make caddy a L4 proxy to terminate TLS for HiveMQ
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@@ -21,13 +21,16 @@
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# GEBOS_POSTGRES_PASSWORD sourced from /run/secrets/gebos-env (sops-nix).
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};
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# Caddy fronts TLS for `ingest.gebos.online` and forwards to HiveMQ.
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# Caddy (layer4) terminates TLS on :8883 and forwards cleartext MQTT to
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# HiveMQ's loopback listener on :1883. tcpProxy is the upstream backend.
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services.gebos.caddy = {
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enable = true;
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sites = {
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"ingest.gebos.online" = { tcpProxy = "127.0.0.1:8883"; };
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"ingest.gebos.online" = { tcpProxy = "127.0.0.1:1883"; };
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};
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};
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networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 8883 ];
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# 8883: MQTTS for senders. 80/443: ACME challenge so Caddy can obtain/renew
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# the ingest.gebos.online cert that the layer4 TLS handler serves.
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networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 80 443 8883 ];
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}
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+55
-10
@@ -3,7 +3,24 @@
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let
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cfg = config.services.gebos.caddy;
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siteBlock = host: site:
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tcpProxySites = lib.filterAttrs (_: s: s ? tcpProxy) cfg.sites;
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httpSites = lib.filterAttrs (_: s: !(s ? tcpProxy)) cfg.sites;
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needsLayer4 = tcpProxySites != { };
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# External MQTTS port the senders connect to (mqtt_port = 8883, SSL).
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tlsListenPort = 8883;
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# Caddy built with the layer4 module (caddy-l4) — needed to TLS-terminate raw
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# MQTT and proxy it to HiveMQ, which Caddy's HTTP-only core can't do. Only
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# built when a host actually has a tcpProxy site; app-host's static/upstream
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# sites run on stock Caddy so they don't pay for the custom build.
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caddyWithL4 = pkgs.caddy.withPlugins {
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plugins = [ "github.com/mholt/caddy-l4@v0.1.1" ];
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hash = "sha256-O6GuC2q1mA/Fa0utb2Yg7ZE73iq13oVYhJI1IVyOvog=";
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};
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# HTTP-style sites: static file server or reverse proxy.
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httpSiteBlock = host: site:
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if site ? staticRoot then ''
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${host} {
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root * ${site.staticRoot}
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@@ -18,14 +35,38 @@ let
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encode zstd gzip
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}
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''
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else if site ? tcpProxy then ''
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${host}:8883 {
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# TLS termination for MQTT — Caddy's `layer4` app would be ideal here;
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# for now, document that the upstream HiveMQ port is ${site.tcpProxy}.
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# TODO: switch to the caddy-l4 module or terminate TLS in HiveMQ directly.
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}
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''
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else throw "site `${host}` needs one of: staticRoot, upstream, tcpProxy";
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# A tcpProxy site needs TWO Caddyfile pieces:
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# 1. a layer4 listener (in the global options block) that terminates TLS on
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# :8883 and proxies cleartext to the upstream (HiveMQ on 127.0.0.1:1883);
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# 2. a normal HTTPS site block for the host, purely so Caddy's automatic
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# HTTPS OBTAINS the ACME cert that the layer4 `tls` handler then serves by
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# SNI — caddy-l4's `tls` handler only terminates, it never provisions
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# certs. This is why ports 80/443 must stay open for the ACME challenge.
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layer4Listener = _host: site: ''
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:${toString tlsListenPort} {
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route {
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tls
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proxy ${site.tcpProxy}
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}
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}
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'';
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certSiteBlock = host: _site: ''
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${host} {
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respond "gebos MQTT ingest — connect MQTTS on :${toString tlsListenPort}" 200
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}
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'';
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# Caddyfile global options block must come first and exist once; we fold every
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# layer4 listener into a single `layer4 { ... }` inside it.
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globalOptions = lib.optionalString needsLayer4 ''
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{
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layer4 {
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${lib.concatStrings (lib.mapAttrsToList layer4Listener tcpProxySites)} }
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}
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'';
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in
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{
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options.services.gebos.caddy = {
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@@ -39,9 +80,13 @@ in
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config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
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services.caddy = {
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enable = true;
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package = if needsLayer4 then caddyWithL4 else pkgs.caddy;
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email = "ops@gebos.online"; # TODO: confirm ACME contact
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extraConfig = lib.concatStringsSep "\n"
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(lib.mapAttrsToList siteBlock cfg.sites);
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extraConfig = lib.concatStringsSep "\n" (
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[ globalOptions ]
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++ lib.mapAttrsToList httpSiteBlock httpSites
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++ lib.mapAttrsToList certSiteBlock tcpProxySites
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);
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};
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};
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}
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@@ -17,12 +17,30 @@ let
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];
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ingesterKeys = [ "ingester_postgres_password" ];
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postgresAdminKeys = [ "postgres_admin_password" ];
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hivemqKeys = [ "hivemq_ingester_password" "hivemq_admin_password" ];
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hivemqKeys = [ "hivemq_ingester_password" "hivemq_admin_password" "hivemq_device_password" ];
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# HiveMQ file-RBAC credentials.xml. Only the passwords are secret; the role/
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# topic policy is structural. `ingester` may subscribe to the whole telemetry
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# tree (t/<tenant>/d/<device>/<metric>); `admin` is an operational superuser.
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hivemqCredentialsXml = ingesterPassword: adminPassword: ''
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# topic policy is structural. Devices publish under `acrios/<IMSI>/<metric>`
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# (set by the sender firmware's mqtt_topic_base), so that is the namespace the
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# ingester consumes and the device role is scoped to.
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#
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# Roles:
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# ingest — the Go ingester; SUBSCRIBE the whole device tree.
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# device — physical senders; full access under acrios/ (publish telemetry
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# + the LWT/status and any downlink topics the firmware uses).
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# superuser — operational break-glass.
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#
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# Option A (current): one shared `device` user (`bender`) for the whole fleet.
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# Tenant isolation is enforced downstream by the ingester's IMSI→tenant
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# registry lookup, NOT at the broker — any device could publish under any IMSI.
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#
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# TODO(Option B / per-device auth): give each sender its own RBAC user with
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# username == IMSI and scope its role to `acrios/${{username}}/#`, so the
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# broker enforces that a device can only publish under its own IMSI (real
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# anti-spoofing + per-device revocation). Requires setting mqtt_user = <IMSI>
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# on each device and a per-device password provisioning flow (generate → sops
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# → push to device). file-RBAC hot-reloads, so added users need no restart.
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hivemqCredentialsXml = ingesterPassword: adminPassword: devicePassword: ''
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
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<file-rbac>
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<users>
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@@ -36,17 +54,30 @@ let
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<password>${adminPassword}</password>
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<roles><id>superuser</id></roles>
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</user>
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<user>
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<name>bender</name>
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<password>${devicePassword}</password>
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<roles><id>device</id></roles>
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</user>
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</users>
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<roles>
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<role>
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<id>ingest</id>
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<permissions>
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<permission>
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<topic>t/#</topic>
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<topic>acrios/#</topic>
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<activity>SUBSCRIBE</activity>
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</permission>
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</permissions>
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</role>
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<role>
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<id>device</id>
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<permissions>
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<!-- No <activity> = PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE; covers telemetry,
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the LWT/status topic, and any downlink under acrios/. -->
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<permission><topic>acrios/#</topic></permission>
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</permissions>
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</role>
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<role>
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<id>superuser</id>
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<permissions>
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@@ -112,7 +143,7 @@ in
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if hasSecrets && cfg.hivemq
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then config.sops.templates."hivemq-credentials".path
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else "${pkgs.writeText "hivemq-credentials-dev.xml"
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(hivemqCredentialsXml "dev-ingester" "dev-admin")}";
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(hivemqCredentialsXml "dev-ingester" "dev-admin" "dev-device")}";
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};
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envFile = lib.mkOption {
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@@ -157,7 +188,8 @@ in
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templates."hivemq-credentials" = lib.mkIf cfg.hivemq {
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content = hivemqCredentialsXml
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config.sops.placeholder.hivemq_ingester_password
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config.sops.placeholder.hivemq_admin_password;
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config.sops.placeholder.hivemq_admin_password
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config.sops.placeholder.hivemq_device_password;
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mode = "0400";
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owner = "gebos-hivemq";
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};
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