated rather than left to be
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discovered.** `lighthouse` and `bio:pdf` drive an installed browser; the Gitea
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runner has none. They are keyboard gates plus blocking items on `docs/06`'s
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cutover checklist, and they are deliberately **not** wired into `npm run build`
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or either deploy path — a check described as running where it cannot is the
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defect `AGENTS.md` Q22 turned out to be.
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**`og:proof` and `check:intake` exist because two facts here are deliberately
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duplicated**, and a duplicated fact needs a mechanism rather than a comment.
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Text baked into an OG card cannot be grepped by `check:claims`, so `og:proof`
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comparing each card's headline to its page's `<h1>` is the only thing keeping
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card copy inside the claim register. And the Lambda validates against its own
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field table, because a server that validates against a list the client shipped
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it is not validating.
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*(`npm run check:claims` was missing from this table before 2026-08-31, along
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with the four added that day. A table of the project's controls that omits a
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control is the shape those controls exist to catch.)*
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## Before you contribute
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Read **`AGENTS.md`** first, and maintain it as you work — it is the living
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record of what this project is, what was decided, and why. Then read
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**`CLAUDE.md`** for the working rules, and the specs in `docs/`.
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The single hardest rule: **no factual claim about Pouya, his credentials, his
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experience, or his practice ships unless it appears in the verified register in
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`AGENTS.md` §4.** This is a public marketing surface, and the site it replaces
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contained fabricated credentials.
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## How work is done here
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Pouya decides; Claude Code implements and then adversarially reviews its own
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work. Run **`/build <task>`** for any substantive change — it plans, implements,
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runs two independent review agents on the diff (the claims audit wherever copy
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changed), resolves the findings, verifies the build, and records the session in
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`AGENTS.md`. `/review` runs the review pass alone; `/wrap` closes a session.
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Full protocol and prompt guidance: `docs/08-execution-protocol.md`.
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## Deployment
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**Today, deploys run locally: `npm run deploy`** (`scripts/deploy-local.sh`).
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It runs the same guard, the same three sync passes with the same cache headers,
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and the same invalidation as the CI workflow — at this scale the pipeline
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changes only *how* a deploy is triggered, not what it does. The script and
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` are one artefact in two places: change one, change
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both.
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`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml` is the CI pipeline — **Gitea Actions**, not GitHub
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Actions. **It has never run**, for two reasons that are not oversights:
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- Actions are not enabled and no runner is registered. The Gitea instance is
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jointly administered, so both need its second administrator (Q23).
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*(It previously listed a second reason — that the scoped IAM user did not exist.
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**It exists**: `adr-sml-deploy`, created 2026-08-26, Q22 closed 2026-08-28. See
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`AGENTS.md` §7 for the inventory and the least-privilege verification.)*
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Its **first** step is a guard: the run aborts, naming what is missing, if any
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required variable or either AWS secret is empty. Only emptiness is tested and no
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value is echoed.
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The GitHub Actions equivalent, which uses OIDC role assumption, is kept as
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`docs/reference/github-actions-oidc.yml.example` in case the project ever moves
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to a forge that supports it. It sits outside `.github/workflows/` on purpose:
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Gitea falls back to that directory when `.gitea/workflows` is absent, so a
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workflow file left there with a `push` trigger would be only conditionally
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inert. As an `.example` under `docs/` it cannot be picked up at all.
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**The pipeline is designed around a long-lived AWS credential, and that
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credential now exists.** Gitea is not an AWS OIDC provider, so there is no role
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to assume: deploys authenticate as a scoped IAM user, `adr-sml-deploy`, with its
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access key in the repository's Gitea Actions secrets. **The user was created
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2026-08-26 and verified least-privilege by execution — `AGENTS.md` §7, Q22 closed
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2026-08-28.** Its access key has **never been used** (`LastUsed` null), because
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deploys still run locally. *(This paragraph asserted the user "has not been
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created" until 2026-08-28.)* In the meantime the local script
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**refuses to run as `user/pouya`**, the broadly-permissioned personal user —
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see `AGENTS.md` §10. Two things are meant to bound the risk, and neither is in
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place yet:
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- **The policy must stay narrow.** Four actions: `s3:ListBucket` on one bucket,
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`s3:PutObject` and `s3:DeleteObject` on that bucket's contents, and
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`cloudfront:CreateInvalidation` on one distribution. No `Action: "*"`, no
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`Resource: "*"`, nothing outside that one bucket and that one distribution.
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The AWS account is shared with unrelated projects, including a bucket whose
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name indicates another business's production database backups — that
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narrowness is what keeps a compromised runner away from it, and it is
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load-bearing rather than hygiene. See `AGENTS.md` §10. If a deploy step needs
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a permission the policy lacks, question the step; do not widen the policy.
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- **The key must be rotated quarterly. It now has an owner and a date: first
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rotation due 2026-11-26** (key created 2026-08-26) — `AGENTS.md` §12 **R17**.
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Create a second access key, update the Gitea secrets, confirm a deploy
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succeeds, **then** delete the old one — rotation that leaves the old key active
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is not rotation, and deleting before verifying leaves no way to authenticate
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the fix. OIDC would have removed the obligation entirely; it is unavailable, so
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this is a standing calendar task. *(It read "nobody owns that yet" until
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2026-08-28; R17 is the owner, and the date is the whole point of the row.)*
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Full procedure, IAM policy, runner setup, and cutover checklist:
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`docs/06-deployment.md`.
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